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INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the Treasury Department published its first "tax expenditure"
budget) Only six years later, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 made
the concept of tax expenditures an integral pan of a new congressional
budget process. Pursuant to that Act, the 1975 Budget contained a "Special
Analysis" entitled "Tax Expenditures," 2
 and all subsequent Budgets have in-
cluded a similar tabulation. In 1976, both the House and the Senate Budget
Committees established a targeted amount of reduction in tax expenditures as
a goal of tax reform legislation and this step was a material factor in the
ANNUAL REPORT or "rHE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE
FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1968, 320-40 (1969) [hereinafter cited as .1968 ANNUAL
'TREASURY REPORT].
2 BUDGE[' OF • EHE UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT, 1976, Special Analysis F at.
101 (1975). See also Special Analysis F in subsequent annual Budget Documents. For
the Fiscal Year 1979 Budget this material is in Special Analysis Cr [the Special Analyses
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passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. 3 In 1977, the President, in assem-
bling material for his consideration of changes in the tax system, asked the
Treasury for a detailed report on the desirability of each item listed in the
tabulation of tax expenditures. In 1977 and 1978, the Congress, in its con-
tinuing search for ways to make the ever-growing federal budget manageable,
again recognized, as it had in 1974, that it must grapple with the role played
by tax expenditures. The principal occasions for congressional analysis of tax
expenditures were the consideration of "sunset" review for federal programs 4
and the question of the jurisdiction of the Senate Appropriations Committee
over "refundable" tax expenditure creclits. 5
These events, along with developments at the state and international
levels," evidence a rapid and expanding recognition of the role that the tax
expenditure concept plays both in tax policy issues and in budget policy is-
sues. Indeed, once the presence of tax expenditures in a tax system is focused
upon, there is a general awareness that unless attention is paid to those tax
expenditures, a country has neither its tax policy nor its budget policy under
full control. This awareness in turn opens up new facets of the concept of tax
expenditures, and leads to new insights in the ways the concept affects the
substance of fiscal policy and the political processes by which such policy is
formulated. The purpose of this article is to describe current developments
and emerging issues concerning the tax expenditure concept.'
1. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
A. Definition of Tax Expenditure
1. Background
Essentially, the tax expenditure concept, as applied to an income tax, re-
gards such a tax as composed of two distinct elements. The first element con-
are hereinafter cited as 1976, 1977, or 1978 Special Analysis F. respectively, and 1979
Special Analysis GI.
3 See Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act if 1976, 25 CLEV. Sr. L. REV,
303 (1976), reprinted in 6 TAX NOTES No. 12 at 291 (March 12, 1978).
See Part V.1) infra,
See Part V.B, I it
'' In 1976, California by statute directed that a report on tax expenditures be
included in the Governor's Budget. 197(1 Cal. Slats. ch. 575. In 1971, the state by
statute had directed the Department of Finance to prepare a biennial tax expenditure
report. 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1762.
In 1976 and 1977, the two major international tax organizations chose the
concept of tax expenditures as a principal subject for their annual meetings—the In-
ternational Fiscal Association at its 1976 Jerusalem Congress, INTERNATIONAL. FISCAL
ASSOCIATION, GENERAL. REPORT, TAX INCENTIVES AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR ACHIEVEMENT
OF GOVERNMENT GOALS, LXIa CAHIERS OE. DROIT FISCAL (Jerusalem Congress, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1FA 1976 Congress), and the International Institute of Public
Finance at its 1977 Varna Congress, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE,
SUBSIDIES, 'FAX RELIEFS AND PRICES (Varna Congress, 1977) (to be published) [here-
inafter cited as !HT 1977 Congress].
This article covers primarily developments in the period 1976 to 1978 and
is a companion piece to a previous article which had the same purpose for the period
from 1974 to early 1976. See Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the
Budget Reform Act of 1974,  17 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REV. 679 (1976).
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tains the structural provisions necessary for implementation of a normal in-
come tax. These structural provisions include the definition of net income;
the specification of accounting periods; the determination of the entities sub-
ject to tax; and the specification of the rate schedule and exemption levels.
These provisions compose the revenue raising aspects of the tax. The second
element consists of the special preferences found in every income tax system.
These special preferences, often called tax incentives or tax subsidies, are de-
partures from the normal tax structure, designed to favor a particular indus-
try, activity, or class of persons. Tax subsidies partake of many forms, such as
permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities,
credits against tax, or special rates. Whatever their form, these departures
from the "normative" income tax structure essentially represent. government
spending for the favored activities or groups through the tax system rather
than through direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.
Put differently, whenever government decides to favor an activity or
group through monetary assistance, it may elect from a wide range of
methods in delivering that assistance. Direct assistance may take the form of a
government grant or subsidy, a government loan, perhaps at a special interest
rate, or a private loan guaranteed by the government: Instead of direct assis-
tance, the government may work within the income tax system to reduce the
tax otherwise owed by a favored activity or group. Examples of this indirect
government assistance are investment credits, special depreciation deductions,
deductions for special forms of consumption, or low rates of tax for certain
activities. These tax reductions, in effect monetary assistance provided by the
government, represent tax expenditures.'
Most tax expenditures are readily recognizable since they are usually
treated by their supporters as tax incentives or as hardship relief, and they
are not urged as necessary to correct defects in the income tax structure itself.
The Treasury Department, in establishing the first tax expenditure tabulation
in 1968, basically utilized the general economic definition of income—the in-
crease in net economic wealth between two points in time plus consumption
during that period. The Treasury modified this general definition by adding
a reference to the "generally accepted structure of an income tax." The mod-
ification had the narrow, explicitly described function of excluding from the
category of tax expenditures certain nontaxable items which economists would
cover under the general economic definition of income but which historically
have not been regarded as essential aspects of the structure of the Sixteenth
Amendment income tax. These nontaxable items include such things as un-
realized appreciation in the value of an asset and income imputed from an
asset (for example, rental income imputed from ownership of a house). With
the exception of its reference to the "generally accepted structure of an in-
come tax," the Treasury closely followed the general economic definition of
income. Thus, it included as tax expenditures those provisions allowing de-
ductions for personal consumption items or other items not incurred in the
See generally Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 679-80.
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earning or production of income. As to the "timing" criteria for defining in-
come for the taxable period, the Treasury referred to widely accepted "stan-
dards of business accounting" used to determine income for financial re-
ports. 5
9 See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 683. The definitional process was
described for an international audience in Address by Stanley Surrey, The Concept of
Tax Reliefs—Its Relation to Tax Policy and Budget Policy, IIPF 1977 Congress, supra
note 6 (the 1977 Varna Congress used the term "tax relief" interchangeably with "tax
expenditure" and in the excerpt below "tax expenditure" has been substituted for "tax
relief" in several places).
Tax expenditure analysis is based on the concept of a normal or nor-
mative tax of the type under consideration. This paper focuses on the in-
come tax and hence discusses the normal structure of such a tax. But the
analysis is appropriate to any broad based tax intended to have a general
application, as a consumption tax (such as a retail sales tax or a value
added tax, or a progressive expenditure tax), a death tax, a general prop-
erty tax, or a wealth tax. In terms of the income tax, the normative struc-
ture involves the determination of the base of the tax (net income); the
accounting period; the taxable unit; and the rate schedule, including per-
sonal exemption levels. In the United States' analysis of tax expenditures,
the normative concept of net income is the general economic definition of
income under the "Haig-Simons" approach, i.e. increase in net economic
wealth between two points of time plus consumption during that period.
"Consumption" is broadly applied, and in essence covers all expenditures
except those incurred as a cost in the earning or production of income and
hence are proper offsets to gross income to arrive at taxable net income.
Since the Haig-Simons approach does not identify appropriate accounting
techniques, resort in establishing a normal structure is made to widely-
accepted "standards of business accounting" used to determine income for
financial reports. The application of these economic and accounting norms
is then tempered by also referring to the "generally accepted structure of
an income tax." This reference, it was pointed out, excluded as normative
the inclusion of unrealized appreciation in asset values and of imputed in-
come from homes or other assets, since in the United States, and largely
elsewhere, these items are not commonly regarded as income for tax pur-
poses though they fall within the economic definition of income.
The taxable unit is not defined by the Haig-Simons defintion nor is
there a normative concept of that unit. Rather, the choice of taxable
unit—e.g., how to tax single persons versus married persons, working
spouses as against non-working spouses, and the family in general—is re-
garded as a policy issue wider than tax policy per se and embracing a
country's attitudes toward marriage, women in general, women in the work
force, etc. Also the rate schedule itself is not a normative concept. Instead
such matters as how progressive the rates should be or at what starting
point in the income scale the rates should generally apply are matters for
fiscal policy to determine. While factors such as the taxable unit or a rate
schedule are necessary to the structure of an income tax, their particular
determination—unlike the determination of the tax base and the account-
ing techniques to identify the net income of a given period—are not part
of a normative concept of the income tax. However, once a general rate
schedule is decided upon as a matter of fiscal policy, a special variation in
that rate intended to confer a special tax benefit becomes a departure from
a normal structure. But a general reduction of tax rates would not be a tax
expenditure—though it would be relief from taxes.
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The basic Treasury formulation of the tax expenditure concept and of
the criteria utilized in classifying tax expenditures has stood up quite well as
both the concept and the classification criteria have obtained wider application
and consequently wider scrutiny. Using this formulation, technicians in the
executive branch and in Congress charged with preparing the annual tabula-
tion of tax expenditures have been able to maintain a high degree of consis-
tency and uniformity in approach, even when faced with the need to classify a
constant stream of legislative changes in the income tax. Although the Budget
Act of 1974 required a legislative definition of the term "tax expenditure,"
since a number of operative provisions of that Act utilize the term," this clef-
Essentially, then, the concept of a normal (or normative) income tax to
be used in identifying tax expenditures is one of applying a general rate
schedule (determined under fiscal policy) against a taxable unit's (deter-
mined under fiscal and social policy) net income base—with that base as-
certained by including all items of gross income and deducting all expendi-
tures associated with the earning or production of that income, with capital
expenditures allocated over time in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting practices. This analysis extends to both the corporation income
tax and the individual income tax. The norm, however, does not specify
any particular general relationship between these two taxes, and thus does
not specify a classical corporate tax structure, a completely integrated cor-
porate tax, or a partially integrated corporate tax. However, once given a
country's general choice of a corporate tax-individual income tax relation-
ship, then special departures from that choice can be tax expenditures.
(The United States tax expenditure analysis is made against the
background of the present classical separation of the two taxes.) The
analysis also does not specify whether the determination of the tax base is
in terms of nominal accounts or in terms of inflation-adjusted accounts.
However, here also, once a clear choice is made, any special departure can
be a tax expenditure. Thus an approach that would adjust the cost of an
asset for inflation in computing gain or depreciation but fail to make an
adjustment in the real cost of funds borrowed to acquire the asset would be
effecting only a partial or preferential change to reflect inflation and
would thus involve a tax expenditure. (In the United States, tax expendi-
ture analysis is made against the background of the present general nomi-
nal dollar determination of the base.) The "indexing" of the rate schedule
for inflation is not a tax expenditure, since the shape of the rate schedule
itself is not involved in the normative structure and hence a decision to
change rate brackets because of inflation is equally outside the analysis.
It will be seen that the essential aspect of the definition of a normal
income tax is the determination of the net income base allocated to the
particular yearly accounting period utilized to compute tax liabilities. Gen-
erally speaking, in countries using a broadly-applied modern income tax,
the determination of that base is not a matter on which informed fiscal
experts would exhibit much disagreement if their function were solely to
establish a normative structure.
'" For a description of the operative tax expenditure provisions in the Budget
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 [hereinafter cited as Budget Act], see
Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 683-84. Examples of these operative provisions
include the requirement in section 601 that the President include tax expenditures in
his annual Budget, and the requirement in section 708(a) that committees reporting
bills which provide for new or increased tax expenditures include statements concern-
ing the effect of the bill on current levels of tax expenditures and a five-year projec-
tion of the revenue effect of the change.
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inition has not proved helpful. The language used by the drafters to define
tax expenditure indicates their problem in capturing the concept in statutory
words: "[tax expenditures are those] revenue losses attributable to provisions
of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduc-
tion from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate
of tax, or a deferral of tax liability ... ."" The word "special" is not explicit
enough to carry the definition, and the legislative history essentially resorted
to references to existing tax expenditure tabulations to convey the congres-
sional intent. The government technicians therefore have generally followed
the original Treasury formulation, and, as stated above, have found that for-
mulation sufficient to handle legislative tax changes and other matters." The
fiscal 1977-1979 tax expenditure lists are set forth in Appendix A.
There remains in some discussions of tax expenditures the feeling that.
the concept somehow implies that, the government is entitled to a taxpayer's
entire income and that the enumerated tax expenditures, instead of being
regarded as subsidies, should be seen as examples of governmental restraint
its not taxing all of that income." But clearly, the tax expenditure concept
" Budget Act. supra note 10, § 3(a)(3).
' 2 Tabulations of tax expenditures are to be found in the following docu-
ments, so far.published annually: BUDGET OF Tun: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. Special
Analyses (see supra note 2); CONGRESSIONAL. BUDGET OFFICE, FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PRO-
JECTIONS, SUPPLEMENT ON TAX EXPENDITURES [hereinafter cited as CB0 TAX EXPENDI-
TURE TABULATION]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES (annual) thereinafter cited as JOINT COMM. ESTIMATES]. See also SENATE
BUDGET COMM., 94TH CONG., 21) SESS., TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL. PROVISIONS (COMM. Print. March 17, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as S. BUDGET COMM. COMPENDIUM], and 95TH CoNe.., 2o SESS., TAX
EXPENDITURES: RELATIONSHIPS TO SPENDING PROGRAMS AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON
INDIVIDUAL. PROVISIONS (COMM, Print September 1978). The 1977 CBO TAX
EXPENDITURE TABULATION, supra, contains in Appendix a brief description of each
item listed; the 1979 Special Analysis G also contains such descriptions.
While earlier Budget Special Analyses differed from congressional tax expen-
diture lists in not including deferral of lax on the income of controlled foreign corpo-
rations, the asset depreciation range, and capital gains at death, 1979 Special Analysis
C includes these items. The functional categories are now identical with those used in
the congressional lists.
13
 The homey example used by Chairman Long in his testimony on S. 2, The
Sunset Act of 1977, Hearings on S. 2 Before the Subcomm, on Intergovernmental Relations tf
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 468-69 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings on the Sunset Act of 1977], illustrates this point. Chairman Long
states:
Some people would like to say, since we put a top tax bracket at 70
percent on individual income, that theoretically, the Government owns 70
percent of everything you make. That being the case, they would like to
assume that an individual is getting some sort of tax advantage or escaping
something if he fails to pay that 70 percent of his income. You could just
as well take the same attitude about the personal exemptions, although
they don't necessarily do that. So you can define "tax expenditure" how-
ever you want to do it. You may include one thing and I include
another—it makes me think of this situation:
You could say that 1 saved 40 cents, because, instead of taking a
bus downtown, I decided that I would walk. But you could just. as
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merely states that if only an "income tax" is desired and no other social or
economic objectives are sought, such a tax should reach fully the normative
scope of "net income." Whether that net income base is taxed at rates that are
high or low is a decision apart from tax expenditure analysis. A deliberate
decision to exclude certain items from that base because of particular social or
economic goals becomes a tax subsidy since the conceded base of the tax has
not been followed. As the Congressional Budget Office appropriately de-
scribes:
[A] tax expenditure is analogous to an entitlement program on
the spending side of the budget; the amount expended is not subject_
to any legislated limit but is dependent solely upon taxpayer re-
sponse to the particular provision. In this respect, tax expenditures
closely resemble spending programs that have no ceiling."
This view of tax expenditures is becoming clearer as discussion in the area
proceeds, although some still attempt to make debating points based on the
"all income belongs to the government" syndrome.'
2. Classification of Legislative Changes
As to fiscal 1979, all three tax expenditures lists—Special Analysis G in
the President's Budget, the Congressional Budget Office Tax Expenditure
easily say that I saved $1.50, because I could have hired a taxicab to
go down there. Or you could say I saved $50 because I seriously
considered taking a limousine, and that would have cost me 50 bucks.
Now that type of logic is implicit all through this argument about
tax expenditures.
Clearly the Chairman understands the concept and his example is but a debat-
ing point. Compare Chairman Long's statements, for example, in Tax Reform Act of
1975: Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
191, 503, 1637, 1664-65, 2404 (1976), that some provisions clearly are tax expendi-
tures. In his above example, one could of course find a norm for a given individual
and the "saving" would be readily measurable, though different if individuals had dif-
fering norms as presumably they would. But the income tax has but one normative
base. The tax expenditure saving does vary with an individual's rate bracket, but that
is simply an aspect that demonstrates a problem—and generally a defect—in utilizing
a tax expenditure device to provide government assistance.
For examples of the mistaken view that the tax expenditure concept implies
that all income belongs to the Government, see Friedman, What Belongs to Whom?,
Newsweek, March 13, 1978, at 71; Stutsman, Brookes, Jewett and McCaskey, Tax Re-
form, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. E3538-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1977) (statement of Rep.
Goldwater); Smith, Taxation of Capital in a Political Economy, 38 TAX FOUNDATION'S TAX
REV. No. 7, 25 (July 1977); I. KtusrroL, TWO CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 208 (1978).
14 1977 CBO TAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION, supra note 12, at
13 As discussed infra in text at notes 310-28, an amendment to the Revenue
Act of 1978 was offered by Senator Glenn to subject tax expenditures to a "sunset
process." During the course of the debate on that amendment, several members of the
Senate Finance Committee opposed the amendment. in part on the rhetorical assertion
that the tax expenditure concept implies that all income belongs to the government.
See, e.g., the remarks of Senators Bentsen and Hansen, at 124 CONG. REC. S 17494,
17760 (daily eds. Oct. 7 and 9, 1978). Senator Long, ever resourceful in debate, pro-
duced a new image:
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Tabulation in its Five-Year Budget Projections, and the Estimates of Tax Ex-
penditures prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation—agree
on which provisions of the tax code constitute tax expenditures." With each
new piece of tax legislation, however, new classification issues emerge. For
example, the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 combined the
minimum standard deduction (the low income allowance) and the regular
standard deduction into a zero bracket amount in the rate scale, and defined
itemized deductions in terms of the excess over the zero bracket amount:
These changes eliminated the standard deduction from the list of tax expen-
ditures. The zero bracket amount is now regarded as a part of the rate
schedule; it is essentially a transformation of the minimum standard deduc-
tion into the rate schedule. The various itemized deductions remain, and their
amounts are to be estimated by reference to the "floor" of the zero bracket
amount."
Looking ahead, welfare reform legislation may affect the list of tax ex-
penditures. For example, the present tax expenditure lists include the exclu-
In my left hand 1 hold a big cigar, which I borrowed from a friend. It
is an object of value.
I hold in my other hand a pencil. The Congress thought about the
matter and decided to put a tax on the cigar, so we pay a tax on the cigar,
and that. results in some revenue for the Government. We once had a tax
on pencils, but we took the tax off pencils, so the pencil bears no tax and
the cigar does.
To apply [Senator Glenn's] argument to the cigar and the pencil, pen-
cil users are being provided an unjust advantage because they are not pay-
ing- the same tax we pay on cigars. Congress thought about what it wanted
to tax and it said, We want to tax the cigar." But to use the Senator's
argument, the Government is losing a fantastic amount of money because
the tax we have on the cigar does not apply to a pencil.
124 CONG. REC. S17491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978).
Chairman Long confuses the issue by selecting metaphorically different tax
bases. If the tax base is cigars (i.e., income), no tax expenditures result within that tax
from the failure to tax pencils (i.e., net wealth). In contrast, if the tax is on cigars
(income), but one-half the lax is deferred on cigars manufactured by small business to
encourage their growth (small corporation income tax rates), a tax expenditure is pres-
ent within the tax. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 27 (1973), discussing the
application of tax expenditure analysis to excise taxes.
1 " The Congressional Budget Office stated that the 1976 Tax Reform Act in-
volved forty-one tax expenditure changes. While most of the changes resulted in in-
creases or decreases in existing tax expenditures, some tax expenditures were dropped
and others were added. The items dropped or phased out were: exclusion of gross-up on
dividends of LDC corporations; special rate for Western Hemisphere trade corpora-
tions; credit for purchases of new homes; five-year amortization of railroad rolling
stock; five-year amortization for employer child care facilities.
The items added were: tax incentives for preservation of historic structures;
contributions in aid of construction for certain utilities; credit (instead of deduction)
for child and dependent care expenses; deduction for eliminating in buildings, etc.,
barriers for the handicapped; exclusion of contributions to prepaid legal services
plans; employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) funded through investment tax cred-
its. See 1977 CBO TAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION, supra. note 12, at Table 2 and the
descriptive material in 1979 Special Analysis G.
" See the discussion of estimates in the text at notes 28-29 infra.
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sions from taxable income of government direct cash•payments, such as social
security payments and unemployment insurance payments. Yet., the tax ex-
penditure lists do not include the government benefits in kind, such as food
stamps, which are also excluded from taxable income. This difference in ap-
proach has been previously mentioned in the Special Analyses in the Presi-
dent's Budget as an aspect that may require reexamination. Where the ben-
efits in kind closely resemble cash payments, as in the case of food stamps, so
that problems of measurement. are not really involved!, it appears that their
exclusion from taxable income should be considered a tax expenditure. The
1968 Treasury decision to exclude as a tax expenditure the non-inclusion in
taxable income of the imputed income from homes and personal property did
not really explore how that decision affected government services generally,
or more particularly, government in-kind transfer programs.' 8 Furthermore,
it is not clear that the "equivalent of cash" characterization which may fit. food
stamps would apply to any other in-kind program. Perhaps the discussion of
welfare reform will clarify the area. Presumably in that discussion it will be
necessary to determine whether conversion to monetary terms of existing
government in-kind programs must itself be included in taxable income. The
decision on that issue and the grounds advanced to support the decision may
also clarify views regarding the treatment in the lax expenditure budget of
remaining in-kind programs.
The 1978. changes in the corporate tax rate structure present an emerg-
ing classification issue. To date, all tax expenditure budgets have treated the
corporate surtax exemption as a tax expenditure, while regarding the corpo-
rate tax as a flat rate tax. The lower rates, provided within the corporate
surtax exemption range, traditionally were justified as aids to small business
and, accordingly, were included in tax expenditure lists. In the Revenue Act
of 1978, the existing "normal tax" and "surtax" structure was repealed and
replaced by a five-step rate structure on corporate taxable income, with rates
ranging from 17 to 46 percent. Concerning this change, the Ways and Means
Committee Report stated: "With respect to business taxpayers, the basic cor-
porate tax structure is changed and taxes are reduced, but the Committee
does not consider a new tax structure to be a tax expenditure, even though
the change reduces tax liabilities. The Congressional Budget Office does not
agree."'" In some respects, the Ways and Means Committee justification of
the changed rate structure is consistent with its view that the change simply
implemented a new rate system for corporations. The Committee was con-
cerned that the k)r "abrupt jump in tax rates" from 22 to 48 percent was
undesirable. Moreover, it argued that the new system of graduated rates
would reduce the impact of the tax provisions on a small business' selection of
operating form.
These arguments appear to be structural rather than tax expenditure jus-
tifications. Nevertheless, the Committee also stated that it was making the
18 1968 ANNUAL TREASURY REPORT, sUpra note 1.
1 " H.K. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1978). The Senate Finance
Committee took the same position. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1978).
January 1979]	 TAX EXPENDITURE DEVELOPMENTS	 235
change because tax relief was "especially needed for small companies." 2"
 The
"small business" aspect was highlighted by the Committee decision to halt. the
progression of the rates at $100,000 of taxable income, since 78 percent of
corporate net. income and 93 percent of corporate taxes are attributable to
corporate income above $100,000. And, despite the Committee's statement,
the tables on changes in tax expenditures provided in the Committee Reports
treat the revenue loss From the lower corporate rates on the first $100,000 of
taxable income as a lax expenditure.'
The 1978 changes in corporate rate structure do present an interesting
conceptual issue. Certainly, tax expenditure analysis does not imply that a
country can only adopt a flat rate corporate tax. Progressive rates traditionally
have not been applied to corporations since a progressive rate schedule has
largely been justified on "ability to pay" concepts, a concept that has little
relevance to corporations. A country could choose, however, to have a truly
graduated and progressive rate scale for corporations. But the 1978 legislation
does not represent such a scheme. As noted above, the benefits of the new
rate schedule are largely confined to "small business" because of the failure to
extend the five-step rate schedule farther up the income scale. Moreover, the
changes amount to only a $7,750 reduction in tax impact on the first
$100,000 of income. This seems a relatively minor revenue change and not
significant enough to take the five-step corporate tax rates out of the tax ex-
penditure category in which the present two-step system is classified. On bal-
ance, we are therefore of the view that classification of the graduated rate
system for corporations as a tax expenditure program for small business
would he correct.
A renewed interest in the "integration" of the corporate and individual
income taxes could present a classification problem if legislation integrating
the two taxes were to develop. Budget Special Analysis G stated in 1978:
Treatment of individuals and corporations as separate tax-paying
entities.—A theoretically pure income tax would integrate the taxa-
tion of individual and corporate income to avoid multiple taxation of
any particular type of income. Only individuals would be taxed; cor-
porate income would be taxed to shareholders, whether or not it was
distributed in the form of dividends. However, for practical reasons,
separate taxation is accepted as part of the normal tax structure for
purposes of this analysis. 22
In contrast, the Treasury analysis in 1968 simply stated that "ttlhe assumption
inherent in current law, that corporations ars separate entities and subject to
income taxation independently from their shareholders, is adhered to in this
analysis.'' 23
 The Treasury analysis thus did not determine whether a
"theoretically pure income tax" would integrate the two taxes. If the "practical
2 " H.R. REP. No, 1445, supra mite 19, at 79. The Senate Finance Committee
Report emphasized the "small business" thrust of the new rate schedule even more
heavily. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 19, at 110.
21
 S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 19, at 144.
22 1979 Special Analysis C at 152 (emphasis added).
23 1968 ANNUAL TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1.
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reasons" mentioned in Special Analysis G extend to the fact that economists
and others are not agreed on the "pure" treatment of corporate and indi-
vidual income taxes, and that a country therefore may choose among various
relationships between these taxes—just as it may choose among various family
unit decisions in constructing its "normative income tax"—then the expres-
sion "for practical reasons" may be acceptable.
The recent discussion of "integration" does exhibit a large degree of dif-
ference in viewpoint as to the appropriate relationship between corporate and
individual income taxes, in terms of economic theory, financial attitudes, and
structural aspects. Indeed, much of the discussion is in terms of incentives to
capital formation and investment rather than in terms of theoretical concepts.
Moreover, the more serious legislative approaches to integration that surfaced
in 1977 and 1978 appeared to extend only to limited tax relief for dividends,
though it was difficult to decide whether a reduction in tax at the shareholder
level or a reduction in tax at the corporate level was being discussed. 24 If
only a limited tax relief for dividends were to be enacted, then presumably
the relief would be classified as a tax expenditure, especially if enactment rests
on incentive grounds." It may be that continued theoretical analysis of "in-
tegration" approaches will lead to more insight on appropriate classification,
as well as to more guidance on the appropriate legislative response to the
substantive questions. The experience in the United States certainly supports
the view that the discussions thus far as to the economic, financial, accounting,
and legal ramifications of the various suggested approaches to integration
have not come close to the extensive exploration of these factors that sensibly
should precede such a basic change in the income tax system.
In summary, the definition of tax expenditures has not as yet presented
any basic problems. 2 " There may be borderline situations in determining
24 See generally C. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?
(1979). See also McLure, Jr. & Surrey, Integration of Income Taxes: Issues fir Debate, 55
HARV. Bus. REV. 169 (1977); The President's 1978 Tax Program: Hearings on the Fred-
dent's Tax Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); M. BLUME, J. CROCKETT & I. FRIEND, FINANCIAL. EFFECTS OF CAPITA!, TAX
REFORMS (1978).
25 In this connection, theoretical analysis in Europe has not yet resolved the
question whether the various European shareholder credits (and the German corpo-
rate rate reduction for dividends) should be considered as permissible responses within
a set of possible normative relationships between the corporate and individual income
taxes which a country can adopt or whether they constitute tax expenditures (in a
system that. views the classical system as normative) or tax penalties (in a system that
views a fully integrated corporate it* as normative).
26 Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 685-88, pointed out. some definitional
misconceptions. A few additions may be described here. Richard Goode states, "In my
opinion the present tax expenditure budget rests on a shaky conceptual foundation
and for this reason is less convincing to skeptics than it would be if more rigorously
derived." Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXA-
TION I, 27 (J. Pechman ed. 1977). He then suggests two alternatives, one being a
broader tabulation using the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition, described id. at 7, and the
other being a narrower tabulation including only those provisions where the legislative
history indicates a dominant tax incentive or hardship relief motivation. Id. at 28. But
as Charles Davenport in his Comments points out, Goode's second alternative using
legislative history would result in the present tax expenditure list and not a narrower
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whether a particular provision of the Code constitutes a tax expenditure, but
tabulation. Continents by Charles Davenport, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 33,
34-35 (J. Pechman ed. 1977). Moreover, Goode's first alternative would not greatly
differ from the present tabulation but would include net imputed rental income from
owner-occupied homes, death benefits from life insurance policies, and accrued gains
on capital assets. hi. at 34. These omissions have been explicitly discussed, however, in
tax expenditure analysis. The Treasury 1968 guidance. which excluded these
items—Goode calls that guidance "pragmatic," Goode, supra, at 26—simply saw no
point in pressing inclusion of these items especially when Congress and the public
certainly do not come close to conceiving of their exclusion from the tax base as tax
incentives. Indeed, much of the confusion Over capital gains results from the inability
of legislators to conceive of the use of the "realization concept" as a benefit to recip-
ients of capital gains. Goode's criticism thus either disappears or is very narrowly con-
fined and by no means supports his term "shaky conceptual foundation."
A curious aberrational concern over the definitional aspect. appeared in
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal's testimony on the proposed Sunset Act of 1977:
I think it is important from the beginning to recognize that tax expen-
ditures is not a clearly defined concept. ...
It is nor clear under this definition that the personal exemption or the
standard deduction might not be categorized as a tax expenditure. [The
definition referred to is the definition of tax expenditures in the bill, which
was almost identical to that adopted in the Budget Act, quoted in text at
note 11, supra].
Hearings on the Sunset Act of 1977, supra note 13, at 109.
Senator Kennedy in his testimony readily pointed out the Treasury's errors:
In his testimony last week, Secretary Blumenthal indicated that there
'night be problems in identifying tax expenditures. But the examples given
do not suggest that the problems are significant. ...
With respect to the specific examples cited by the Secretary, no tax
expenditure budget for the past 10 years has included personal exemptions
as a tax expenditure; every budget has included the standard deduction as
a tax expenditure. To my knowledge, there is no disagreement as to either
treatment.
Moreover, the Treasury seems to be concerned in its other examples
by items that are not included in the tax expenditure budget. But the
suggested definitional difficulties seem to be resolved in light of the
thorough analysis that has characterized the efforts of the Congressional
Budget Office and the joint Committee on Taxation on this issue in recent
years.
The Budget Reform Act of 1974 contains a workable definition of tax
expenditures. So, too, do S. 2 and the legislation developed by Senator
Glenn. Moreover, under the Budget Reform Act, the committee reports of
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee
must identify new or increased tax expenditures.
Therefore, the Joint Tax Committee and the Congressional Budget.
Office—as well as the Treasury—are given guidance by Congress as to the
items that should be included in the tax expenditure budget.
Id. at 329-30.
Later, the Treasury, on further reflection, recognized that the definitional
problem did not really exist and submitted a letter from Secretary Blumenthal which
came back to the basic Treasury position:
In my testimony, I discussed the definitional difficulties in the tax ex-
penditure concept. Section 401(a)(1) of Title IV contains a broad definition
of tax expenditures which is subject to the difficulties cited by me in my
testimony. On the other hand, tax expenditures are listed and ipso facto
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any useful classification has borderline problems. 27 The important point, and
one overlooked by some economists and others, is that the assertion of defini-
tional impossibility is an assertion that a country has lost control of its tax and
budget policies. The Congress at least understands that it must separate tax
expenditures from the regular tax system if it is to have rational budget con-
trols. Once those who seem to despair or agonize over definitional problems
realize that an operative tax expenditure analysis is a legislative necessity—as
well as an executive branch tool—then perhaps there will be more helpful
discussion of the definitional boundary.
Estimates qf Tax Expenditures
The technicians working on the tax expenditure tabulations have been
able to handle the problems presented in estimating the various items. 28 This
is not surprising since the analytical problems which arise in estimating tax
expenditures are precisely the same as those presented in estimating revenues
for any proposed legislative tax changes. These problems include: the han-
dling of an estimate for one item when the item is affected by changes in
other items—the so-called "stacking" of changes in interrelated items; the
defined in three places: the special analysis of the budget prepared by the
Executive; the annual reports of the Congressional Budget Committees;
and. the annual estimates of tax expenditures prepared for the Committee
on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee by the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation. The definitional difficulties can be avoided
if an abstract definition is replaced by reference to any of the currently
used lists of specific tax expenditures. Furthermore, budget procedures al-
ready enacted require the specific identification of new tax expenditures as
they are legislated.
Id. at 120.
Apparently the initial Treasury statement. was prompted by its dislike at being
caught between a directive by OMB at the last moment to support in principle the
entire proposed Sunset legislation even as to termination of tax expenditures on lines
parallel to termination of direct Budget programs—a Carter campaign position—and
the Treasitry's awareness that Chairman Long disagreed with the tax expenditure ter-
mination provisions (though not with the basic concept of reviewing tax expenditures,
see id. at 47(1). The later Treasury letter reflected a more reasoned approach. See also
text at notes 310-28.
Another definitional misconception surfaced in the 1977 Sunset Act Hearings.
Senator Glenn indicated a preference for the term "tax incentive" instead of tax ex-
penditure, id. at 87, not realizing that his terminology would leave out tax subsidies for
the relief of hardships, e.g., many of the income security items, which his basic position
on Sunset legislation would want covered by the review and termination provisions.
27 Professor Carl Shoup has pointed out:
The listing of tax expenditures will no doubt be "incomplete" (or over-
complete), but if publication were to be denied to any listing that was sure
to he incomplete, on the grounds that incompleteness is "potentially mis-
leading" ... as indeed it is, national income accounts would never have
appeared and no censuses would have been taken.
Shoup, Surrey's Pathways to Tax Reform—A Review Article, 30 J. FINANCE 1329, 1334
(1975).
28 Much that has already been said about defining tax expenditures equally
applies to estimating them. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 688-90 discusses tax
expenditure estimating techniques and some misconceptions about them.
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assumption that economic behavior remains unchanged if an item is elim-
inated—the so-called "first-order" estimates; and the assumption that
economic conditions remain unchanged by microeconomic measures. The
technicians who supply these revenue estimates for tax reform proposals are
the same individuals who furnish the tax expenditure estimates. Hence, any
critical observations made of the tax expenditure estimates are essentially
criticisms and observations concerning the basic revenue estimating proce-
dures used by the Treasury and Congress. The criticisms may or may not be
proper, but they must be seen as relating to basic revenue estimating proce-
dures and not as criticisms of the tax expenditure concept itself. 29
29
 Hence the remark of Richard Goode in his paper at the Brookings Institu-
tion Conference on Comprehensive Income Taxation that the tax expenditure esti-
mates are less firmly based than would be desirable for official statistics," Goode, supra
note 26, at 28, seems strange indeed. Likewise strange, for a different reason, are
Henry Aaron's remarks in the same conference:
But it is futile to dream of a "grand budget" that sums direct
expenditures—a set of affirmative actions actually taken—and tax
expenditures—a set of actions not taken or revenues not collected. The list
of things we have chosen not to do is infinite and unspecifiable. The futil-
ity of such an endeavor is revealed by the fact that if we try correctly to
estimate the aggregate level of tax expenditures, the level of each particu-
lar tax expenditure depends on the number of tax provisions that are de-
fined as tax expenditures. The level of social security outlays does not de-
pend on whether we define, say, Federal Home Loan Bank Board ad-
vances to be in or out of the budget; but the revenue implications of, say,
permitting the deduction of property taxes does depend on the fact that
unemployment insurance is excluded. The impossibility of constructing an
unambiguous grand tax expenditure budget should not divert attention
from the immense value of program analysis that includes both direct and
tax expenditures.
Comments by Henry Aaron, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 30, 31 (J. Pechman ed.
1977) (emphasis in original). However, as Charles Davenport points out in his Com-
ments, the same problem is presented in direct program estimates:
For example, if food stamps were eliminated, the outlays for aid to families
with dependent children might increase, but no one suggests that estimates
for the food stamp program are in error for this reason.
Comments by Charles Davenport, supra note 26, at 35.
The International Fiscal Association 1976 Congress, on the subject of incen-
tives, said as to estimates:
Another difficulty was seen in determining the initial cost to be attributed
to a tax incentive in cases where e.g. foreign capital or foreign technicians
would not be attracted in the absence of such incentive.
Summary of Proceedings, [1976] I.F.A.Y.B. 46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as IFA Summary].
However, this comment indicates the problems that persist because of a failure to rec-
ognize that tax incentives are really spending programs. Thus, suppose a country, to
attract foreign capital or foreign technicians, adopted a direct grant program of
roughly the same cost magnitude as a tax incentive program for the same purpose.
Surely the "cost" of the direct program would appear in the budget, even though
without that program there might have been no foreign capital or foreign technicians.
The revenue obtained from such attraction becomes an offsetting item. But the choice
of a tax incentive spending program should show a similar "cost," offset by the rev-
enue brought in by the foreign capital and foreign technicians (including the "cost"
itself). The two programs are thus comparable and the "cost" of each is in effect ob-
tained in the same fashion, each cost being open-ended.
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The President's 1978 tax reform proposals presented a descriptive prob-
Stiglitz and Boskin. in Impact of Recent Developments in Public Finance Theory on
Public Policy Decisions, 67 AN]. ECON. Rev. 295 (1977), also misconceive the estimating
process and fail to state that, to a great extent, their observations equally apply to all
revenue estimates (the observations may be accepted as statements, but estimators and
others familiar with the process have long heen fully aware of the situation):
The other concept., the use of which is now written into law, is that of
tax expenditures: the loss of revenue due to a particular provision. We
have three major objections to this concept. First, as presently formulated,
the measurement of foregone revenue implicitly assumes zero elasticities;
the estimates of aggregate tax expenditures are correct only when one con-
templates eliminating all deviations from taxing real economic income
simultaneously and if the factors of production are in perfectly inelastic supply
[which Boskin in 1977 and Heckman in 1974, among others, demonstrated
is not the case]. Further, the estimates for particular so-called tax prefer-
ences arc often extremely inaccurate, For example, if the tax law allows a
deduction for charitable contributions, it is not correct to argue that.
abolishing the deduction will increase tax revenue by (the summing over all
contributors who itemize deductions) the product of the marginal tax rate
and the amount currently given to charity. The amount of resources flow-
ing into each such "tax expenditure" category reflects the tax treatment. of
that category as well as others. Since the charitable deduction reduces the
price for a dollar of charitable contributions from $1 to $(14), where t is
the marginal tax rate, any price elasticity at all iu charitable giving would
imply that abolishing the deduction would also reduce charitable contribu-
tions. Take the case of a family with a marginal tax rate of 20% which
currently gives $300 a year to charity. The tax expenditure budget counts
.2 times $300, or $60, as a tax expenditure. Yet abolition of the deduction
implies a 25 percent price increase: with the elasticity of -1,2 estimated by
Feldstein (1976), contributions fall to $210, and at the other extreme the
"revenue foregone- is only $42 if the extra $90 tines not flow into taxable
income. The lax expenditure budget thus overestimates the revenue loss by
more than 40 percent!
Id. at 296-97 (emphasis in original).
But the phrase "if the extra $90 does not flow into taxable income" misses the
issue. The $90 is already in taxable income since the $300 was a deduction from taxable
income. The taxpayer would have to use the $90 for some expense that would still
qualify as deductible and would not be within the tax expenditure list. This is unlikely
and hence the criticism of the estimate is unsound.
Another criticism in the same article is as follows:
[T]he tax expenditure concept suffers from a further defect: the legislation
implicitly assumed that the "natural - tax base is income. broadly defined;
as we shall argue below, there is little, justification for this. That is, to know
what is being "exempted - from taxation one needs to know what "ought"
to be taxed.
Id. at 297.
The article then discusses, for example, whether "consumption - is a more
appropriate tax base than "income. - It may or tnay not be, but the present federal
income tax is accepted as a tax that uses "income" as its base. It is therefore appro-
priate to structure a tax expenditure list for that tax accordingly. A different tax expend-
diture list would be—and could be—structured for a tax using "consumption - as the
base, since (Ile legislature, contrary to the assumptions of' many economists who prefer
the consumption base, would undoubtedly also work into such a tax a large number of
- incentive- and "relief" exceptions.
Another aspect of the estimation process is the "feedback," or second order
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tern for the technicians handling tax expenditures. 3° Those 1978 proposals
involved major tax rate reductions which in turn reduced the value of all tax
expenditures other than those utilizing a credit against tax technique. The
proposals also recommended the elimination or direct scaling down of specific
tax expenditures. To separate these varying effects, Budget Special Analysis G
in 1978 first showed the existing tax expenditures under existing tax rates,
and then showed the combined results of the recommended rate reductions
and the revisions in particular tax expenditure items."'
effects, of proposed tax changes. Renewed interest has been expressed in efforts to
estimate these effects. Attention has focused especially on proposals to reduce the tax
on capital gains. See, e.g., M. Evans, An Alternative to the Fiscal Stimulus Act of 1978:
A Reduction in Capital Gains Tax Rates (Chase Econometrics Assoc., Inc., May 1978).
The hazards of such endeavors and the sometimes truly heroic assumptions required
to be made are discussed and debated in Bristol, Pitfalls in Using Econometric Models:
The Chase and DRI Capital Gains Estimates, 6 TAx NOTES No. 20 at 531 (May 15, 1978);
Evans, Capital Gains Taxes and Econometric Models, 6 TAX NOTES No. 22 at 593 (May 29,
1978); Eckstein, The Use of Econometric Models to Evaluate Capital Gains Changes, 6 TAx
NoTES No. 23 at 611 (June 5, 1978); Bristol, Pitfalls in Equation Construction, 6 TAx
NOTES No. 23 at 635 (June 5, 1978). See also Gravelle, Study by Chase Econometrics on
Effects of Reducing the Capital Gains Tax Rate, Library of Congress. Congressional
Research Service (1978), reprinted in 124 Coxc. REC. E26 16 (daily ed. May 16, 1978).
At this writing it appears that economists generally agree on the desirability of de-
veloping techniques that would provide accurate data on feedback effects in appro-
priate situations. However, there is no agreement that reliable techniques have yet
been developed. Moreover, considerable care must be employed where t.ax expendi-
tures are involved. Usually tax expenditures affect only the allocation of available re-
sources and do not involve the creation of new resources. Hence, models showing net
increases in jobs or capital front changes in tax expenditures are highly suspect. See
the discussion of this subject in 124 CoNG. REc. 14610-18 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1978),
which includes a Treasury Department technical analysis of the appropriate use of
feedback estimates.
In proposing an increase in the capital gains deduction for individuals from
50 percent to 70 percent of the realized gain, the Senate Finance Committee reduced
its estimated revenue loss of $3.394 billion by an assumed $1.092 billion "feedback,"
resulting from estimated increased realizations of gains. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1978). While there seemed to he general agreement among
economists that the reduction might produce a short-term increase in realizations,
Treasury economists concluded that there would be no long-term increase in the level
of realizations by investors. See Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Rev-
enue Act of 1978. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 197-201 (1978) (statement. of Secretary of the
Treasury Blumenthal).
3u Some estimating situations presented by the 1976 Tax Reform Act
change—e.g., minimum tax changes. at-risk provisions, and the termination of sonic
tax expenditures which had involved deferrals of tax liabilities—are discussed in the
text at notes 156-62 infra.
11 See also CONGRESSIONAL. BUDGET OFFICE, 	 E PRES! DENT'S FISCAL YEAR TAX
EX Pl•IND ITURE PROPOSALS (April 1978).
The estimates for the tax expenditures involving itemized deductions—e.g..
mortgage interest, charitable contributions—are made as f011ows: Since, in general,
only the total of itemized deductions in excess of the zero bracket amount ($2300
single, $3400 married) is allowed, where there is an allowable excess considering
itemized deductions as a group, then as to ;my particular itemized deduction the tax
expenditure value of that item is computed by applying the marginal rate used by the
estimators to the lesser of the amount of the excess or the amount of the specific item.
As a consequence, the total of the separate estimates for the various itemized (Leduc-
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Thus, as to the conceptual problems involved in estimating tax expendi-
tures, we may conclude that a consensus among fiscal experts as to the esti-
mates to be attached to those expenditures should be readily obtainable. The
problems of estimating tax expenditures are similar, in this respect., to those
involved in the identification of tax expenditures. Indeed, a moment's
thought should indicate how serious are the consequences of asserting that tax
expenditures cannot be identified or, if identified, that their costs cannot be
ascertained. At bottom, this would be an assertion that the fiscal experts of a
country do not know what is contained in their income tax or how much
particular programs cost the government. In short, as stated earlier, the asser-
tion would be an admission that the country has lost control of both its tax
policy and its budget policy. Ten years ago the United States did not know
what its tax spending programs were or how much they cost. The United
States now realizes that in January, 1978 it had around 85 such programs
involving over $135 billion, a total equal to 27 percent of the estimated $500
billion of direct budget outlays. Unquestionably, this figure represents too
large an amount of revenue to allow its distribution to evade scrutiny or
analysis. Yet, without the tax expenditure analysis commenced in 1968, that
would be the situation today in the United States. The obvious point is that
once experts are given the assignment of identifying and quantifying tax ex-
penditures, the task can be accomplished, and a new dimension opened for
fiscal policy.
C. Tax Penalties and Limits on Tax Expenditures
We have been discussing those departures in the present tax laws from a
normative income tax whose effect is to provide government assistance
through the income tax system. Along with these tax expenditure provisions,
there are other provisions departing from a normative income tax whose ef-
fect is to penalize the taxpayer by requiring.a greater tax payment than would
occur under the normative net income base. One example is the disallowance
of gambling losses in excess of gambling gains even where the gambling is
entered into on a "for profit" basis. 32 Other examples are found in the vari-
ous "public policy" provisions denying deductions for certain business ex-
penses involving lobbying, bribes, or fines. 33
 A classification of these public
tions overstates the revenues that would be collected in the event that several of the
deductible items were eliminated. In contrast, the total of the tax expenditure estimates
of exclusions from gross income understates the revenue gain that the elimination Of
several of the exclusions would provide.
32
 I.R.C. § 165(d). The provision was not adopted as a penalty. The legislative
history, under the 1934 Act, indicates that the courts had limited the deduction of
gambling losses to the amount of gains where gambling was illegal. But there was no
such limitation for legal gambling, and apparently many taxpayers were deducting
legal gambling losses but failing to report their gambling gains. The provision was
designed to reach this evasion.
33
 I.R.C. § 162(c), (e), (f), (g), and regulations thereunder. Other tax penalty
provisions include I.R.C. § 280B (denial of current deduction for losses sustained as a
result of the demolition if a "certified historical structure"), and I.R.C. 274(h) (dis-
allowing the costs of attending more than two foreign conventions each year even
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policy provisions as penalties does require, however, the assumption that
"morality" has no place in a normative income tax, an assumption that may be
hard to argue given the inevitable tendency of courts and legislatures in some
instances to assert:the overriding importance of public morality. Still, the re-
sult of these provisions is to tax more than net income.
There are only a few of these "tax penalty provisions," and the list has
been kept narrow by the Congress." These tax penalties can be seen as sub-
stitutes for direct regulatory measures, limiting or proscribing specific ac-
tivities. When so viewed, tax penalties are regulatory provisions embodied in
an income tax system. We will later consider other tax measures, framed as
excise taxes, that also have a regulatory purpose. The discussion of regulatory
tax measures would seem equally applicable to tax penalties. 35
In addition to the tax penalty provisions, and not to be confused with the
tax penalties, is a group of provisions adverse to taxpayers consisting of limits
placed on the use of the tax expenditures themselves. Thus, the restriction on
the deductibility of capital losses is a concomitant limit on the tax expenditure
treatment of capital gains. 3" Similarly, the 1978 Energy Tax Act denied the
investment credit and accelerated depreciation for boilers fueled by oil and
gas." The minimum tax is another limitation on the use of tax expenditures
since the "preferences" included in the base for determining that tax are tax
expenditure items." The decision under the 1976 Tax Reform Act to en-
though the excess conventions are business-related). The denial for tax deduction
purposes of certain accounting reserves is not a tax penalty, but rather an effort to
have administratively feasible accounting rules. The 1954 experience indicates that a
full tax acceptance of accounting reserves would set off a wave of pessimism on the
part of company controllers and accounting firms.
" S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 336-37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
PATH WA YS].
35
 The appropriate Budget presentation of these tax penalties is discussed in
the text at note 163 infra.
31' The 1977 Jothrr Comm. Es- ► tmATEs, supra note 12, at 4, states, "The limita-
tion on the deduction of a net long-term capital loss is a limit on the incentive made
available through the special treatment for capital gains." IF capital gains were treated
as ordinary income, then the deduction of capital losses would presumably be
liberalized. But some limitations might remain, since the "realization" concept permits
the taxpayer to realize his losses and postpone his gains. Any such remaining limita-
tions would thus be a concomitant of retention of the realization concept. As the incen-
tive effect of that concept—as opposed to the accrual concept—becomes more under-
standable, retention of the realization concept could well be listed as a tax expenditure.
See PATHWAYS, supra note 34. at 18-19.
A 1976 addition to the tax penalty list is the disallowance of certain deduc-
tions associated with the demolition of historic buildings, I.R.C. § 280B. This penalty
was enacted at the sante time as a tax expenditure (five year amortization) for the
rehabilitation or historic structures, I.R.C. § 191, and superficially could be seen as a
limit on that tax expenditure. But while the tax system is in each case being used for a
social purpose, the tax penalty is essentially separate in structure and effect from the
tax expenditure and therefore different from the capital gain–capital loss relationship.
37 See I.R.C. §§ 48(0(10), 167(p).
38
 The only exception under the minimum tax is the inclusion, as a preference
under the minimum tax, of accelerated depreciation in excess of straight-line deprecia-
tion for leased property. Of course, the accelerated depreciation methods of 1.R.C.
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force the congressional opposition to the boycott against Israel essentially
utilized limitations on the availability of certain tax expenditures as the sanc-
tions for this anti-boycott policy. These tax expenditures were the deferral of
income on domestic international sales corporations (DISC) and the deferral
of tax on the income of controlled foreign subsicliaries. 39 Superficially, some
may see these boycott limitations as tax penalties and deplore the use of the
tax system for that purpose—a view that has force when tax penalties are
really involved. In fact, provisions such as these, limiting existing tax expendi-
tures, perform a function quite different from the tax penalties.
It must be recognized that once tax expenditures are injected into the tax
system to serve, for example, certain international economic goals, it is accept.-
able in a policy sense to place limits on their use where the limits serve other
international goals. What may be deplored is that, in particular instances, an
analysis of the limitations may often indicate that the limitations are not the
most sensible set of sanctions. Thus, in the boycott area, since Congress has
now legislated direct. sanctions," the overlap would seem hard to justify. It
would be useful to determine whether the direct sanctions do eliminate the
need for a separate set of limits written into the tax expenditure provisions.
Another form of limitation on tax expenditures occurs when Congress, in
its "reform" efforts, 'eliminates or reduces the scope of the tax expenditure
either by applying the proper normative rule or by attaching non-normative
limitations on the use of lax expenditures. In 1976, illustrations of the first
approach were the adoption of certain capitalization requirements for farm
tax shelters and accrual accounting for certain farm corporations." An
§ 107M are themselves on the classification borderline, in view of their generosity in
many situations. Note that ADR is included in the tax expenditure list. See 1979 Spe-
cial Analysis G at 152.
""	 §§ 999, 995(b)(1)(F)(ii), and 952(a)(3). The sanctions also extend to
denial of the foreign tax credit, 1. R.C. § 908. Since that credit is not a tax expenditure.
the denial becomes a tax penalty—though perhaps the denial and the grouping of the
credit with DISC and deferral says something about the congressional attitude toward
ihe tax credit or the lack of analysis in the hasty technical implementation of the con-
gressional anti-boycott policy.
In a related matter, the 1976 Tax Reform Act. amended 1. R.C. § 964(a) to
provide that illegal bribes paid by a foreign subsidiary shall not reduce the earnings
and profits of the subsidiary, for example, to determine the inclusion of such earnings
and profits in the income of the United States parent under Subpart F. Since without
this legislation the bribe would be subtracted in determining earnings and profits—a
cold technical concept having no room for morality, see Rev. Rul. 77-442, 1977-2 C.B.
264—this legislation is a tax penalty. Congress in die Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 94 Stat. 1494, adopted direct sanctions against. bribery over-
seas by United Slates enterprises, raising the question whether the 1971i tax penalty is
now needed.
41 ' Export Administration Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91
Stat. 235.
41
 The amortization requirement for real estate construction period interest
and taxes, I.R.C. 189, does not fully apply a normative approach since it contains a
10-year limit even though the building may have a longer life. See the 1977 CBO TAX
EXPENDITURE TABULATION, supra note 12, at Table 2, for tax reform provisions that
will decrease tax expenditures.
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example of the second approach—that of using limitations that are not a part
of' the normative tax system but are simply designed to reduce the benefits of
tax expenditures—is the minimum tax. 42
These varied approaches to tax expenditures can indeed become confus-
ing and it is doubtful that the tax technicians themselves have always kept the
separate categories in mind. 43 But it is desirable to clarify the analysis of
these different approaches to ensure that resort to them remains manageable
and appropriate."
42
 The "at risk" provisions in I.R.C. § 465 are perhaps viewed by Congress as
in the same category as the minimum tax, that is, an ad hoc limitation on the tax
expenditures involved. Yet, unlike the minimum tax, whose preferences are with one
exception limited to tax expenditures, see note 38 supra, the "at risk" disallowance
extends to business expenses which are deductible as part of the normative net income
concept. It is not clear whether thought was given to this application. This application,
however, does raise the question whether the "at risk" concept is itself a normative tax
concept or a tax expenditure limitation. The basic issue is when a "loss" or "expense'
is really a "loss" or "expense." The Crane (331 U.S. I (1947)) approach allows a deduc-
tion when funds, even non-recourse borrowed funds, are spent with a reconciliation to
be made later if the taxpayer need not repay the borrowed funds. The "at risk" ap-
proach suspends the deduction until the taxpayer has spent "his own" funds, including
as "his own" funds borrowed amounts for which he is liable and leaving aside the
boundary lines involved in the definition of "at risk." The issue thus becomes one of
the proper timing of otherwise proper tax deductions. It is thus a tax accounting ques-
tion for which appropriate standards have not yet evolved. In a world where tax shel-
ters are not abused, it might be possible. to live with the Crane rule, which has the
justification of emphasizing the time at which funds were spent. In addition, "at risk"
does control the "sales price" or "market value" of assets where the only parties in-
volved, besides the I.R.S.. are the buyer and seller, and their interests are not adverse,
e.g., certain motion picture and book arrangements. The "at risk" rule is further jus-
tified by emphasizing the time at which the taxpayer had to utilize his own funds. One
gets the impression that the current Treasury technicians tend in the direction of con-
sidering the "at risk" approach to be a proper tax rule and not just an anti-tax expen-
diture abuse weapon. Impetus was given to this view by the extension of the "at risk"
rules in the 1978 Act, although real estate activities and widely held corporations re-
main exempt from the rules.
4 " Thus, 1979 Special Analysis G, at 149, groups as "negative tax expenditures
or tax penalties" the treatment of gambling losses, the limitation on the deductibility of
capital losses, the non-deductibility of costs associated with the demolition of historic
buildings, see note 36 supra, and the denial of "certain normal tax treatment" under
the anti-boycott provisions. The term "negative tax expenditures" is not a helpful one
for provisions that are tax penalties—in essence regulatory devices—and the term "tax
penalties" is more useful. Moreover, the grouping itself is improper as the text indi-
cates.
44
 The issues surrounding the classification of a foreign revenue measure as
an "income tax,'' qualifying for the foreign tax credit under I.R.C. § 901, would seem
to illustrate the text. In Revenue Rulings 78-61, 78-62, and 78-63, 1978-8 I.R.13. 11,
16, and 18, the standard applied for qualification is whether the foreign tax "consti-
tutes an 'income tax' as determined from an examination of the Federal income tax
laws of the United States." Rev. Rul. 78-62, supra.. Presumably this standard does not
require that the foreign tax contain all or any of the tax expenditures present in the
United States income tax. Yet, it would seem that the standard does require a rather
close approximation of our normative concept of an income tax—the concept which
permits our classification of non-normative provisions as tax expenditures. Thus, the
foreign tax must have a "purpose ... to reach net gain and ... is so structured as to
246	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 I Vol. 20:225
D. Excise Taxes and Regulatory Use of the Tax System
Tax expenditures represent a use of the tax system to provide gov-
ernmental financial assistance. The tax expenditures are essentially spending
programs and thus become a part of the budgetary process. In recent years,
Congress has suddenly turned to using the tax system for regulatory purposes
as well. This injection of regulatory provisions into the lax system, like the
initial use of tax expenditures, has come into being without any analysis of the
regulatory provisions themselves, or of the resulting complications for the tax
system, the regulatory process, the legislative process, and executive branch
administration. Congress has long utilized tax expenditures without develop-
ing criteria for determining when to resort to a tax expenditure and when to
resort to a direct program in situations where government assistance is the
be almost certain of doing so." Rev. Rul. 78-62, supra. But the standard should also
recognize that there can be differing responses to particular questions and each of
those responses can constitute part. of a "normative tax." The recent rulings stress that
"the gain on which the foreign lax is levied must be realized in the United States
sense." Rev. Rul. 78-62, supra. See also the phrase "gain actually realized," Rev. Rul.
78-61, supra. If this statement is understood as applying to situations involving artificial
or fictitious gains, e.g., the use of "posted prices" as the base of the tax, Rev. Rul.
78-63, supra, or other estimated gains, Rev. rul. 78-62, supra, the statement is accept-
able., But if it were used to deny credit for a general income tax which includes in the
base imputed income from owner occupied homes, as the reference in Rev. Rul. 78-63
to the Woolworth case, 54 T.C. 1233 (1970), implies, or appreciation in value reached
annually under an accrual concept (compare the Canadian Carter Commission rec-
ommendation for including accrued asset. appreciation on a five-year basis—would
such a Canadian income tax really not be creditable?), then the statement. is inappro-
priate. Such a general income tax would, certainly as far as economists view the mat-
ter, be a "better" income tax than the United States income tax.
Thus a country with an income tax that comes closer to the economists', nor-
mative model should be a qualifying "income tax" under I.R.C. § 901. A country with
an income tax that contains many tax expenditure provisions also should still have an
"income tax" within § 901. That country is like the United States, whose income tax
embodies both a normative tax and tax expenditures. A country with an income tax
that contains tax penalty provisions also should still have an "income tax" within § 901.
Thus, if a country desiring to encourage oil drilling has a tax expenditure provision
allowing the deduction of intangible drilling expenses, it still has a qualifying income
tax. If another country desiring to discourage oil drilling has a tax penalty provision
denying all deduction for drilling expenses, it also should still have a qualifying income
tax. But a country which has only a gross income tax, and thus clearly has a different
normative model to begin with, does not have a qualifying income tax.
Tax expenditure analysis can thus help to answer sonic of the questions re-
garding qualification as an "income tax" under § 901. That analysis, however, cannot
answer other questions under § 901, such as whether an income tax applied only to a
single industry is an "income tax"; whether an income tax applied only to foreigners is
an "income tax"; whether an income tax applied at one rate to foreigners from
"exemption countries" and at a higher rate to foreigners from "foreign tax credit
countries" is an "income tax"; or, whether a government which owns resources and
foregoes royalty revenues, thus relying only on its income tax, still has a qualifying
income tax. See Revenue Rulings 78-233, 78-234, and 78-235, 1978-23 I.R.B. 13, 15,
and 16, which involve some of these issues and do not resolve them in a wholly satis-
factory manner. The Internal Revenue Service has initiated a Regulations project to
examine the problem in a comprehensive fashion.
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policy goal. In similar fashion, Congress is now using the tax system for reg-
ulatory purposes, again without examining the criteria necessary to govern the
choice between tax regulatory devices and direct regulatory measures.
Historically, Congress has resorted to excise taxes—such as taxes on
white phosphorous matches, narcotic drugs, or adulterated butter"—when it
thought that direct regulation would be unconstitutional. Occasionally, Con-
gress has used these taxes when the tax committees either became impatient
with the failure of other committees to respond to public pressure, or when
the tax committees simply desired to undertake certain actions themselves.
The anti-gambling excise taxes of 1958 are an example of this use of excise
taxes. 4 " This historical regulatory use of excise taxes, however, has gradually
diminished. 47 Originally, of course, excise taxes were primarily used for rev-
enue purposes. In 1965, Congress severely reduced the number of these
revenue-raising excise taxes in a deliberate move to bring some order to the
excise tax field. Essentially, the scope of excise taxation was then limited to a
few significant revenue raising excise taxes, such as alcohol and tobacco, and
to excise taxes that were essentially user charges often connected with trust
funds, such as the various highway taxes."
In 1969, congressional tax technicians began to utilize excise taxes as
sanctions to enforce what were essentially restrictions on tax expenditures or
tax provisions that could be classified as tax expenditures. For example, in
1969 various excise taxes were adopted to restrain tax-exempt private foun-
dations from resorting to activities substantively prohibited under regulatory
tax provisions." In 1974, Congress also used such excise taxes to enforce the
substantive tax restrictions regulating pension plan activities." The basic
congressional decision in each situation was to use the tax structure itself to
impose the substantive regulatory rules. Since the tax-exempt foundation was
a creature of the tax laws, using the tax system to restrict its abuses was a
natural reaction. Even so, direct penalties rather than excise taxes could have
been used as sanctions. Nevertheless, the tax technicians, having molded the
substantive regulatory tax provisions, kept the entire regulatory structure
within the tax system by using excise lax sanctions." Most of the 1974 pen-
PATHWAYS, supra note 34, at 155. For a historical description, see R.A. LEE,
A HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION (1973).
1.R.C. §§ 4401-4424.
47
 An exception was the interest equalization tax enacted in 1964 to control
the outflow of investment dollars to purchase foreign securities. See former I.R.C. §§
4911 et. seq. (repealed 1976). The tax approach was here adopted after a thorough
canvass of alternative direct regulatory measures, such as an overall dollar limit on
purchases and a government. auction of transferable rights to purchase within that
limit.
4" Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, 79 Stat. 136.
49 I.R.C. §§ 4940-4948.
5" I.R.C. §§ 4971-4975.
'' Apparently, the Treasury Department desired sanctions involving fines and
enforcement in the federal district courts, while the joint Committee Staff desired the
excise tax sanctions.
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sion plan regulatory structure could have been placed entirely outside the
Code and implemented as a direct labor regulatory system—the Treasury ap-
proach in 1967 and 1968. 52
Other recent examples of the use of the excise tax sanction are the excise
tax on lobbying expenditures by tax-exempt organizations in excess of permit-
ted amounts.'" the excise tax on real estate investment trusts to police re-
quired distributions of income,' 4 and the excise tax on self-dealing and other
activities relating to trusts established by coal mine operators to finance black
lung benefit payments." These recent. excise tax sanctions are related to
existing tax expenditures or tax assistance provisions, and hence the use of
the tax sanction is understandable." Even here, however, no criteria seem to
have been sufficiently developed to determine when the sanction should be an
excise tax and when the sanction should be a direct civil, or even criminal,
penalty.
The recent developments in the energy field have introduced essentially
new regulatory uses of excise taxes. Unlike the fmnidation or pension plan
excise taxes, where there was a previous link to the tax system, the energy
taxes represent. an innovation. They involve a deliberate choice between using
the tax system, through excise taxes, as the way to impose regulatory policy
goals, and using direct regulatory laws to reach these same goals."
The energy regulatory taxes fall into two classes. The first class involves
the imposition of regulatory standards within the contours of excise taxes."
This regulatory use of the tax system has been favored by many economists,
especially in the pollution field,• although generally these economists have
not directed their research to developing criteria governing the choice be-
tween tax regulation and direct regulation, nor have they considered the ef-
5.2 Perhaps the House Ways and Means Committee in 1973 desired to 'get into
the act" along with the Labor committees. But in 1968, at least Chairman \l ills was
willing to follow the Treasury decision to exclude use of the tax system and instead to
consider the area as one involving only a direct regulation of labor. The Congressional
Joint Committee Staff, while acquiescing in the 1968 decision, in the 1973 legislation
desired to use the tax system.
I.R.C. § 4911.
54 1.R.C. § 4981.
55 1.R.C. §§ 4951-4953.
56	§ 4981, relating to real estate investment trusts, is an exception, since
the treatment of real estate investment trusts, mutual funds, and Subchapter S corpo-
rations, all of which are enabled, in effect, to move out of the scope of the corporation
income tax, have not been treated as tax expenditures hut. as appropriate accommoda-
tions to the relationship between the corporation income tax and the individual income
tax.
57 Most of the historical regulatory excise taxes did not involve a choice since
direct regulation was not thought to have constitutional infirmities. The 1964 interest
equalization tax did involve a choice of approaches since direct regulation was a con-
stitutional route.
58 The proposed Hospital Cost Containment Act, H.R. 8337, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), while a regulatory measure, would use an excise tax sanction applicable to
hospitals to enforce its standards.
See, e.g., A. Km:Est: & C. ScutuurzE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1975).
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fects of the choice on the legislative and administrative processes."" An
example is the "gas guzzler" excise tax on fuel-inefficient cars, adopted in
1978." A clear alternative here was a direct regulatory approach with civil
fines as the sanction. Indeed, under the Energy Production and Conservation
Act, a set of direct mileage standards simultaneously is employed to reach the
same result.
In the administrative or legislative consideration of the alternatives, no
well researched position on the criteria governing the choice between a tax
sanction and a regulatory sanction, or governing the choice to impose both a
tax sanction and a regulatory sanction, was developed. At best, in enacting the
excise tax, there seems to have been a feeling that. if direct regulation proved
too onerous for manufacturers, Congress would bail out the automobile com-
panies through new legislation rather than see prohibitive fines imposed for
failure to comply. In contrast, since the customer ultimately pays the man-
ufacturer's excise tax sanction under the tax approach, perhaps the selection
of the tax approach was based on the belief that Congress would be less ready
to bail out the customer. But if the customers rebelled against. the extra cost
of the excise tax and the companies could not sell automobiles, it is not clear
why Congress would not here also be willing to bail out the automobile com-
panies."' In short, we have no clear answer why the tax approach is prefera-
ble to the direct approach, assuming the regulatory standards are the same
under each approach. The Internal Revenue Service has had experience in
administering an excise tax in the automotive field; indeed, there is a truck
excise tax now. Presumably, the Service did not regard the excise tax ap-
proach as a significant departure from its prior responsibilities.
A second class of energy regulatory taxes is even newer in concept and
was adopted in the House version of the 1978 Energy Tax Bill. It involves the
use of the tax system as a substitute for what economists call "service ratemak-
ing." The House bill contained an excise tax on the production of crude oil,
With prices fixed on "old oil" at a lower level than "new oil," the energy
officials faced the question how to allocate the low priced oil—a typical prob-
lem in regulation when producers are prevented from obtaining windfall
prices. A tax on crude "old oil," which would in effect allow its market price
to rise to the level of "new oil" as the tax was passed on to consumers, would
eliminate this problem of allocation by eliminating any low priced oil. Such a
"" For an earlier discussion, see PATHWAYS, Supra note 34, at 155.
"' I.R.C. § 4064.
If a regulatory standard becomes difficult for a company to meet and the
standard is enforced by a fine, the standard may in effect become prohibitive or at
least involve very high compliance costs. This is because non-compliance, leading to
payment of the fine, may be regarded by the public as a lawless act and the company
would not want to subject itself to that stigma and consequent damage to its image.
Hence, Congress might be willing to step in and relax the standard. In contrast, pay-
ment of a regulatory excise tax because of non-compliance, though a cost to the com-
pany, might not carry the same stigma and image damage. Thus, a fine, though in-
tended to be non-prohibitive, may in 'operation become prohibitive, while the excise
might remain non-prohibitive.
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tax also would prevent the windfall profits from going to the producers. In-
stead, the windfall profits would go to the Treasury via the revenues collected
through the excise tax.
The receipt of the excise tax revenues led to new analytical
difficulties—what should the Treasury do with these windfall revenues? Since
billions of dollars were involved, the stakes were high. Should taxpayers in
general receive the funds through tax rebates, and if so, which taxpayers?
Should special consideration be given to low-income users of gasoline ad-
versely affected by the price rise, or should the funds be given to producers
as a quid pro quo for seeking new supplies of oil or new sources of energy?
In the alternative, should the revenues be used as "sweeteners" to soften any
recommendations for serious tax reform proposals through reduced income
tax rates, or should the revenues be used to help finance the social security
system? Should the revenues be used to finance new spending programs unre-
lated to energy? In addition to these analytical difficulties, the large amounts
involved had a macroeconomic effect which had to be taken into account in
determining fiscal policies.
One senses that the proponents of using the tax system for this second
kind of regulatory purpose did not foresee the political and economic prob-
lems involved in distributing the revenues raised by the "regulatory" excise
tax. Essentially, the tax approach substituted the problem of "who gets the
revenues" for the problem under the direct regulatory approach of "who gets
the cheap product." It is by no means clear that the new problem is any easier
to solve than the old problem. The political difficulties involved in the accep-
tability of decisions on the revenue allocation seem equally as severe as those
involved in the acceptability of decisions on the product allocation. 53
63 The House oil and gas equalization taxes and per capita rebates thereof
were not included in the final Energy Tax Act of 1978 as passed by Congress. See REP.
No. 1324, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 55-57 (1978).
This article is not the place for a comprehensive analysis of the 1977-1978
energy legislation. Obviously, a retrospective analysis describing the choices between
the tax approach and the direct regulatory approach in the various areas involved and
the reasons for the final decisions is very much in order on the part of energy and tax
experts with a taste for tax detail as well as regulatory expertise.
For a brief general description, as of July 1977, of the Administration's
energy proposals, see S. Breyer, The Regulatory Implications of the President's Energy
Proposals (The First Boston Corporation, July 1977). Professor Breyer, in the 1978
manuscript of a forthcoming book, "The Reform of Economic Regulation," discusses
briefly the considerations relevant to the choice between tax regulation and direct reg-
ulation in the two classes of regulatory situations described in this article, and his dis-
cussion is not limited to the energy field. The discussion leans to the use of the tax
system, but has yet to be extended to the impact on the legislative or administrative
process and the political and economic problems involved in allocating the revenues in
the second class of situations. A later paper by Breyer, Taxes as a Substitute for Regu-
lation, in Papers on Energy Policy Meeting on Growth and Change (Univ. of Ken-
tucky, 1978), touches on these latter aspects and also on the technical problems in-
volved in determining the amount of the appropriate tax. See also Brannon, Tax Policy
and Producer Incentives in the Energy Crisis, in Papers on Energy Policy Meeting on
Growth and Change (Univ. of Kentucky, 1978); Davenport, The Role of Taxation in the
Regulation of Energy Production and Consumption, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 221 (1978); Mead, The
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Clearly, much more analysis is required before we can decide whether or
when a tax approach in either of these two classes of regulation is preferable
to a direct. regulatory approach. The economists who feel they know the dif-
ficulties of the regulatory approach seem far too eager to seize on the tax
system, though it is apparent they have not yet foreseen the difficulties that
may exist in the latter choice. Not the least of these difficulties is how Con-
gress should handle the consideration of regulatory taxes, a matter discussed
further in Part V.
As stated earlier, the "tax penalty" provisions in the income tax can also
be analyzed as regulatory measures, though the regulatory purpose in their
adoption is not as evident as in the use of the various regulatory excise taxes.
Since there are few tax penalty provisions, little thought seems to have been
given to developing the criteria necessary to determine whether an income tax
penalty or a direct regulatory approach is preferable in a particular situation.
We would suppose these criteria would not differ from those that should gov-
ern when a regulatory excise tax is involved.
Since we do not yet have full understanding of the criteria appropriate to
a choice between providing financial assistance through the tax system—tax
expenditures—rather than through direct spending, and equally do not have
the criteria for determining when to regulate through the tax system—
income tax penalties and regulatory excise taxes—rather than through direct
regulation, we are not in a position fully to compare the criteria for
similarities and differences. Certainly the major questions are the same—
whether the governmental goal is an appropriate one; to what extent will the
tax approach or the direct approach achieve the desired objective; and, if
both approaches are possible candidates, which approach is the more effec-
tive. We can alsO sense that the problems caused, for example, in the legisla-
tive process and in tax administration would be present under each approach.
The definitional questions involved in analyzing these major questions would
also seem the same in that the regulatory excise taxes resemble tax credits and
are easy to identify and in that the tax penalties present the same kind of
classification issue as do tax expenditure exclusions or deductions. Moreover,
the aspect of estimation would also appear identical. Further, while the
upside-clown aspect of tax expenditures is not present. in the regulatory excise
taxes, it is present in the tax penalty provisions, where it operates adversely to
the taxpayer as contrasted with tax expenditure assistance." We are thus left
with the general view that the criteria and issues are essentially identical,
Uses of Taxes, Regulation and Price Controls in the Energy Sector, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 229
(1978).
Of course, traditional direct regulation, such as rent control or fixing a low
price on old oil, can be analyzed as an implicit tax on the owners of real property or
the producers of oil, with implicit direct spending to tenants or the consumers of oil
products. Rut Congress has not taken this approach, and the Lax committees presum-
ably would not claim jurisdiction over such direct controls.
64
 Those advocating regulatory taxes must keep in mind that the taxes are
deductible, whereas direct fines or penalties are not deductible. See PATHWAYS, supra
note 34, at 172-73. In the case of the gas guzzler tax, the purchaser would be denied
inclusion of the tax in basis, so that in effect the tax, like a fine, becomes non-
deductible. § 1016(e).
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whether it be tax expenditure assistance or regulatory excise taxes and income
tax penalties that are under consideration." 5 Perhaps further thought will
disclose differences that may exist, and this question is thus an aspect of the
exploration necessary in both areas.
E. Other Taxes
The first list of federal tax expenditures for taxes other than the income •
tax was prepared in the 1976-1977 period. Senator Kennedy, in testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee in 1976, submitted a list of tax expendi-
tures prepared by the authors for the estate and gift taxes as in effect prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1976." Subsequently, we prepared a revised list of
tax expenditures under the estate, gift, and generation-skipping taxes, reflect-
ing the changes made by the 1976 Act." 7 That list is set forth in Appendix C.
It is understood that technicians in the Office of Ni a nage men t. and
Budget (OMB) and in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have co ►n-
"5 The question whether a monetary levy a "tax" or a regulatory assessment
presents a different question from whether an admitted tax is being used for regula-
tory purposes. As to the former question, there can be borderline cases in which a
monetary' levy may either - be a "tax" or a "11011-lax" measure involving fines, assess-
uterus, or the like. See, e.g., the legislative history involving the financing of payments
to miners afflicted by "black lung" disease. While originally structured as a non-tax
measure involving a fund financed by "premiums" and "assessments" on coal mined,
as a result of a jurisdictional claim by the Senate Finance Committee over the measure
because it involved a "tax," the legislation finally emerged in the technical language of
a tax. See Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11
(1978). adding I.R.C. 4121 to the Code. This per ton tax on coal finances the Black
Lung Compensation Insurance Fund, established to pay benefits under the Black
Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. I... No, 95-239, § 13, 92 Stat.. 95 (1978).
The question whether a financial payment is a "tax" can, of course, arise apart
from congressional committee .jurisdiction (including the constitutional provision that
bills "raising revenue- must originate in the House), e.g., under § 164 allowing a de-
duction for "taxes," (see, e.g., Trujillo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C, 670 (1977) and McGo-
wan v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 599 (1976) (deciding mandatory "contributions" of a
percentage of , wages to a state disability fund are deductible "income taxes" under
I.R.C. § 164(a))); I.R.C. § 901 allowing a credit for "income taxes"; the constitutional
requirement that "all Duties, Imports and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United Stales," U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 8, el. I.
Under preseni attitudes, an excise tax would be administered by the Internal
Revenue Service, but a fine (or fee or assessment.) would he administered by the
regulatory agency involved, with resort to the federal courts where necessary. Presum-
ably, an excise tax could be administered by a regulatory agency even though a "tax" is
involved, hut. it. would seem that this approach would be unlikely.
It limy he observed that some "complexity" issues are different. for lax expen-
ditures than for regulatory taxes. Thus, a tax expenditure complicates the income tax
form while a regulatory excise is likely to be compartmentalized with its own separate
form. Nloreover, the audit and administrative problems tray differ - in other respects.
I"' Revision of Ferleml Estate Tax Law, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. nit Finance,
94111 Cong., 2c1 Sess. 22. 45 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy),
1 ' 7 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL, & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXATION 884 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL WEALTH TAXATION].
Sec id. at 880-87, for a discussion of particular items included in or excluded from the
list, and the revenue estimating procedures employed.
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menced studies looking toward the inclusion of tax expenditures under the
wealth transfer taxes in the annual tax expenditure list prepared by those
offices. It is important that this work proceed since present tax expenditure
lists, while encompassing the bulk of tax expenditures, do not as yet give a
complete picture of the extent of spending effected through the federal tax
system."
II. TAX POLICY ISSUES
The tax expenditure concept, as it is gradually internalized by those re-
sponsible for and involved in the formulation of tax policy, has produced
some discernible shifts in several areas normally denominated as "tax policy"
issues. It has become increasingly clear that a number of matters traditionally
treated as concerns of "tax policy" would more accurately be classified as
"spending policy" issues. It remains true, however, that decisions to utilize the
tax system to expend federal funds do have important implications for nor-
mative tax policy issues. In this part, we consider the impact of the tax ex-
penditure concept on both tax and spending policy issues.
A. Tax Reform Aspects
Recent legislative efforts for tax reform centered almost exclusively on
items in the tax expenditure list. Data showing that very high income indi-
viduals pay little or no income tax" have continued to fuel the guest for tax
"" OMB does not require any specific statutory authority to expand its tax
expenditure budget to include the wealth transfer taxes. See 120 CoNG. REC. S7935
(1974) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the Estate and Gift Tax
Reform Act of 1976 recognized that lax expenditures are contained in the estate and
gift tax provisions. However, the Report then proceeded to list as tax expenditures
some items that constitute part of the normal structure of a transfer tax (e.g., the
marital deduction) as well as true tax expenditures. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 73 (1976). This kind of confusion illustrates the need for the careful separa-
tion in the wealth transfer taxes of the normal lax provisions from the tax expenditure
provisions.
69 See U.S. TREAS. DEPT., H1GD INCOME TAX RETURNS: 1974 AND 1975 (Mar.
3, 1977); U.S. TREAS. DEPT., HIGH INCOME TAX RFEURNS: 1975 AND 1976 (Aug. 1978),
for reports on high income taxpayers emphasizing those tax returns that incurred little
or nq lax liability. The 1977 Report revealed that in 1975, 215 returns with adjusted
gross income (AG1) of $200,000 or inure paid no federal income tax; 2,858 returns
with AGE of $50,000 or more paid no tax. The Treasury report complacently reas-
sured us, however, that "most" high income taxpayers pay "very substantial amounts of
tax," although the data supplied by the Treasury indicated that these "substantial"
amounts were in fact considerably below the taxes that would have been paid had
these same taxpayers not been the beneficiaries of lax preferences. The 1978 Report
disclosed that, as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the number of no-tax indi-
viduals with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $200,000 had declined to 22 in 1976.
The 1978 Report emphasized that the problem of low effective rate-high income indi-
viduals was even a greater problem than the no-tax individuals. Finally, the report
noted, the average effective tax rate for the over-$200,000 income group was only
35%, which the Treasury described as "substantial." 1978 Report at 5-7.
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reform.'" The reasons why wealthy individuals do not pay the effective rates
of tax at the levels indicated by the tax rate schedules are almost without.
exception to be found in the tax expenditure budget."
Appendix B sets forth the distribution by income class of tax expendi-
tures provided through the individual income tax for fiscal 1977. These statis-
tics clearly reveal both the reasons why the progressivity of the federal income
tax system is so much less than a 14-70 percent rate schedule would imply,
and why taxpayers with the same economic incomes can pay substantially dif-
ferent amounts of federal income taxes. Specifically, Appendix B indicates the
quantitative extent of the upside-down character of the tax expenditures
employed in the United States. In fiscal 1977, the top 1.4 percent of tax-
payers, with "expanded gross income" 72 of $50,000 or more, received 31.3
Some have seized on the Treasury studies to conclude that the income tax
bears disproportionately on the upper income groups in the country. They reach this
rather startling conclusion by referring to such facts as the upper one-half income
group pays 94% of all personal income taxes, the top 25% pay over 70% of personal
income taxes, and the top 1.4% (over $50,000 adjusted gross income) pay 23% of the
taxes. See 124 CONG. Rec. H 1975-76 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Kemp). The conclusion that upper income groups pay a disproportionate amount of
tax, on the basis of these facts, is a non sequitur. The data merely reflect the use of a
progressive income tax in the United States. Similar results would be expected if the
marginal rates ranged from 2% to 20%. The only relevant data to determine the ap-
propriateness of the tax burden on upper income individuals are clam pertaining to
effective rates of tax. Here, studies have repeatedly shown that, on the average, the
effective rate never exceeds about 32% to 36%, even for taxpayers with incomes in
excess of $1 million annually. Such data hardly seems to justify a picture of an "over-
burdened" upper income class. For recognition of this point, see 124 CONG. REC.
H7924 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1978) (statement of Rep. Wright); 124 CONG. REC. E1819
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978) (statement of Rep. Vento).
7 " Nevertheless, the reduction in the tax rate on capital gains, in the Revenue
Act of 1978, demonstrated little concern for this situation.
7 ' The period from 1976 to 1978 did not produce significant developments in,
or require modification of, our earlier analysis of the use of effective rates in formulat-
ing tax policy. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 698-706. Those studies on effective
rates that have appeared confirm our prior conclusion that traditional effective rate
analysis—comparing actual taxes paid to actual economic income—remains a valid
and useful tool in determining the effects of tax expenditures. See, e.g., the following
studies by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service: Gravelle, Tax
Provisions and Effective Tax Rates in the Oil and Gas Industry (Oct. 6, 1977), reprinted
in 123 CONG. REC. S16946 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1977) (statement of Sen. Kennedy);
Gravelle, Provisions Reducing the Effective Tax Rate of Commercial Banking Organi-
zations (Jan. 19, 1977). See also U.S. TREAS. DEPT., EFFECTIVE INCOME TAX RATES PAID
BY UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS IN 1972 (May, 1978). See note 69 supra.
" "Expanded gross income" is adjusted gross income plus tax preferences sub-
ject to the minimum tax. The term does not include items of income that do not
appear on tax returns, notably interest from tax-exempt bonds.
A curious aspect of the "expanded gross income" definition is that it treats the
deduction for investment interest up to the amount of investment income as not a tax
preference. Apparently, in the view of the Treasury economists, high income tax-
payers routinely borrow funds and make investments with no objective of making a
profit. But the Treasury assumption seems clearly wrong and results in an overstate-
ment of the effective rates of tax paid by high income taxpayers. More analysis is
required to allocate properly investment interest. One suspects, for example, that a
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percent of the Treasury "tax checks" delivered through the tax expenditure
mechanism—over $26 billion out of a total of almost $84 billion spent. On
the average, taxpaying units in this select group received, in effect, federal
subsidies of $71,429. The 49,000 taxpayers with incomes above $200,000,
representing 5/100 of 1 percent of total returns, on the average received fed-
eral tax subsidies of $535,653. Tax sheltered individuals live in stately man-
sions!
The upside-down character of tax expenditures is also strikingly apparent
when individual items in the tax expenditure budget are considered. The top
1.4 percent of taxpayers, with expanded gross incomes of $50,000 or more,
received from 66.7 percent to 80 percent of tax expenditures for natural re-
sources; 85.4 percent of the tax expenditures resulting from exemption of the
interest on state and local bonds; 87 percent of the revenues from tax-exempt
industrial development bonds issued for pollution control purposes; 86.3 per-
cent of the tax expenditures involved in industrial development bonds gener-
ally; 75.6 percent of the tax expenditures for rental housing; 60 percent of
the benefits from the Asset. Depreciation Range (ADR) system; 73.3 percent
of the revenues involved in the charitable contributions deduction for educa-
tion; 58.8 percent of the revenues from the charitable contributions deduction
for health; 43.2 percent of the revenues for all other charitable contributions
deductions; 67.7 percent of the tax expenditures resulting from preferential
treatment of capital gains; and 100 percent of the benefits of the maximum
tax on earned income.
While some tax expenditures provide relatively greater benefits to those
with incomes below $50,000, only 14 of the 69 tax expenditures set forth in
Appendix B reflect a progressive distribution pattern, that is, the greatest per-
centage of benefits going to the low income groups, with the percentage de-
clining as income increases. Moreover, these 14 tax expenditures involve only
$10.9 billion. In short., less than 13 percent of the total tax expenditures are
distributed on a progressive basis."
It thus remains true, after a decade of tax reform efforts sharpened by
tax expenditure analysis, that the overwhelming majority of tax expenditure
programs, and of the funds distributed thereunder, benefit the upper income
groups. Not only are the tax expenditure provisions the primary cause of tax
inequity, but it seems safe to say that the provisions do not even achieve what
most Americans would perceive to be a fair distribution of funds, measured
by criteria applied to direct spending programs. Major strides toward tax
equity—horizontal and vertical—could be achieved by eliminating all the tax
expenditures front the Internal Revenue Code. But, short of total repeal, ac-
large part of the investment interest should be allocated to untaxed, unrealized ap-
preciation. The 1978 Treasury Report, supra note 69, at. 12-14, reflects a greater sen-
sitivity to the problem, recognizing that the decision to treat only investment. expenses
in excess of investment income as the tax preference element is an - arbitrary- one.
Existing data do not. however, permit a more precise method of matching interest
deductions and income.
7 " See Manycl, Tax Expeudilures by Income Classes, 7 TAX NOTES No. 3 at 55 (July
17, 1978) (describing the allocation of tax expenditures to income classes in terms of
transfer payments, capital gain items, and all other tax expenditures).
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Lion can be taken to improve the fairness of both the tax system and of the
tax expenditure programs. The 1976-1978 legislative experience revealed
some significant trends in this "second best" approach to tax reform."
B. The Trend to Tax Credits
1. Tax Credits Versus Special Tax Deductions: Efficiency, Equity, and Pro-
gram Funding Issues
A trend continued during the period from 1976 to 1978 was the in-
creased reliance on tax credits, instead of special deductions or exemptions, as
the mechanism for providing federal financial aid or incentives through the
tax system. The reasons for the shift to tax credits vary depending on the
type of preferential provision which they replace. In determining whether tax
credits should be utilized in lieu of special business deductions, for example,
the tax expenditure concept indicates that the same cost-benefit analysis must
be made of tax spending programs as is made of direct spending programs.
The results of such analysis tend to favor using tax credits rather than special
deductions, assuming, of course, that the studies demonstrate a need for some
federal financial assistance.
Cost-benefit studies have been particularly effective in exposing the inef-
ficiencies in the program areas supported by the "tax shelter" deductions. For
example, studies have demonstrated an unacceptably high level of inefficiency
in the tax expenditures used to construct oil and gas, and real estate tax shel-
ters. 75 This inefficiency results from passive tax shelter investors retaining a
substantial portion of tax expenditure funds which should be expended in
actual drilling or construction operations. The waste, in large part, results
from the interaction of progressive rates with the special deduction technique.
In effect, the tax shelter syndicator is selling the tax benefits that the driller
or developer is unable to use. While the special deductions for oil or real
estate are valuable for the 70 percent tax bracket investors, there are not
enough 70 percent investors to provide the driller or developer with needed
funds. Accordingly, the tax shelter deal is modified to make it attractive to the
50 percent investor, with a resulting windfall to the investors in brackets
above 50 percent, and a waste•of federal funds. A tax credit to the driller or
developer, even if available to passive investors, would largely eliminate this
type of inefficiency. 7e
74 For a general discussion of tax reform issues, vintage early 1978, see Surrey,
Current Tax Developments in Perspective, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 807 (1978),
Regarding real estate tax shelters, see H. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES:
WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES? (1972); Kurtz, Tax Incentives for Real
Estate Have Failed, 3 REAL ESTATE REV. No. 2 (Suinmer 1973); McDaniel, Tax Reform
and the Revenue Acl of 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and Lessons, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 813 (1973). Regarding oil and gas tax shelters, see G. BRANNON, ENERGY TAXES
AND SUBSIDIES (1974); McDaniel, Tax Shelters and Tax Policy, 26 NAT'I. TAX J. 353
(1973).
7 " Additionally, the studies have shown that even where the funds are
employed by drillers and developers, investments with low national priorities result,
e.g., development wells instead of exploratory drilling, or shopping centers instead of
low-income housing. This aspect of the efficiency problem, however, is one of proper
program design, rather than one of credits versus deductions.
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A 1977 Congressional Budget Office study of real estate tax shelter sub-
sidies reached a similar conclusion, and recommended that consideration be
given to replacing the accelerated depreciation deduction for real estate with a
tax credit for builders of low income housing. Similarly, it has been proposed
that the deduction for intangible drilling and development costs be replaced
with a tax credit. 77 In recent years, the enactment of new tax subsidies to
business via the tax credit technique, such as the WIN tax credit 78
 and the
target jobs tax credit, 79 further illustrate this response to the inefficiency of
certain special deductions.
More recently, the 1977 National Energy Plan, as proposed by the Presi-
dent, contained new or expanded tax expenditure programs, almost all of
which were structured as tax credits. The President recommended that tax-
payers' costs of undertaking certain energy conservation and conversion ac-
tions be reduced. The cost reduction was provided in some instances by tax
credits and in others by direct spending programs. The President's National
Energy Plan unfortunately did riot articulate why tax spending was to be pre-
ferred over direct spending in any given program area. Where the tax route
was proposed, however, the tax credit mechanism was almost exclusively
employed. Thus, in the business area, the President's plan included a 10 per-
cent tax credit for investment in approved conservation measures arid a 10
percent tax credit for investment in energy saving equipment. The lone ex-
ception to the credit approach was a proposal to extend the special deduction
for intangible drilling costs to geothermal drilling." •
In Congress, the House generally followed the President's approach to
national energy policy, although it did add a percentage depletion allowance
for geothermal resources." The Senate nevertheless rejected the Presidential
and House bill reliance on taxes as regulatory or penalty measures. The Sen-
ate Finance Committee version shifted entirely to the tax incentive route, pro-
viding for sonic $40 billion in new and expanded tax expenditures between
1978 and 1985. 82 Additional tax expenditures were added on the Senate
floor. With only a few exceptions, both the Finance Committee and the floor
amendments relied on tax expenditures in the form of tax credits, rather than
special deductions or exemptions." The Energy Tax Act of 1978, as it fi-
77
 As to housing, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ESTATE TAX SHEL-
TER SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES (May 1977) [hereinafter cited as
CBO HOUSING STUDY]. As to oil, see McDaniel, Tax Shelters and Tax Policy, 26 NAT'L
TAx J. 353, 375 (1973); Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R.• 10612 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SFC
1976 Hearings].
I.R.C. ** 40, 50A-5011,
1.R.C. ** 44B, 51-53. The targeted jobs tax credit was adopted in the Rev-
enue Act of 1978 to replace the expiring new jobs tax credit.
80 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING,
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN].
8 ' H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 129-30 (1976).
82 S. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-26 (1977).
83 See e.g., the Senate version of the energy tax bill, H.R. 5263, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) § 1012 (energy cost credit for the elderly); § 1013 (credit for increased
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nally emerged from Congress, more closely followed the Senate than the
House approach, although a modified regulatory "gas guzzler" tax was in-
cluded
The tax expenditure concept inevitably does drive advocates of tax pref-
erences toward the use of credits as opposed to special deductions or exemp-
tions. As the 1977-1978 energy tax legislation demonstrated, tax credits and
direct grants result, or can result, in identical economic consequences to the
government and to beneficiaries of the programs." This result does not.
mean, however, that tax policy makers therefore should be indifferent to the
use of tax credits as opposed to direct grants. There are important differences
in, and consequences of employing, the two approaches which to date have
not been sufficiently appreciated or analyzed by proponents of tax expendi-
tures. Some of the more crucial of these differences and consequences will be
identified below.
The trend to tax credits in lieu of special deductions in the business area
continues to demonstrate that neither Congress nor a number of departments
in the executive branch have yet mastered the technique of evaluating tax
credits as alternatives to direct grants. The Senate Finance Committee Report
and the Senate floor debates on the proposed energy tax credits dem-
onstrated that the Senate had very little concrete evidence before it (1) as to
the need for a given credit; (2) if there was a need, why the level of funding
provided by the credit was appropriate; or, (3) whether the program design
implicit in the credit reflected the program design which would have been
adopted had a direct spending program been under consideration.
This last point requires a caveat. The tax expenditure analysis should not
lead policy makers unthinkingly into substituting tax credits for special busi-
ness deductions. Assuming that a need for federal financial aid for a particu-
lar activity has been established, the next question is the most effective form
cost due to imported oil); § 1028 (credit for electric motor vehicles); § 1044 (tax credit
for production of oil and gas from nonconventional sources); § 1055(e) (credit for
home heating oil). Exceptions to the tax credit approach included § 1027(b) (exclusion
from employer income of value of employer-furnished van pooling services); § 1042
(percentage depletion for peat and geopressured methane gas); § 1043 (intangibles
deduction for geopressurized methane gas).
8♦ The final bill included tax credits for residential insulation and other energy
conserving components; for residential solar, wind, and geothermal equipment; for
vehicles used in van pooling; for personal use electric or hydrogen motor vehicles; for
business investment in "alternative energy property" and "specially defined" energy
property; for business insulation costs; and, for business investment. in congeneration
and recycling equipment. Tax expenditures that did not employ the credit technique
included the exclusion from income of employer-provided van pooling service; percen-
tage depletion for geothermal deposits and geopressured natural gas; and, immediate
deduction of intangible drilling costs for geothermal wells. S. REP. No. 1324, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
85 For example, the President proposed a tax credit for certain business
energy conservation costs. He proposed, however, direct grants to tax-exempt organi-
zations that incurred the same costs. No explanation was offered why the direct grant
approach was adopted for tax-exempt entities rather than refundable tax credits, and
tax credits for business rather than direct grants. See NATIONAI. ENERGY PLAN, supra
note 80, at 42.
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of providing that aid. Generally, the alternatives to tax credits are outright
grants and loans. Assume that the loan approach is adopted. If it is then
decided to provide the loan through the tax system, three techniques are
available: (1) accelerated deductions in which the amount of the loan is the
tax saving in the early years of the life of the asset; (2) an income exclusion
with a corresponding basis adjustment, in which the amount of the loan is the
amount of tax that would have been due had the excluded amount consti-
tuted currently taxable income; or, (3) a tax credit. repayable in full over time
with no basis reduction, in which the amount of the loan is the creditable
amount itself. The amount of the "tax loan" under the first two techniques is
a function of the tax rates—the higher the tax bracket the larger the amount
of the federal loan.
The repayable tax credit approach in (3) makes the same federal loan
available regardless of the bracket of the taxpayer. In this sense, therefore,
the results in approach (3) seem fairer than those in approaches (I) and (2).
But, if one compares the results to commercial lending practices, that conclu-
sion is less certain. Private lending institutions do, after all, lend larger
amounts to those with higher incomes than to those with lower incomes. The
rationale for this practice is obvious and it would seem not patently unreason-
able for the government to adopt the same view in the loan programs that it
administers. Thus, the shift from an accelerated deduction to a tax credit is
not necessarily called for if (a) a loan rather than a direct grant is the desired
form of federal assistance, and (b) the variation in the size of loans under the
accelerated deduction is roughly equivalent to that observed in commercial
lending practices. On the other hand, because it is the government making
the loan, attention must be focused on the question whether individuals and
corporations with large net incomes merit larger loans than do their lower
income counterparts.
There is, moreover, one marked difference between private and most di-
rect government loans and the loans made available through techniques (I)
and (2) above. This difference lies in the failure to charge interest. on the "tax
loan" programs. 86
 Possibly, an interest charge would be imposed if Congress
adopted technique (3). This situation could be remedied by imposing a direct
annual interest. charge on taxes deferred as the result of accelerated deduc-
tions, or deferred income inclusion. The interest incurred could be paid to
the Treasury each year with the taxpayer's tax return. Such a procedure
would complicate tax administration. Moreover, Congress to date has not dis-
played much concern over the interest free use of government funds through
accelerated deductions. If that concern develops, then it is possible that a shift
to repayable tax credits in technique (3) would take place since the amount of
the loan in the case of tax credits would appear simpler to determine than
would the amount of the loan generated by the tax savings from accelerated
deductions. Again, to emphasize a familiar point, the foregoing analysis does
8"
 The minimum tax may be viewed as an annual interest charge on the tax
loans effected through the accelerated deductions to which it applies. The interest
charge is quite erratic, however, varying (I) from taxpayer to taxpayer as a result of
the basic exemption and offset for one-half of the regular taxes paid, and (2) from
asset to asset depending on its useful life.
260	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:225
not suggest that the government should use the tax system to provide loans. It
simply points out that if the tax system is to be used (a very big if?), proper
construction of the loan program does not necessarily involve the use of tax
credits rather than accelerated deductions.
In the area of business tax subsidies, therefore, the waste resulting from
the interaction of deductions and progressive rates that has been identified
and quantified by the tax expenditure concept appears to have been an im-
portant factor in the congressional and executive branch decisions to employ
tax credits rather than special deductions as the mechanism for providing the
subsidies. But, in terms of clearly demonstrating the need for federal financial
support, identifying effective program design, establishing proper levels of
federal funding, and articulating the criteria for choosing the tax as opposed
to the direct spending route to aid business, Congress and the executive
branch still fall considerably short of full implementation of the tax expendi-
ture analysis."
In the area of federal tax subsidies for personal expenditures, a similar
trend to tax credits is emerging. New tax expenditure proposals more fre-
quently take the form of tax credits rather than itemized personal deductions,
and a number of proposals have been advanced to convert existing deductions
to tax credits. Three major aspects of tax expenditure analysis appear to have
contributed to this trend.
First, tax expenditure analysis has been particularly effective in exposing
the upside-down results produced by special deductions for personal costs."
The tax credit technique is perceived to avoid an increase in benefits as a
87 For example, the targeted jobs tax credit enacted as part of the Revenue
Act of 1978 provides lax credits to employers who hire qualified employees from
seven specific "target groups." I.R.C. § 51(d). Qualified employees are those certified
as such by the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury. Since the Labor
Department appears to be the appropriate agency to handle employment programs, its
presence in the certification procedure is logical. What was never made clear, however,
was why the Department of Labor was not also authorized to issue the subsidy checks
directly, since its certification constituted the critical program eligibility requirement.
In short, the program was structured to require both Labor and Treasury involve-
ment, when it appeared Labor alone would have been sufficient. Perhaps the real
answer lies not in program design issues, but in the issue of which congressional com-
mittees would exercise control over the program. See infra, Part V.
Two 1978 changes in tax expenditures did not employ the tax credit ap-
proach. One was the increase in the exclusion for long-term capital gains from 50% to
60% of the gain. This change was viewed as an expansion of an existing tax expendi-
ture in a form that it had traditionally taken. No thought was given to converting the
exclusion to a tax credit.. The other change was the introduction of a series of special
deductions for United States citizens living overseas. Here again, tax credits could have
been employed. However, the use of deductions in I.R.C. § 913 appears to have been
grounded in part on the mistaken view that the excess expenditures incurred by a
United States citizen living abroad for higher costs of living, education, housing, home
travel and living in "hardship" areas represent extraordinary costs of producing in-
come. Although the items appear to be personal under normal United States lax prin-
ciples, use of the deduction technique would be appropriate if one were persuaded
that in fact they represented costs of producing income.
" Sonic commentators have asserted that the "upside-down" argument is not
applicable to the deduction for charitable contributions. This conclusion is reached,
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function of higher tax brackets, a result that is produced automatically when
the deduction technique is employed. It is not clear whether tax credit propo-
nents philosophically believe that benefits should not rise with income or
whether they simply wish to eliminate an argument against their proposed tax
expenditure. In any event, it is evident that an expenditure program effected
through a tax credit usually more closely resembles a corresponding direct
program than does one implemented through a special deduction or exemp-
tion (we, at least, are unaware of any direct spending programs that are struc-
tured to provide progressively increased financial benefits as income or wealth
rises). The impact of the equity issues so dramatically posed by tax expendi-
ture analysis of personal deductions is reflected in the evolution in the pro-
posed tax expenditure for the costs of higher education. Initially, such pro-
posals were almost always advanced in the form of special deductions for such
costs or for contributions to a "qualified higher education fund." 89 Sub-
sequently, however, proponents of tax expenditures for higher education
costs converted their proposals to the tax credit approach approved by the
Senate in 1976 and 1977, 9 ° and by both the House and Senate in 1978. 9 '
however, by using an "after tax and after charitable deductions disposable income" test
and then observing that, under this test, changing the deduction for charitable con-
tributions to a credit would be more beneficial to the rich, since the consequent decline
in their charitable contributions caused by the decline in tax benefit would give the
rich more disposable income. Since the price elasticity effect of the tax deduction is
greater than one, the rich would save more in lower charitable contributions than their
increased tax, and the poor would give up in higher contributions more than their
lowered tax. But one can ask whence comes the "disposable income" test. The fact that
the rich are moved to change the consumption patterns previously induced by the tax
system to patterns that involve less in charitable contributions and more in, say, travel
or entertainment is not an argument against the upside-down characterization. The
increase in disposable income produced by the tax change, as compared to the prior
pattern, is just the reflection of the earlier shift in how disposable income was utilized.
An increase in disposable income could equally result if a previously allowed deduction
for, say, travel expenses, were eliminated, but that is hardly an argument that the
elimination would favor the rich or that the initial allowance of the deduction hurt the
rich.
Essentially the above argument must rest on the view that contributions to
charity are not "consumption" under the Haig-Simons definition. This view hardly
seems supportable when, for example, one reads literature urging the wealthy and
corporations to contribute only to those colleges that would employ more
conservatively-inclined professors. The view that the charitable contribution is not
"consumption" really comes from changing "consumption" in the Haig-Simons defini-
tion to refer to a "standard of living" and then concluding that since charitable con-
tributions do not increase a "[material] standard of living" they are not "consumption."
There is some of this same shift in definition in U.S. TREASURY DEPT., BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM (Jan. 17, 1977), 31 et seq. But the shift in definition does . not seem
an acceptable modification of the Haig-Simons definition. One doubts that Simons
would approve this reworking of his definition.
" See, e.g., H.R. 9678, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
9" See The Tax Reform Bill of 1976, H.R. 10612, § 2601, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(as passed by the Senate); The Social Security Financing Amendments of 1977, Senate
Amendment No. 1057 to H.R. 9346, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (as passed by the Senate),
123 CoNG. REC. S 18792-93 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977).
91 See H.R. REP. No. 1790, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (the Conference Com-
mittee report on the Tuition Tax Credit Act of 1978).
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A second aspect of special itemized personal deductions thrown into
sharp relief by tax expenditure analysis is the exclusion of standard deduction
(zero bracket amount) taxpayers from the tax expenditure program. With the
higher standard deduction figures approved in 1975, 1977, and 1978, 92 every
tax expenditure program implemented as an itemized personal deduction au-
tomatically excludes some 77 percent of all taxpayers—almost all of whom are
low and middle income individuals—from the program. Although the result
could be avoided by allowing the itemized deduction outside the standard de-
duction, that is, removing the implicit floor imposed on all itemized deduc-
tions by the zero bracket amount, such an action would not eliminate the
upside-down effect of the subsidy. The tax credit approach may therefore be
the more acceptable way to include in the tax spending program those whose
itemized deductions are below the zero bracket amount. Such considerations
appear to account in part for the decisions in the 1978 Energy Tax Act to
provide individual tax credits instead of itemized personal deductions for
solar energy equipment, energy saving devices such as windmills, energy sav-
ing efforts such as installing storm windows or more energy-efficient heating
equipment, and for the purchase of electric powered automobiles." Simi-
larly, suggestions to convert the present itemized deductions for charitable
contributions and home mortgage interest and property taxes to credits ap-
pear motivated in part by the equity issues raised by the tax expenditure
analysis."
Third, tax expenditure analysis has accelerated the trend towards tax
credits by demonstrating that when an itemized personal deduction is viewed
as a spending program, the level of funding for the program fluctuates up
and down as the result of decisions totally unrelated to the program itself. An
increase in tax rates automatically increases the federal spending inherent in a
special deduction or exemption. Conversely, a tax reduction automatically
reduces the size of the tax expenditure program. Once this fluctuation is
perceived, it becomes evident that beneficiaries of a special deduction have a
direct financial stake in every tax change considered by the Treasury or
Congress. 95 Some specific examples of this phenomenon are discussed in
Part IV.
Recognition that general tax trends are in the direction of reducing the
value of the itemized personal deductions, and that support of the deduction
92 The Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26, increased
the standard deduction to 16% of adjusted gross income with an overall maximum of
$2,600 for joint returns and $2,300 for single individuals. The Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126, converted the standard
deduction (and the prior low - income allowances) to a $3,200 "zero bracket amount"
for joint returns ($2,200 for single individuals). The Revenue Act of 1978 increased
the zero bracket amounts to $3,400 and $2,300 respectively.
See note 84 supra.
94 123 CoNG. REC. S11408 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy),
" See 124 CoNG. REC. H2395 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1978) (statement of Rep. Con-
able), for a discussion of the estimated decline in charitable receipts resulting from
increases in the standard deduction since 1969.
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mechanism involves beneficiaries of special deductions in tax issues in which
they should have little interest, may lead to the conclusion that each itemized
deduction should be replaced with a tax credit. For example, some charitable
organizations 9" and some congressional supporters 97
 of incentives for private
philanthropic giving have recommended that a tax credit be substituted for
the charitable contribution deduction. A tax credit equal to, for example, 30
percent of the donor's contribution would insure that aggregate amounts re-
ceived by charity would be increased somewhat over present levels. Moreover,
the credit would be much more insulated from extraneous shifts in tax policy
than is a deduction. Consequently, it seems likely that we shall see a greater
interest in the use of tax credits instead of itemized personal deductions as the
beneficiaries and supporters of programs financed via the itemized personal
deduction mechanism become more cognizant of the arbitrary variations in
federal funding levels for their programs, produced by actions completely un-
related to the tax expenditure program itself.
2. Tax Credits Versus Basic and Dependents' Exemptions: Interaction of
Spending and Structural Issues
Tax expenditure analysis does not, of course, imply that all deductions or
exemptions should be converted to tax credits. If a deduction or exemption is
a part of the normal structure of a tax on net income, it is inappropriate to
convert such a provision to a tax credit. For example, replacing a deduction
for wages with a tax credit would impose a tax penalty on those in tax brack-
ets above the one corresponding to the break-even point for the tax--credit.
Such a penalty provision is as much a deviation from a normal tax system
based on net income as is a tax preference.
Certain recent and proposed actions indicate that policymakers are not
sufficiently discriminating in their enthusiasm to convert deductions and
exemptions to tax credits. For example, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Con-
gress substituted a tax credit for the basic exemption in the wealth transfer
taxes." This action was justified in part on the ground that the exemption
was "worth more" to high bracket estates than to lower bracket estates." But.
the basic exemption can be viewed as part of the normal structure of the
progressive transfer tax, in effect constituting an amount of wealth trans-
ferred that is subject to a zero rate. The "worth more" argument is irrelevant
to an analysis of an exemption or deduction that is part of the normative
structure of a tax. Accordingly, the result of the 1976 legislation was to give a
hidden tax reduction to those estates otherwise below the 32 percent bracket
and impose a hidden tax increase on estates above that rate bracket. If a
" The National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, a group of social ac-
tion exempt organizations, is conducting a study of the desirability and effects of such
a change.
17 See note 94 supra.
4	 " I.R.C.	 2010.
"" H.R. RE,P, No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976).
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different distribution of the relative tax contributions by estates was the de-
sired end result, it would have been politically more open to have increased
the exemption for all estates and raised the top rates.""
Similarly, the President proposed in 1978 that the personal exemptions in
the income tax system be converted to tax credits."' In analyzing the Presi-
dent's proposal, it is useful to differentiate between the basic personal exemp-
tion and the dependents' exemption. One can make a strong case for the
proposition that the dependents' exemption does constitute a tax
expenditure—in effect a form of children's allowances. Regarded as a tax
expenditure, the dependents' exemption provides relatively larger children's
allowances for higher income than for lower income families, and no allow-
ances at all for families whose income is less than the zero bracket amount. So
viewed, changing the exemption to a tax credit—especially if the credit were
made refundable—would improve the equity of the tax expenditure. At the
very least., it seems unlikely that the United States would adopt a direct chil-
dren's allowances program that would exclude poverty level families com-
pletely and would provide high income families with larger payments per
child than low income families. 102
A different analysis would have to be applied to the basic personal
exemption. This is part of the normative rate structure of the income tax—in
effect a part of the zero rate bracket. Consequently, the upside-down analysis
applied to the dependents' exemptions above is irrelevant. The President's
proposed shift to a tax credit for the basic exemption therefore must be jus-
tified as a disguised change in the rate structure, in effect reducing taxes for
those below the 32 percent bracket and increasing taxes for those above that
bracket. The same distributional and revenue results could be achieved by
increasing the basic exemption for all taxpayers and correspondingly increas-
ing the tax rates for upper income taxpayers. The choice between the two
techniques is thus essentially a matter of political judgment and does not in-
volve tax expenditure analysis.
In short, viewing the basic personal and the dependents' exemptions as
performing different functions, conversion of the personal exemption to a tax
credit must be defended on political grounds, while conversion of the depen-
dents' exemption to a tax credit rests on tax expenditure analysis and forces
us to examine further whether the dependents' tax credit also should be made
refundable and taxable. There are some who insist, however, that the basic
personal and dependents' exemptions do not perform two different functions.
"" For a more extensive discussion of the issues raised in the text, see FEDERAL
WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION, supra note 67. at 829-31,
11 Under President Carter's 1978 tax recommendations, the $750 personal
exemptions would have been converted to $240 tax credits. See HOUSE COMM. ON
N.VAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2d SEss., THE PREsnwrirs 1978 TAX PROGRAM 75
(Comm. Print 1978).
102 • i)
.1 the Netherlands, the Labor Government in 1976 proposed repeal of the
exisiting dependents' exemptions in the income tax and correspondingly increasing the
amount of the direci children's allowances. The children's allowances constitute taxable
income and predictably there was strong opposition to the proposal from high income
taxpayers with children.
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Instead, they see both exemptions as establishing a level of family income
below which it is inappropriate to impose positive rates. Thus, both exemp-
tions are seen as part of the normative tax structure. For advocates of this
view, the decision between tax credits and exemptions is basically one of com-
parative distributional effects of the two approaches and of the political open-
ness of the approach adopted to achieve the desired distribution of the tax
burden. In any event, regarding the basic and dependents' exemptions in this
manner means that tax expenditure analysis should not be applied to either
'type of exemption. Thus, under this view, the question of refundable and/or
taxable credits for dependents would never arise. 103
A judgment as to the correctness of proposals to substitute tax credits for
the personal exemptions thus can be made only if proponents of such an
action plainly articulate their views on the underlying structural questions.
Clearly, tax expenditure analysis should not drive policy makers to use tax
credits as a reflex response to the rhetorical assertion that deductions or
exemptions are inferior to credits because deductions and exemptions are
"worth more" to high than to low income individuals. Tax credits are appro-
priate substitutes where special tax deductions or exemptions are involved.
Tax credits generally are inappropriate substitutes where the deductions or
exemptions involved form part of the normative structure of an income tax.
3. Factors Inhibiting the Trend to Tax Credits
Despite the inevitable push toward the use of tax credits in lieu of special
deductions or exemptions that is provided by the tax expenditure concept,
several factors resist such a movement. Two of the more important factors
that have surfaced in both recent studies and legislative experience serve to
illustrate this resistance.
The first factor is that the change of an existing deduction to a tax credit
may alter the relative amounts received by beneficiaries of the program. Op-
position can therefore be expected from those who would be relative financial
'"' The text discussion reveals that the treatment of the personal exemptions in
the tax expenditure budget raises issues that must be resolved by preparers of the
budget. Tax expenditure budgets to date have not treated the dependents' exemptions
as tax expenditures, in effect adopting the second view discussed in the text. Funda-
mentally, that view regards the basic and dependents' exemptions as a taxable unit
notion, i.e., the family is the taxable unit and the exemption level should therefore
vary according to family size. One difficulty with that justification, however, is that the
taxable unit for income tax purposes does not include dependents, i.e., income of de-
pendents is not included in family income. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 73. Consistent application
of the taxable unit rationale would require inclusion in the tax expenditure budget of
the revenue loss resulting from the failure to include dependents' income in the tax-
able income of the family (or from the failure to restrict sufficiently the definition of a
"dependent- ). But, tax expenditure budgets have not reflected any such item. It seems
clear that a tax expenditure budget cannot as a matter of consistency exclude both the
dependents' exemption and the failure to include income of dependents in family tax-
able income (or alternatively the failure to define "dependent" with sufficient precision
so as to reach the same net result). One or the other set of rules constitutes a form of
children's allowances and should be so reflected.
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losers under the change. For example, studies conducted for the Commission
on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs indicate that, while a 30 percent tax
credit for charitable contributions would increase the aggregate amount re-
ceived by all charities, organizations such as colleges and universities,
museums, and symphonies might suffer some reduction in total funds. 1 " 4 This
result, of course, reflects the fact that low and middle income donors favor
different. charities than do high income donors. A tax credit would allow the
low and middle income donors—who in total out-of-pocket dollars contribute
more to charity than do high income donors—to exercise an increased
amount of control over the disposition of the federal tax expenditure funds.
Correspondingly, the federal funds controlled by the upper income donors
would be reduced. The reallocation of the federal funds from charities fa-
vored by high income donors to those supported by low and middle income
donors will obviously be resisted by the presently favored group. 105
'The second factor inhibiting a shift from deductions to tax credits is the
tax simplification theme. It is asserted that the computation of a tax credit
involves more steps—at least two—and more complex arithmetic—usually
multiplication and division rather than simple subtraction—than is required
in calculating deductions. When these computational difficulties are added,
taxpayers make more errors in the preparation of their tax returns. 10" In
addition, tax credits allowed outside the standard deduction (zero bracket
amount.) significantly increase the audit burden of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. Thus, no matter how IRS officials may view the equity or rationality of
itemized deductions, they may be expected to oppose a shift of such deduc-
tions to credits outside the standard deduction on the grounds that such an
action requires virtually every taxpayer to compute the credit. Such computa-
tions would significantly increase the problem of tax return error, and impose
an impossible audit burden on the IRS, at least under present financial re-
sources available for audit activity.
C. RefUndable Tax Credits-
One of the striking results of tax expenditure analysis has been the con-
fluence around the concept of refundable tax credits of those in the "tax
1 i 4 See Feldsiein and Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Estimates
and Simulations With the Treasury Tax Files, 3 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED B' . THE
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1419, 1433 (U.S. Treas.
Dept.. 1977).
1"5 Actually, a more complex calculation is required of universities and the like.
A change of the charitable contribution deduction to a tax credit may prevent such
institutions from suffering even greater losses as the result of the impact of other tax
trends such as lower tax rates and a higher zero bracket amount.
"" See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ISSUES IN SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME
TAX LAWS 38-39 (Comm. Print 1977). When a floor-and/or limit is placed on a deduc-
tion, however, the greater simplicity alleged for tax deductions seems to disappear. In
addition, with the proliferation of tax credits, it becomes necessary to establish an
order in which the credits are to he taken. A proposal for ordering existing tax credits
was set forth in U.S. TREAS. DEPT., THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM 39 (1978).
See also I.R.C. § 53.
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reform" camp, who generally oppose the use of tax expenditures, and those
in the "tax preference" camp, who generally advocate tax expenditures."'
This agreement on the refundability issue is interesting because it indicates
that proponents of these seemingly polar views have in fact accepted the valid-
ity of the tax expenditure analysis—although the motives for advocating re-
fundability may he quite different. For example, considerable discussion has
focused on whether the investment tax credit should be refundable. The ear-
liest congressional proponent of a refundable investment credit was Senator
Kennedy, the acknowledged leader of the tax reformers in the Senate. His
proposal was quickly endorsed by Senator Long, Chairman of the Finance
Committee.'"
A combination of practical politics and conceptual perceptions surround-
ing the refundable investment credit issue appeared to coalesce the positions
of these two Senators, who generally hold opposing views on tax policy.
Senator Kennedy's espousal of a refundable investment. tax credit arose not so
much from a commitment to the efficacy of' the credit as such, but rather
from applying tax expenditure analysis to the credit given his realistic political
appraisal that the credit was not going to be repealed. Assuming that a fed-
eral subsidy for investment in machinery and equipment was to be provided
through the tax system, the issue then became whether the credit was struc-
tured in a rational and equitable manner as compared to a direct spending
program.
This comparison revealed a number of defects in the credit. First, the
former limitation on the credit. to 50 percent of current tax liability would be
difficult to justify as a rational limit if a direct program were administered by
the Commerce Department. Indeed, in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the
then 50 percent limit had been temporarily increased for selected industries
to 100 percent of tax liability.'" In addition, this line of inquiry inevitably
leads to questioning the rationality of limiting the allowable credit to the
purchaser's tax liability. It is unlikely, if the Secretary of Commerce were ad-
ministering the program, that she would condition a grant for the purchase of
new machinery and equipment on a demonstration by the purchaser that it
had incurred a tax liability to the Treasury. Clearly, conditions on direct
grants might well be imposed, but it appears highly unlikely that tax liability
would be among them."" Moreover, Senator Kennedy questioned the equity
aspects of making tax liability a prerequisite for claiming the credit. Such a
condition excludes newly created businesses that frequently experience losses
107
 The first refundable tax credit employed in the United States income tax
system was the earned income credit enacted as part of the Tax Reduction Act of
1975. I.R.C. § 43. This refundable credit was justified as (1) an offset to higher social
security taxes, and/or (2) as a means of encouraging those on welfare rolls to obtain
employment. S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-35 (1975).
'" See SFC 1976 Hearings, supra note 77, at 211, 1923-24, 2061; 123 CONG. REC.
S5770 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1977) (statement of Sen. Long) (introducing S. 1270).
105 I.R.C. § 46(a)(7)-(9).
1 " Apparently no direct federal subsidy program is conditioned on a potential
recipient's demonstrating that a tax liability would be incurred for the year in question.
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in start-up years; businesses that experienced losses during the 1973-1975 re-
cession period and, due to net operating loss carryovers, would not have tax
liability for some years;'" and tax-exempt institutions.
Practical politics also affected the Kennedy backing of a refundable
credit. His initial proposal for a refundable credit had been advanced before
the Finance Committee in testimony on the pending Tax Reform Act of 1976.
It was renewed in 1977 when the Administration proposed an increase in the
investment credit from 10 percent to 12 percent."' In Kennedy's view, an
increase in the credit rate primarily would assist the very large and profitable
corporations while providing no help to those unable to take full advantage of
the existing 10 percent rate. Accordingly, he advocated using the funds
targeted for business stimulation to make the 10 percent credit refundable—
again accepting the political reality, if not the need, for such an expenditure
of federal funds.
Senator Long's championing of the refundable investment credit appears
to rest in part on an agreement with the view that a limitation is neither
rational nor equitable under spending program criteria. 13 This view was
also advocated forcefully by lobbyists for the leasing industry, banks, airlines,
railroads, and shipping companies, all of whom are prevented by the limita-
tion from obtaining full current benefit of the credit even though they made
the purchases, or leased from other purchasers, intended to be stimulated by
the credit.'" Moreover, as we shall discuss in greater detail in Part V,
refundability represents a potential method to expand the influence of the
already powerful Finance Committee chaired by Senator Long.
Since the Administration opposed the refundable investment credit, the
Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 did not include the pro-
posal." 5 Senators Kennedy and Long urged that the concept be included in
the President's 1978 tax reform proposals,'" but Treasury opposition to the
"' Of course, unused investment credits then can be carried forward. I.R.C. §
46(h). But to a business, the value of a carry forward is obviously discounted substan-
tially as compared to immediately available funds.
See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3477 Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 167-80 (1977). Sec also note 108
supra.
13 See 123 CoNG, REG. 55770 (daily ed. April 7, 1977) (statement of Sen. Long).
14 In general, the investment credit is available only to corporate lessors. But see
I.R.C. § 46(e)(3). The support of those in the leasing business for a refundable invest-
ment credit is something of a mystery. One would think that a refundable credit might
cause some businesses that are presently lessees because of the lack of sufficient tax
liability to use the credit in full to become purchasers, a result that would reduce the
volume of leasing business.
On the issue whether the investment credit should be made available only to
users of the property and thus not to lessors, see McDaniel, Tax Reform and The Revenue
Act rf 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and Lessons, 14 B.C. IND. & Cont. L. REV. 813 (1973).
1 • 123 CONG. REC. S6577-83 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1977).
"" Letter from Senators Long and Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury
Blumenthal, August 12, 1977. The President's 1978 tax proposals did recommend in-
creasing the present 50% of tax liability limit to 90%.
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concept kept it out of the package. The grounds for the Treasury position
have not been publicly articulated, but the failure to require a basis adjust-
ment. for the refundable credit, discussed below, appears to account in part
for the Treasury resistance. The Revenue Act of 1978, however, moved closer
to a refundable credit by increasing the 50 percent limitation to 90 percent
over a period of four years." 7
Not only does the tax expenditure analysis almost inevitably push legis-
lators toward the use of tax credits rather than deductions or exemptions, it
also pressures them to adopt refundable tax credits as a matter of logic and
equity. The persuasiveness of the tax expenditure analysis in this regard was
especially evident in the handling by the Senate of the energy 'tax legislation
in the period from 1975 to 1977. In its initial consideration of the 1975
Energy Conservation and Conversion Act, the Finance Committee tentatively
approved converting House-passed tax credits to refundable credits."'
Neither the 1977 energy tax legislation proposed by the President nor the
legislation passed by the House incorporated the refundability concept for the
, approved tax credits."' The Finance Committee's version of the energy tax
bill, however, included five refundable tax credits.'" On the Senate floor,
one of these credits was deleted, but five other refundable credits were
adcled.' 2 ' Thus, the Senate version of the energy tax bill went. to conference
with nine refundable tax credits.
The revenue implications of refundability are significant. The following
table sets forth, in millions of dollars, the total revenue costs fur the refund-
able tax credits approved by the Senate in its energy tax bill and isolates the
costs of the refundable feature for each of the credits.
Refundable Credits
FY 1978
Refundable
Portion
FY 1978
Total
Cost
FY 1978-1985
Refundable
Portion
FY 1978-1985
Total
Cost
I. $400 Residential
insulation 	 $26 $529 $464 $9,274
2. $2,200 Residential
solar 	 1 2 7 39 784
3. 15% Alternative energy
property (business
conversion) 	 104 424 1,253 8,633
4. 1(1% Specifically defined
energy property (business
heat conservation) 	 174 486 747 4,604
5. $75 Elderly 	 0 0 7,284 8,4 i 1
6. $150 Residential heating
oil 	 0 183 471 5,897
7. $150 Residential electricity
derived from imported
residual oil 	 0 6 16 332
8. $150 Residential propane
gas 	 0 69 239 2,382
9. Contingent	 refined	 im-
ported petroleum product (Becomes effective only if Administration subse-
adjustment 
	
(pettily raises import fees on relined products)
TOTAL $305 $1,724	 $10,513	 $40,317
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As the table shows, for fiscal 1978 the refundable feature of the approved
.credits constituted 17 percent of the total revenue cost. of the credits, a per-
centage that would rise to 25 percent for the total tax expenditures from
fiscal 1978 through fiscal 1985.
Because of the above revenue implications and Treasury opposition, only
one of the tax credits approved in the Energy Tax Act of 1978 was
refundable—the credit for business installation of solar and wind energy
equipment. But the House agreement to the refundability of this particular
credit—apparently selected for no special reason itself—may presage a future
House willingness to move in the direction the Senate has taken on several
occasions. For example, in its consideration of the Social Security Financing
Act of 1977, 122 the Senate Finance Committee initially approved a refundable
tax credit for state and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations
equal to one-half the increased social security taxes imposed on employers by
the bill.' 23 Later, however, at the request. of the Senate Budget Committee,
the Finance Committee withdrew the refundable credit and substituted a
lower tax rate for these employers. On the floor, the Senate added a college
tuition tax credit as an amendment to the Social Security Financing bill,r24 It
also approved an amendment by Senator Bumpers—in general a member of
the tax reform group—to make the credit refundable. Senator Bumpers'
principal argument for refundability was equity: "It would be patently unfair
for us to approve the [college tuition tax credit] and say to a lot of people in
this country who need help much worse than those who are going to get it
under the [proposed] amendment, 'There is nothing in this bill for you.' " 125
Similar equity considerations had caused the Senate in its version of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 to make the child care credit in section 44A refunda-
ble,' L11 although the refundability aspect was dropped in conference."'
Thus, the trend to tax credits as the favored vehicle for implementing tax
expenditure programs almost surely will carry with it a corresponding im-
" 7 I.R.C. § 46(a)(3).
"8 Goodnough, Senate Finance Reports Out Windfall Tax Measure, 3 TAX NOTES
No. 31 at 23-26 (Aug. 4, 1975).
'' See NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, .copra note 80, at xv-xxm; H. REP. NO. 543,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
120 S. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1977). The credits made refund-
able were those for home insulation costs, renewable energy source equipment. busi-
ness energy investment, specially defined energy property, and intercity bus service.
12 ' The intercity bus credit was deleted and the credits listed as items 5-9 in the
table in text following were added.
"2 H.R. 9346, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
122 S. REP. No. 572, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
124 123 CONG. REC. SI8792-803 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977). The Senate amend-
ment was rejected by the Conference Committee. S. REP. No. 612, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 78-79 (1977). The tuition tax credit bill passed by,the House in 1978 was not
refundable. H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The Senate Finance Committee
bill provided refundable tuition tax credits.
125 123 CONG. REC. S18802 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977).
128 122 CONG. REC. SI215-54 (daily ed. July 21: 1976).
127 S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-51 (1976).
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petus to expand the utilization of the refundability mechanism. Refundability
is seen as a necessary element t.o ensure that the tax expenditure program
mirrors a corresponding direct program in terms of rationality, efficiency,
and equity.' 28 As in the case of the trend to tax credits, however, certain
forces resist the implementation of the refundability concept. In the area of
business tax credits, some economists oppose refundability on the ground that
federal subsidies should not be given to businesses operating at a loss lest the
government grants provide inefficiently operated businesses with means to
continue operation after market forces have prophesied their demise. These
economists, t'Vho are often strong tax reform advocates, will frequently be
joined—in the kind of curious political alignments that the refundability con-
cept seems to produce—by many of the largest corporations. For example,
those corporations that are not restricted by the 50 (increasing to 90) percent
of tax liability limit in the investment credit may oppose refundability and
urge instead that the available subsidy funds be allocated to increasing the
investment tax credit rate from 10 percent to some higher level. Similarly,
where new business credits are proposed, profitable companies may oppose
diversion of substantial revenue to low-or-no tax liability entities. Thus, as we
saw in the case of the shift from deductions to credits, the issue of allocation
of the available subsidy revenues among potential beneficiaries affects the
manner in which refundability is viewed.
In the area of tax credits for personal costs, refundability likely will be
opposed by those responsible for tax administration. As discussed above,'"
the shift of an itemized deduction to a tax credit outside the standard deduc-
tion brings some 77 percent of taxpayers into the subsidy system. As a result,
the particular item must be computed and disclosed on millions more returns.
Refundable personal credits magnify the problem since such credits require
that some 15 million non-filers, generally those with incomes below poverty
levels, must become tax return filers to benefit from the tax subsidy. Thus,
refundability runs counter to the considerable efforts over the past decade to
relieve poverty level individuals from the burdens of tax payment and tax
return filing and preparation. Moreover, as the experience with the refunda-
ble earned income credit has demonstrated, it is not a simple matter for the
income tax administration system to reach poverty level persons and convince
them that they should now file tax returns.' 3 ° This last point, however, fo-
cuses more on why the tax system is being used to effect the federal subsidy
program in the first place—an issue to which we return below—than to the
issue whether, if the tax system is used, poverty level individuals should be
included in the program. Finally, as discussed later in Parts III and V,
refundability raises substantial issues concerning budget policy and the legisla-
tive process.
"8 See CBO HOUSING STUDY, supra note 77.
129 See text' at note 92 supra.
129 See Schenk, Simplification for the Average Taxpayer, II ALI-ABA Confer-
ence on Tax Simplification 3, 7 (Jan. 4-7, 1978) (to be published). In response to this
. problem, the Revenue Act of 1978 included provisions to simplify the credit so that it
could be incorporated in the withholding system and refunds could be provided to
employees on a current basis. I.R.C. §§ 43(f) and (h), 3507.
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D. Taxable Tax Credits
An issue that has not yet surfaced in legislative consideration of tax
credits is the proper income tax treatment of tax credits themselves. We have
pointed out in prior discussions the need to consider whether the amount of
the tax credit itself should constitute taxable income to the recipient."' The
Treasury has approached the issue somewhat obliquely in its recommendation
for basis adjustments when business tax credits are involved. 132 But a basis
adjustment for the business assets is an alternative to taxability, and the pro-
priety of such an adjustment must be based on an assumption that the
amount of the credit under normal income tax principles constitutes taxable
income. Indeed, tax expenditure analysis indicates that many tax credits
should constitute taxable income.
If the amount of the tax credit is not included in income, the upside-
down effect of tax expenditures effected through special deductions or exclu-
sions remains in the tax expenditure effected through the tax credit. This
point can best be understood by comparing the treatment of direct govern-
ment subsidy programs. Most direct commercial subsidy payments constitute
taxable income. In contrast, if the payment constitutes a contribution to capi-
tal, the payment is excluded from income but the taxpayer reduces the basis
of its assets. This basis reduction, in effect, defers the tax on the subsidy, but
as stated above, assumes that the subsidy represents taxable income. If a busi-
ness tax credit is used in lieu of a direct subsidy, the same tax result should
occur. That. is, the amount of the credit either must be included in income or
there must be a basis adjustment to ensure collection of the tax on the subsidy
over time.
The following table illustrates this analysis by comparing a taxable direct.
subsidy of $10 for each $100 investment in machinery and equipment, assum-
ing a 10-year life, with a 10 percent investment credit.
Taxable
Direct
Subsidy
Taxable
Investment
Credit
Nontaxable
Investment
Credit
Nontaxable
Investment
Credit-
Basis
Adjustment
.
Operating income $100 $100 $100 $100
Subsidy 10 10 — —
Depreciation —	 10 — 10 — 10 — 9
Taxable income 100 100 90 91
Tax (50% rate) 50 50 45 45.50
Credit 0 .	 — 10 — 10 — 10
Tax liability 50 40 35 35.50
After-tax cash 60 60 65 64.50
The after-tax cash position of the taxpayer with a nontaxable investment
credit is increased by the amount of the tax imposed on the direct subsidy. The
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basis adjustment technique reaches the same net result as a taxable subsidy,
but only after 10 years. And, if the tax rates are varied, the higher bracket
taxpayer will always realize a greater after-tax benefit than a lower bracket
recipient of the same nontaxable credit.
The tax expenditure principle suggesting that a tax credit, or any tax
expenditure, should be first reconstructed as a direct spending program,
applies equally in determining whether a tax credit should be taxable. After
reconstructing a tax credit as a direct spending program, normal income def
inition principles are then applied to the tax subsidy program. If the corre-
sponding direct subsidy would be included in income, so should the amount
of the tax credit. Conversely, if the corresponding direct program would not
result in taxable income, neither should the tax credit.. Moreover, if the direct
program would be treated as a nonshareholder contribution to capital and
taken into account by means of a basis adjustment, the same result should
follow to the tax credit recipient.
Applying the foregoing analysis to the investment credit, the critical issue
is whether the credit restructured as a direct subsidy would always constitute
taxable income to the recipient or whether it would qualify for the section
118—section 362(c) basis adjustment rule as a nonshareholder contribution to
capital. Under the tests laid clown by the Supreme Court in United Slates v.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co., 133 a direct subsidy program structured
like the investment credit would appear to constitute a contribution to capital
rather than, for example, income for services rendered. Accordingly, under
present rules, one proper income tax treatment of the investment credit
would be a basis adjustment. Alternatively, Congress could simply mandate
that the amount. of the credit, constitutes currently taxable income, with no
basis adjustment.
As noted above, Congress has not yet evidenced any overt awareness of
the need to determine the proper income tax treatment of tax expenditures.
Yet, perhaps unknowingly, it has already legislated the equivalent of a taxable
tax credit. That action was taken in connection with the enactment of the
"new jobs tax credit" in the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977,
and continued with respect to the "targeted jobs tax credit," enacted in the
Revenue Act of 1978 as section 44B to replace the new jobs tax credit. Section
280C requires that the deduction for wages paid during the year be reduced
by the amount of the jobs tax credit allowed under section 44B. The purpose
of the reduction is to prevent the combination of the wage deduction and
credit from producing tax write-offs in excess of 100 percent of wages actu-
ally paid. Such a result could have been avoided by making the jobs tax credit
taxable. The net effect of section 280C is thus precisely the same as if Con-
131 See Surrey & McDaniel. supra note 7, at 693 n.43; McDaniel. supra note 114,
at 839, 844.
132 See President Ford's Economic Message of October 8, 1974, 120 CONG. RFC.
34421 (1974).
133 412 U.S. 401 (1973).
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gress had provided that the amount of the jobs tax credit constituted taxable
income to the taxpayer claiming the credit. Assuming the taxpayer qualified
for a $10 jobs tax credit and paid wages of $50, the following table dem-
onstrates this fact.
Targeted jobs	 Taxable Targeted
Tax Credit.	 Jobs Tax Credit
With Wage
	 With No
Deduction	 Reduction of
Reduced	 Wage Deduction
Income $100 $100
Taxable credit —	 0 10
Deduction for wages — 40 — 50
Taxable income 60 60
Tax (50% rate) 30 30
Tax credit — 10 — 10
Tax 20 20
A provision similar to the de facto taxable jobs credit was contained in the
tuition tax credit measure adopted by the House and Senate in 1978. That
measure required that a taxpayer claiming the proposed education tax credit
reduce any deductions for educational expenses by the amount of such ex-
penses which qualified for the credit.'"
The section 280C technique for achieving the equivalent of a taxable tax
credit evidences clever work by tax technicians. But, it does not represent a
sufficient response to the broader issue of the proper income tax treatment of
the subsidies made available through tax expenditures. Normative structure
deductions, such as for wages or costs of producing income, should not be
complicated and distorted to achieve what can be done directly and simply.
While the taxability issue is most easily perceived in the context. of tax credits,
the problem is inherent in all tax expenditures. What is needed is a systematic
analysis by the Treasury and the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
that would (1) hypothetically recast all existing tax expenditures as direct ex-
penditures; (2) determine, under normative income tax rules, the proper in-
come tax treatment of the subsidies as recast; and (3) request Congress to
provide the requisite general statutory authority to apply through regulations
the proper tax treatment to each tax expenditure. The Treasury and Joint
Committee Staff, of course, should make a similar advance determination for
all proposed new tax expenditures considered by Congress. The taxability of
tax expenditures raises important equity issues that must be addressed. In the
'" See H.R. REP. No. 1790, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. (1978). The bill was not passed
by Congress because the Senate refused to agree to the Conference Committee Report
which the House had altered to include elementary and secondary schools. 124 Cosc,
REC. SI9141-44 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
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final analysis, nontaxability of the tax expenditures ensures that a person will
be wealthier if he receives a government tax subsidy than if he had by his own
efforts earned an identical amount.
One who has followed the implications of the preceding discussion on tax
credits will be aware that with a refundable, taxable tax credit we have now
come full cycle to a direct spending program. Such a credit is the exact repli-
cation of a direct subsidy in the tax system. r It can satisfy the criteria applied
to direct spending programs—need, efficiency, and equitable distribution of
benefits. Moreover, since it impairs neither horizontal nor vertical equity, a
taxable tax credit has no adverse effect on tax equity. The question then is
why use tax expenditures instead of direct expenditures? What is gained and,
perhaps more importantly, who gains from the use of the tax rather than the
direct spending mechanism? Conversely, what is lost and who are the losers if
the tax expenditure route is followed?
We have addressed these questions in detail elsewhere; ' 35 however, the
1976-1977 experience throws some of the previously proferred answers into
sharper focus. First, the use of refundable and taxable tax credits may
hamper tax simplification efforts and the effective administration of the tax
system. We discuss these issues in the following section. The winners are, of
course, those who can secure approval of a tax expenditure, but who could
never obtain a direct subsidy. The principal reasons why they can win con-
gressional approval of tax expenditures now appear to lie (I) in the power
politics of the committee system in Congress and (2) in the willingness of
non-tax executive branch departments to accede to or even support requests
for new, continued, or expanded tax expenditures. The politics of the com-
mittee system are discussed in Part V and the executive department's support
of tax expenditures is discussed in Part IV.
E. Tax Simplification
The theme of tax simplification continues to make periodic appearances
at center stage in United States tax policy discussions. The causes of tax com-
plexity have been well known for a long time, and have not only gone unrem-
edied, but indeed have intensified. One therefore approaches with some dif-
fidence the question whether tax expenditure analysis can aid in achieving a
simpler income tax system. For decades, authorities addressing the tax
simplification issue have recognized that tax preferences constitute a major
source of complexity in the tax system.' 26 The tax expenditure budget now
lists and quantifies those tax preferences. This very process, we believe, pro-
vides guidelines as to the scope of the simplification issue, a more realistic
perception of the obstacles to simplification, and a more refined strategy for
achieving simplification.
135 See PATHWAYS, supra note 34, at 126-54; Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at
693-98.
134' For a compilation of authorities see McDaniel, Federal Income Tax Simplifica-
tion: The Political Process, 34 TAX L. REV. 27 (1978).
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As set forth in Appendix A, there are approximately 85 tax expenditure
programs in the income tax system. For fiscal 1979, the combined revenue
cost of these tax expenditures has been estimated to exceed $135 billion. In
turn, this figure represents 20 percent of total anticipated federal spending
for fiscal 1979. 137
 Both the number of programs and the revenues involved
were significantly increased by the tax legislation in 1978. From a statutory
drafting standpoint, each tax expenditure may require numerous sections of
the Code to implement the program.
It is clear that enormous tax simplification could be achieved by repeal of
all tax expenditures in the income tax. But the tax expenditure budget itself
reveals how futile it is to expect any such action in the near future. No one
can seriously believe that 20 percent of the federal budget could be repealed
in the name of "tax simplification." 138
 Indeed, one suspects that if such an
all-or-nothing approach were ever taken in a tax reform bill, few of even the
most ardent congressional tax reformers would support it. A moment's reflec-
tion indicates why this is so. In a number of instances, the purposes for which
funds are provided through tax expenditure programs are purposes virtually
everyone would agree should be supported by federal financial aid. In some
cases, the tax expenditure program is the only or the largest federal program
presently in force. Consequently, serious difficulties would be enountered in
attacking a tax expenditure for a widely-approved objective when the primary
justification is merely "tax simplification." Even the promise of using the rev-
enues from repealed tax expenditures for general rate reductions seems
unlikely to assuage tax expenditure program beneficiaries—who suspect that
increased funds in taxpayers' pockets will not find their way back into the
particular activity supported by the tax subsidy.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, tax expenditure principles can assist in
devising effective strategies for achieving tax simplification. First, the issue of
"complexity" is different for normative tax structure provisions than for tax
expenditure provisions. A normative tax on net income—computed annually
by varying taxable units, with progressive rates applied to an infinite variety of
economic activities—inherently contains a significant and unavoidable degree
of complexity. In dealing with normative provisions, the task of "tax simplifi-
cation" is to ensure that such rules are clear, consistent, and logically coher-
ent. The objective is to ensure that the normative income tax responds to
'" The total anticipated federal spending for fiscal 1979, $635 billion, is made
up of $500 billion in direct expenditures plus $135 billion in tax expenditures. See THE
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1979 at I I ; 1978 JOINT
Comm, ESTIMATES, supra note 12, at 8.
138
 Apparently, there are those who believe the need for simplification could
support this result. The compilers of U.S. TREAS. DEPT., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM (Jan. 17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS] would be numbered in this
group. See also Senator Hatfield's proposed Simpliform Tax Act of 1977, S. 1969, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and his statement thereon at 123 CONG. REC. 513196 (daily ed.
Aug. 1, 1977). An editorial call for elimination of all tax expenditures was sounded by
the Chattanooga Times, Dec. 29, 1977, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. S 141 (daily ed. Jan.
20, 1978) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
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simple or complex transactions with appropriately simple or complex tax
rules.
In contrast, the simplification issues presented by tax expenditures are
quite different. Here, the complexities of "spending" programs become com-
plexities of the tax system. Because the spending program is to be im-
plemented through the Internal Revenue Code, tax language must he
employed to describe the program, and the tax return must be complicated
with a seemingly endless series of lines and instructions. The result is that the
tax system is inevitably complicated by the decision to use tax expenditures.
Thus, althotigh we can conclude that tax simplification is a feasible and desir-
able goal where normative tax provisions are involved, the decision to use tax
expenditures inevitably produces a more complex tax system.
Accordingly, we must ask whether matters would be simplified if most of
the tax expenditures were eliminated. The answer is clearly yes, if the tax
expenditures so eliminated were not replaced by direct programs. If, however,
the tax expenditures were replaced with direct programs, the answer depends
in part on whether the direct programs in themselves would be more com-
plex, for example, as to qualification requirements and other details. This is a
likely result since direct programs generally are constructed, wisely or un-
wisely, with much more detail than the counterpart tax expenditure pro-
grams.'" But if we disregard this initial difference, the following results of
the change from a tax to a direct program become apparent: The tax laws
would be simpler, and hence clearly the complexity of tax administration
would be lessened; the administration of the tax expenditure programs would
be dispersed among a number of agencies; tax lawyers would lead a more
relaxed life, while the work of their non-tax colleagues would increase; tax-
payers would face a far simpler tax return, since they would no longer have
to read numerous items having no application to them;'" and those tax-
payers benefited by the direct programs would have to fill out more forms
and then send them to other agencies, the number of forms depending on
the particular program. Overall, one would expect a net gain in cost-benefit
ratios. While the dispersal of programs and resulting forms for administration
may in one sense foster complexity, the net gain in reduced complexity for an
inherently complex normative income tax system would place matters on the
plus side. And, after all, it is tax simplification that we are discussing.
I"
 The text statement, of course, depends on the nature of the direct program.
lf, for example, the itemized deduction for state property taxes were instead reflected
in a H U I) program to assist homeowners, the detail for aid recipients could presum-
ably increase. But if it were reflected in increased federal revenue-sharing aid to state
and local governments, the converse would be the case.
14"
 While a particular tax expenditure may in itself appear simpler than would
its counterpart direct program, that expenditure becomes an added item on a tax
return making the entire return more difficult to handle. Thus, while a tuition tax
credit in itself may look simpler than direct educational assistance—"just a line in the
tax return"—when we consider that the tuition credit becomes credit number 10 or so
on the tax return. the added complexity of that "simple line" becomes far more
serious.
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A second issue in devising methods of tax simplification is the effect of
repealing individual tax expenditures. As previously stated, we think it un-
likely that total repeal of all tax expenditures, even if all revenue were applied
to rate reductions, will be realized in the near future. Nevertheless, achieving
tax simplification by step-by-step repeal of tax expenditures may be possible if
realistic strategies are pursued. Objective and comprehensive studies of exist-
ing and proposed tax expenditures suggest three different strategies:
(1) For those tax expenditures for which no direct federal pro-
gram is needed, outright repeal, perhaps coupled with use of the
revenue involved for general rate reduction, is the appropriate
strategy. The preferential treatment_ of capital gains would be a can-
didate for such treatment.
(2) For those tax expenditures for which a federal program is
needed, but which overlap or closely resemble existing direct pro-
grams, the appropriate strategy is to couple repeal of the tax expen-
diture with a corresponding transfer of all or part of the revenues to
the direct program, as amended to encompass the scope of the tax
expenditure program. The special tax preferences for farm opera-
tions, pollution control, and state and local taxes would be among
the possible candidates for such treatment.
(3) For those tax expenditures for which a federal program is
needed, but for which no adequate direct program presently exists
to which the tax expenditure revenues can be transferred, a new
direct program must he developed if the effort to repeal the tax
expenditure is to be successful. Examples of such tax expenditures
would likely include the medical expense deduction and the charita-
ble contributions deduction.
Implementation of the suggested approach to tax simplification obviously
is a lengthy process—over 85 tax expenditure programs cannot be dealt with
properly in a short period of time. Moreover, the approach requires the de-
velopment of more sophisticated and coordinated techniques for considering
tax expenditures both within Congress and the executive branch. These
techniques and the necessary studies must in turn take into account the politi-
cal process through which the proposals must be approved. The discussion in
Parts IV and V below illustrates the methods and political obstacles to imple-
menting tax simplification.
F. Tax Administration
The existence of tax expenditures complicates enormously the task of tax
administration. Indeed, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jerome Kurtz
graphically demonstrates, much of the available IRS time, effort, and person-
nel must be devoted to "spending program administration" rather than "tax
administration":
Each of (the tax expenditure] provisions is, in effect, a non-
revenue related expenditure program written into the tax law. Each
entails its own special set of issues, definitions and limitations ....
Because of these provisions I find myself, a Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, administering programs of many other agencies. If
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these programs were parceled out to those agencies, the concentra-
tion of programs would be diffused and the tax law and administra-
tion would be vastly simpler .... [T]he administrative problems
which result from [the complexities created by tax expenditures] are
formidable. To help taxpayers and officials alike, we must provide
an inventory of 368 different forms for public use, along with in-
structions for each .... When a provision is placed into the tax law
which applies only td a relatively small segment of the taxpaying
population, it nevertheless requires additional instructions and lines
on the tax return which is distributed to all taxpayers. Thus, each
narrowly applicable provision increases the filing burden for
everyone, both for those to whom the provision does not apply as
well as for those to whom it does."'
Clearly, even if ideally structured refundable, taxable tax expenditures
are employed, the administration of the normative income tax system becomes
hopelessly burdened. As long as the Internal Revenue Service must imple-
ment, regulate, audit, and litigate over 85 programs that have nothing to do
with the collection of taxes, it is obvious that the performance of its primary
task of administering the normative rules necessary to implement an income
tax system will suffer. In addition, it is questionable whether IRS tax lawyers,
accountants, agents, engineers, and administrators represent the most compe-
tent group to implement and oversee particular spending programs. Obvi-
ously, some agency of the federal bureaucracy must administer a financial aid
program. But it is less than obvious why the Internal Revenue Service is bet-
ter equipped to handle a national program to encourage and support the arts,
for example, than is the National Endowment for the Arts."' What is clear
is that every Revenue Agent cannot possibly be an expert in the intricacies of
the normative income tax and in the details of over 85 spending programs
encompassing every area in which government operates.
A related concern is the considerable impact and costs of the paperwork
generated by federal programs. The tax forms have borne a good deal of the
blame for the perception that the government requires excessive paperwork
from the private sector.' 43 Without assessing the validity of the conclusion
that the paperwork burden is excessive,'" it seems apparent that the task of
141 Kurtz, Tax Simplification: Some Observations from a Retrospective View of
the United States' Experience, Address Before the Eleventh General Assembly of the
Inter-American Center of Tax Administrators, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. 58349,
8351 (daily ed. May 23, 1977) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
142 See H.R. 1739, H.R. 7896, H.R. 9325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), propos-
ing tax expenditures to provide financial aid to the arts and to artists.
143 See COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, FINAL REPORT ON FEDERAL TAXA-
TION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (June 1977). Rule XXIX of the Standing Rules
of the Senate requires a paperwork impact statement to be prepared with respect to
proposed legislation. See S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1977), for an
example of such a statement in connection with the Tax Reduction and Simplification
Act of 1977.
144 See KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES AND ABUSES 56-58 (1977).
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completing tax forms cannot be made less onerous so long as Congress and
the executive branch continue to channel one-fifth of total federal spending
through the tax system.
It is thus clear that tax expenditures have substantially complicated and
overburdened the tax administrators. What is now needed is more detailed
information separating the costs and time devoted by the Internal Revenue
Service to administration of the normal income tax system. The costs of im-
plementing spending programs through the tax system in terms of planning,
forms, regulations development, rulings issuance, collection, audit, and litiga-
tion must be ascertained. The gains or losses to be incurred by converting tax
expenditures to direct programs—dealing with potential program ben-
eficiaries only instead of over 80 million tax return filers annually—must be
calculated. Detailed information of this nature should assist Congress and the
executive branch as they decide whether to implement or expand a program
directly or through the tax system.
G. Inflation Adjustments
In the face of persistent inflation in the United States, it is not surprising
that during the 1976-1978 period increasing attention was focused on propo-
sals to index the tax system, in whole or in part, for inflation.'" Tax expen-
diture analysis does not indicate whether a country should or should not au-
tomatically adjust its tax system to take inflation into account. That. decision
must be based on the broad economic conditions facing a government, and on
the policies which that government chooses to pursue.'"
Indexation measures can be applied to rates, brackets, or to elements in
the tax base, such as the basis for assets. In the case of the tax base, tax
expenditure analysis does indicate that once a government has decided to
index elements in the tax base for inflation, indexing must. be  .consistently
applied or tax expenditures can result. In the United States, the decision has
been made not to adjust the tax base for inflation on an automatic basis. That
decision is, of course, subject to review and change. But so long as the present
policy decision is maintained, any action to index a particular aspect of the tax
base for inflation will create a tax expenditure. For example, the House-
passed version of the Revenue Act of 1978 included a provision to adjust. gain
realized on the sale or exchange of certain capital assets for the inflationary
element, if any, inherent in the gain ) 4 7 This proposal, given the present
policy not to index the tax system on an across-the-board basis, constituted a
clear tax expenditure benefiting holders of particular types of investments.
I" For an explanation of indexing, see Brinner & Minnie!, Taxation of Capital
Gains: Inflation and Other Problems, [19741 NEw ENG. ECON. REV, 3 (Sept./Oct.).
146 For a comparison of the extent to which various countries have indexed
their tax system for inflation, and the varying reasons for taking, or not taking, such
action, see INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, INFLATION AND TAXATION, LXIIa
CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL. INTERNATIONAL (Vienne Congress 1977).
17 See H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2(1 Sess. 125 (1978).
January 1979]	 TAX EXPENDITURE DEVELOPMENTS 	 781
Excluded front the proposal were debt instruments, savings accounts, the cash
value of life insurance and annuity contracts; and inventories and other assets,
all of which are also adversely affected by inflation.'"
Tax expenditure analysis therefore requires that proponents of inflation
adjustments for capital gains justify their proposal as a federal spending pro-
gram. Critical issues in analyzing such proposals include the question whether
inflation in the United States is high enough to indicate a need for any sub-
sidy to offset its effect; whether data indicate that sellers of capital assets are
in greater need of a federal subsidy than those whose investments are in the
form of savings accounts or bonds; whether this federal subsidy would possi-
bly accelerate inflationary trends; and, how benefits of the subsidy would be
distributed among income classes.'"
A different, but still tax, response to inflation, is Arthur Okun's proposal
to provide selective tax relief for employers and workers if a company agrees
to hold wage and price increases below prescribed rates.' 5 " Such a measure
would constitute a tax expenditure program. Whatever the merits of the
proposal in terms of the "stagflation" problem, it is clear that tax expenditure
analysis must he applied if its operation and effects are to be clearly perceived
by policymakers."'
In short, tax expenditure analysis does not indicate whether a tax system
should or should not he adjusted automatically for inflation. But it does dem-
onstrate that if the United States is to change its present policy and avoid
creating new tax expenditures, it must identify and correct all the elements in
the tax system that are affected by inflation—adjustments that would neces-
sarily produce taxable income for some as well as deductions for others. Selec-
tive adjustment for inflation in fact would constitute federal subsidy programs
for the favored investment or activities. Using tax expenditure analysis, it is
apparent that these proposed tax subsidies must therefore be justifiable as
spending programs before such changes can be implemented.
"8 Advocates of inflation adjustments usually focus their concern on the tax-
ability of gains attributable to inflation (or the lesser depreciation resulting from not
indexing the basis of assets) and fail to mention that inflation produces untaxed gains
for the same persons, e.g., borrowers repaying debt with inflated dollars.
1" See generally INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (H. Aaron ed. 1976).
' 5" Okun, The Great Stagflation Swamp, 14 THE BROOKINGS BULL. No. 3 at J/6
(Fall 1977).
' 5 ' The so-called "tax based insurance policy" (TIP) was analyzed in various
studies included in CURING CHRONIC INFLATION (Okun and Perry eds. 1978), but none
focused the issue in tax expenditure terms. President Carter made a broad proposal
for a kind of TIP (applicable to wages only) in his anti-inflation proposals announced
in October, 1978. The Presidents proposal is essentially a wage insurance program,
insuring employees whose wage increases are held within a prescribed limit against a
price rise in excess of that limit. The program is to be administered, however, by the
Internal Revenue Service rather than the Labor Department. Nevertheless, the struc-
turing of the program, not yet developed at. the time of its announcement, should be
based on the recognition that it is an insurance program and not a tax matter. Essen-
tially, the payments should he treated as wage payments and tax policy decisions
should be formulated on the basis of that concept.
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III. BUDGET PRESENTATION ISSUES
One major use of the tax expenditure concept is in the formulation of
the United States Budget. The years 1976 to 1978 saw continued develop-
ment of some previously identified budget implications, 1 S 2 and the emergence
of additional ramifications of the concept.
A. Current Issues in Budget Presentation
The Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget
Office, in preparing the direct and tax expenditure budgets, are required to
decide the proper budget presentation of legislative actions associated with tax
expenditure and tax penalty provisions. The budget presentation of five iden-
tified categories of these provisions, as follows, must be resolved.
1. Refundable tax credits: The budget presentation issue to be resolved is
whether the revenue associated with the refunded portion of refundable tax
credits should be included in direct budget outlays, or whether the entire
credit should be placed in the tax expenditure budget, with separate estimates
for the portion that offsets tax liabilities and for the "portion that is refunded.
The present example of this category is the refundable earned income credit.
2. Provisions that phase-out tax expenditures by adopting the correct
normative rule: The issue for resolution is whether the increased revenues
from these provisions should be reflected only in direct budget receipts, with
a corresponding reduction in and ultimate elimination of the item from the
tax expenditure budget, or whether a negative figure should be included in
the tax expenditure budget during the phase-out of the tax expenditure. The
provisions in this category are illustrated by the repeal of accelerated deduc-
tion items such as the five-year amortization previously provided for railroad
rolling stock.
3. Provisions that reduce or limit. the scope of a specific tax expenditure:
The issue for resolution is whether the increased revenues from these provi-
sions should be reflected only in direct budget receipts, with a corresponding
reduction in the tax expenditure, or whether the tax expenditure budget
should reflect a figure for the total tax expenditure with a separate figure
reducing the tax expenditure revenue loss. An example in this category is the
denial of domestic international sales corporation (DISC) benefits for partici-
pation in an international boycott.
4. Provisions that reduce or limit the scope of more than one tax expen-
diture: The budget presentation issue is whether the revenue increase from
these provisions should be reflected solely in direct budget receipts, or
whether the revenue figure for each affected tax expenditure should be ap-
propriately reduced. Examples of provisions in this category include the
minimum tax, the "at risk" rules, and the limitation on the deduction for
investment interest.
5. Tax penalties: The budget presentation issue to be resolved is whether
the revenue from tax penalties should be reflected in increased direct budget
152 See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 691-98.
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receipts, or as a negative figure in the tax expenditure budget. The examples
in this category include the disallowance of gambling losses in excess of
gambling gains, as discussed in Part I.'"
In the following discussion, we examine first the present budget treat-
ment of the above items by OMB and CBO. We then propose more com-
prehensive budget approaches for consideration.
B. Existing Budget Practices
1. Treatment of Refundable Credits
The earned income credit is so structured that if an individual's tax liabil-
ity is not sufficient to absorb the full credit, any excess credit is refunded to
the individual. Differences of opinion have existed over the budget presenta-
tion of the refunded portion. The OMB originally included the refundable
portion of the credit in direct budget outlays, while placing the portion that
offset tax liabilities in the tax expenditure budget.'" In contrast, the CBO
included the entire credit in the tax expenditure budget, with separate esti-
mates for the two portions.'"
From a budgetary standpoint, the choice between the two treatments .
turns on whether the crucial budgetary distinction is the issuance of checks by
the Treasury, as in the original OMB approach, or the inclusion of the total
funds expended for a particular program in a single place in the budget, as in
the CBO approach. The original OMB approach divided a tax expenditure
program into two parts—that which produces a tax reduction, and that which
produces an outright grant of Treasury funds. The principal function of the
direct budget, under this view, is to show all Treasury outlays. Hence, proper
budgetary practice would require inclusion of the refundable portion of a tax
expenditure in that budget. Since tax expenditures are not fully integrated
into the regular budget, it is a necessary corollary that the tax expenditure
program be split into two parts and shown in different parts of the budget
presentation. This approach thus differs significantly from the CBO ap-
proach. The justification for the CBO approach is that a clear budget presen-
tation should reflect the total costs of each program, both those incurred
through tax reductions and those incurred through refundability. The crucial
budgetary emphasis is on the program, rather than on whether a Treasury
check is issued for all or part of the tax credit.
In 1977, OMB accepted the CBO approach for the earned income credit
and placed the entire earned income credit in the tax expenditure budget,
with separate estimates for the two parts.'" From the standpoint of proper"
"a See text at notes 32-34 supra.
154 See 1976-1978 Special Analyses F.
155 See 1977 and 1978 CBO TAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION, Supra note 12, for
fiscal years 1978-1982. The annual JOINT COMM. ESTIMATES, supra note 12, have simi-
larly treated the earned income credit.
" 6 1979 Special Analysis G at 160. In the First Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal Year 1979, Congress decided to treat the refundable portion of the
earned income credit as a direct budget outlay. Presumably, CBO and OMB will follow
this practice in future budget presentations.
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budget presentation by the executive branch, there seems little basis on which
to choose one or the other of these approaches to refundable credits." 7
Nevertheless, there are important practical differences between the two ap-
proaches in the congressional tax, budget, and appropriations processes.
These differences are analyzed in Part V.A below.
2. Provisions That Phase-Out Tax Expenditures by Adopting the Correct
Normative Rule
The issue of the proper presentation of the budget effect resulting from
the phase-out of a tax expenditure has specifically arisen in the context of
legislative actions to repeal accelerated deductions—tax deferral—items. The
revenue estimate for an existing tax deferral item in Special Analysis G of the
1979 Budget is the difference between (I) the tax payments that would have
been made for the year in question had the deferral provision never been
enacted, and (2) the tax payments actually made. For example, under one of
the five-year amortization provisions, the tax loan on any given investment
with a 15-year useful life is paid off in years 6 through 15. In the meantime,
however, new assets qualifying for the tax deferral are being acquired in years
'6 through 15. Hence, the revenue loss shown in Special Analysis G for defer-
ral items in any given year represents the net of the tax loan repayments and
the new tax loans being made for the year in question.' 58
Suppose, however, that Congress repeals a tax deferral granting acceler-
ated deductions, as it did in 1976 in the case of the five-year rapid amortiza-
tion for railroad rolling stock. After the effective date of the repeal, no new
tax loans are made, arid hence the only tax loan repayments are by taxpayers
who had invested previously in the qualifying property. In resolving the
budget presentation of the phenomenon, OMB, in the 1978 Special Analysis F
and the 1979 Special Analysis G, showed negative figures for certain terminat-
ing 5-year amortization provisions.' 59 The negative figures reflected the in-
creased taxes from the repayment of the tax loans that will be due as the
ability of taxpayers to take out new tax loans ceases, since, as a consequence of
the repeal, no new government loans will be made under the tax expenditure
program. The increased federal receipts from the termination of the tax ex-
157 In Hartman & Pechman, Issues in Budget Accounting, in SETTING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES: THE 1978 BUDGET 425, 434 (J. Pechman ed. 1977), it is argued that treat-
ing the refundable portion of the tax credit as a tax expenditure may have a practical
political effect. Presidents tend to talk about limiting federal spending, by which they
mean direct outlays in the Budget. Thus, including the refundable portion as direct.
outlays may reduce the amounts available for other federal programs. If a fully de-
veloped negative income tax were implemented, this aspect obviously becomes quite
important, although, as discussed in the text at Part III.0 infra, again full budgetary
integration of tax and direct spending programs appears to be the real answer to the
problem.
158 1979 Special Analysis G at 154-55.
"9 See 1979 Special Analysis G at 158-59; 1978 Special Analysis F at 128. 1977
and 1978 CBO FAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION, SUpTa note 12, did not show negative
figures for terminating tax expenditures.
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penditures should be reflected, however, in the direct budget estimates. If
that is the case, it is then improper to show a negative figure in the tax ex-
penditure budget (just as it is improper to show the refundable portion of a
tax credit as a direct budget outlay and as an item in the tax expenditure
budget.). Eliminating the increased receipts that result from repeal of a tax
expenditure item from the direct budget, and showing the revenue effect.
solely in the tax expenditure budget would be consistent with the treatment of
refundable credits as discussed above, that is, all revenue effects associated
with tax expenditures appear in the tax expenditure budget and are shown
nowhere in the direct budget.
3. Provisions That Reduce or Limit the Scope of a Specific Tax Expenditure
As discussed in Part I,'" Congress may impose limits on specific tax ex-
penditure items. The 1976 action to deny DISC benefits to taxpayers who
cooperate in international boycotts illustrates this congressional power. Al-
though the issue is not discussed in Special Analysis G or the CBO budget.
presentation, presumably the revenue loss associated with these tax expendi-
ture items is simply reduced, and direct budget receipts reflect a correspond-
ing increase in revenue. Alternatively, as in the case of the 1976 congressional
action with respect to DISC (viewing DISC as a tax deferral provision), the
budget effects could have been reflected entirely in the tax expenditure
budget, that is, the revenue loss from DISC apart from the 1976 changes
could have been shown and a separate negative figure employed to reflect the
reduction in funds expended through DISC following the 1976 changes.
The approach adopted in the OMB budget is not unexpected, but one
can question whether it is consistent with the practice described in subsection
2 above with respect to the elimination of tax expenditures.
4. Provisions That Reduce or Limit the Scope of More Than One Tax Ex-
penditure
Provisions such as the minimum tax, the "at risk" rules, and the limitation
on the deduction for investment interest cut across and affect indirectly sev-
eral tax expenditures. The result of each provision is to increase direct budget.
receipts and, consequently, to reduce the revenue expended through the af-
fected tax expenditures. In the case of the minimum tax, the tax expenditure
budgets of both OMB and C110 reduce the revenue loss for each tax expendi-
ture affected by the minimum tax by the minimum tax revenue associated
with the particular tax expenditure.'"
In contrast, in the case of the limitation on investment interest and the
"at risk" rules, the difficulty of matching a portion of the revenue gain with a
particular tax expenditure and the fact that the rules apply to non-tax expen-
I See text at notes 36-44 supra.
1979 Special Analysis G at 154; 1977 CBO TAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION.
.cupra note 12, at 5.
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diture items have required that the revenue effects of such provisions he re-
flected only in increased direct budget receipts. Accordingly, the tax expendi-
ture figures have not correspondingly been reduced." 2
5. Tax Penalties
The revenue derived from the tax penalty provisions discussed in Part I
presently shows up in direct budget revenue receipts.'" In these penalty
situations, the persons involved are paying additional amounts, not properly
designated "income taxes," to the government. In lieu of stating these
amounts as direct budget revenue receipts, these amounts could be excluded
from the income tax total shown in direct budget receipts and then classified
separately in the tax expenditure budget as receipts from tax penalty provi-
sions. Such an approach would appear consistent with that adopted for direct
outlays associated with tax expenditures like the refundable tax credits, as
discussed above.
C. Toward a More Comprehensive Budget Presentation
of Tax Expenditures and Tax Penalties
1. A Unified Direct and Tax Expenditure—Tax Penalty Budget
The preceding discussion indicates that. present budget practices are not
wholly consistent in presenting revenues and outlays associated with tax ex-
penditures and tax penalties. The problems of budget presentation encoun-
tered to date could be avoided by a budget that fully integrated tax expendi-
tures and tax penalties with direct budget receipts and outlays in a single
unified budget. A unified budget, for example, would reflect the following
items insofar as the income tax is concerned:
I. Receipts
A. Cash Receipts Derived from the Normal rIncome Tax System
B. Receipts Associated with Tax Expenditures and Tax Penalties
I. Imputed revenue receipts associated with tax expenditures
2. Cash receipts from special provisions that limit tax ex-
penditures
3. Cash receipts from tax penalties
II. Outlays
A. Direct. Cash Outlays
B. Outlays Associated with Tax Expenditures
1. Imputed outlays from tax expenditures
2. Cash outlays associated with tax expenditures (i.e., refundable
tax credits)
The above unified budget presentation would achieve the dual objectives .
of reflecting all direct budget receipts and outlays in a single place, and re-
]62 rv-m	 !IA	 : r
	 A 107'7 CBO T-T us:1 Specia l /Analysis	 at 1 L -t; .1 I I'	 TAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION,
supra note 12, at 5.
' 63
 See text at notes 32-34 supra.
January 1979]	 TAX EXPENDITURE DEVELOPMENTS	 287
Electing all program receipts and outlays, actual or imputed, in a single place.
A more rational and informative total budget would then be available for
policy makers.
2. Expansion of Special Analysis G
Short of adopting a fully unified budget, Special Analysis G could be
expanded and refilled to mitigate some of the current presentational prob-
lems. A more comprehensive Special Analysis G might be retitled "Tax Ex-
penditures and Tax Penalties." The Special Analysis would then include two
parts:
Part I: Special Analysis of Receipts and Outlays
A. Imputed Revenue Receipts Associated with Tax Expenditures
B. Imputed Outlays Associated with Tax Expenditures 1i 4
Part II: Direct Receipts and Outlays Associated with Tax Expenditures
and Tax Penalties
A. Receipts
1. Minimum tax, "at risk" rules, etc.
2. Tax penalties
B. Outlays
1. Refundable portion of tax credits
If desired, the effects of Parts I and II could then be netted to demonstrate
the net revenue result of employing the tax system to expend funds in excess
of that reflected in direct outlays, and of collecting funds in excess of the
amounts normal income tax rules would produce.
The expansion of Special Analysis G in the manner described does not
achieve all the benefits of a fully unified budget. But, refinement of the Spe-
cial Analysis along the lines outlined above would result in a more complete
budget presentation than we now have of the extent to which the tax system is
employed to achieve non-tax objectives.
IV. INTERACTION OF TAX AND BUDGET POLICY ISSUES
A. Need for a Coordinated Approach
Parts II and III of this article discussed the relationship of the tax ex-
penditure concept to tax policy and to budget policy as separate issues. Yet,
the essence of the tax expenditure concept is that tax policy considerations
involving tax expenditures are essentially related to the budget process.
Hence, in any assessment of tax expenditures a coordinated approach to tax
policy and budget policy is necessary.
Whether an existing tax expenditure or a new expenditure is being
examined, one basic question is why the tax system is being utilized to carry
out the particular policy objective. Direct spending programs are continually
1 " The 1978 CBO TAX EXPENDITURE 'TABULATION, supra note 12, at 27 (Table
5), sets forth the items suggested in Part I.A and I.B in the text at notes 1-31 supra.
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being assessed as to their effectiveness (in terms of achieving objectives), effi-
ciency (in terms of cost-benefit relationships), equity (in terms of social welfare
achieved), and overall priority (in terms of a proper allocation of resources).
A tax expenditure program with the same objective as a direct spending
program likewise must be assessed in these terms. Suppose, for example, that
the HEW Secretary is asked to design a program with the specific objective of
providing assistance for educational expenses, and, further, that the Treasury
Secretary is asked to design a program with the same objective but using the
tax system. Initially it must be determined whether the two programs differ,
even though the same objective is sought. If the programs are different, the
next issue is ascertaining the material points of difference and the reasons for
the differences. it would seem in the end that if the two programs do differ,
what is really involved is a choice between different programs and not be-
tween a direct spending program and a tax expenditure program designed to
meet the same objective. If one of the programs reaches different individuals,
spends more or less money, or has different conditions, then policy choices
are required in evaluating those program differences. Once the choices are
made, then the results selected can be built into either a spending or a tax
program. All this lies in the area of program design, and knowledgeable deci-
sions should be forthcoming in this area." 3
There is a consequence of using the tax route, however, that does not
exist under the direct spending route.'" Most tax expenditures—since they
are structured as exclusions, deductions, or deferrals—are dependent on the
1" 5 Feldstein, The Theory of Tax Expenditures (Harvard Institute of Economic
Research, Sept. 1975), appears to examine the question of tax expenditure versus di-
rect government spending. But the paper initially makes the assumption that the tax
expenditure concept assumes direct spending is always better than a tax expenditure,
and that tax reform must therefore aim for the elimination of all tax expenditures.
Contrary to this conclusion, the tax expenditure concept indicates that a choice is always
involved, and it is that choice which must be considered. Qf course the concept, by
focusing on a tax expenditure as a spending prograth, does indicate that, on govern-
ment priority and political grounds, funds would not be voted for direct programs in
many of the tax expenditure areas even if a direct program were efficiently devised.
For example, Congress would not spend direct program funds to encourage shopping
centers or commercial office buildings even though an existing tax expenditure pro-
gram using accelerated depreciation does spend government funds for those activities.
Feldstein goes on to state that a tax subsidy for publicly favored forms of
consumption may achieve a desired increase in the amount of such consumption, and
do so more effectively than public provision of such goods. But apparently his com-
parison is between a tax subsidy and direct government provision of the goods in
question. That comparison still does not tell us what are the terms of trade between a
Treasury tax subsidy check, and a direct spending check afforded through a grant
from an agency of government representing an alternative to the tax expenditure
route. Since this type of comparison is not considered, Feldstein does not consider the
upside-down effect of tax subsidies or the inability of non-taxable individuals or en-
tities to participate in the subsidy—the equity effects. He is really comparing giving
government funds to people, although the method he examines to provide the funds
is limited to tax subsidies and does not consider direct monetary payments, and provi-
sion by government itself of the goods or services. But that comparison, as stated
above, is only one step in the series of questions to be asked.
"'" See text at Part II supra.
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basic rate structure for their value as benefits. The rate structure now runs
from 14 percent to 70 percent, or 50 percent on earned income. At one point
in 1977, President Carter considered a possible change in the tax rates to a
structure running from 12 percent to 50 percent. That Change, especially at
the top brackets, would have materially reduced the amounts expended
through a number of tax expenditures. In 1978, the President recommended
a rate structure running from 12 percent to 68 percent, which had the same
tendency to reduce the amounts expended through tax expenditures, though
not as significant. The Revenue Act of 1978 did produce a somewhat similar
effect, however, by reducing taxes through a widening of the tax brackets. In
addition, in 1977 and 1978 Congress, largely in the interest of tax simplifica-
tion, increased the standard deduction (zero bracket amount), thereby reduc-
ing the number of "itemizers." " 7
 As a consequence, the personal deductions
requiring itemization—such as the incentive deductions for homeownership
and charitable contributions—or the hardship relief deductions—such as for
medical expenses—became useless for itemizers who switched to the standard
deduction (zero bracket amount). Further, the Revenue Act of 1978 increased
the personal exemptions to $1,000, thus raising the income floor below which
no tax is due, a step which will eliminate a number of individuals from the tax.
expenditure programs. The overall effect of the individual rate reductions
and increased floor will be to reduce tax expenditures for individual tax-
payers.
All this seems strange indeed. If the tax expenditures have valid objec-
tives, it is peculiar that the accomplishment of those objectives suddenly is
altered because fiscal goals or other overall tax objectives, such as simplifica-
tion, require changes which automatically reduce the value of the tax expendi-
tures without any consideration given to that consequence.'" The result
throws considerable doubt both on the wisdom behind the objectives of the
tax expenditure programs so affected, and on the use of the tax route to.
accomplish those objectives.'"
Returning to the matter of program design, suppose the various aspects
described above are considered and, as a consequence, the end results of the
tax program and the direct spending program are designed to be the same.
" 7
 The technical arrangement involved a substitution of a zero rate bracket for
both the standard deduction and the minimum standard deduction (low income allow-
ance) at a figure higher than the standard deduction, and then an allowance for
itemized deductions only for the amount. in excess of the zero bracket.
"`' In 1969, 46% of the individuals filing tax returns itemized their deductions.
For 1977, the estimate is around 23%, and the changes approved in the Revenue Act
of 1978 should bring that figure down still further. As a consequence, the tax incen-
tives for homeownership, for example, were in less than 10 years taken away from
over 50% of the individuals who were then receiving the benefits of those incentives
presumably because of the social objectives said to be obtained by the incentives. Yet,
throughout this period neither H U 1) nor any other group offered serious objections to
what was happening to the incentives or indeed even raised the question.
" 9 See 123 CoNG. REC. 511408 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy), calling attention to the effect of the developments, discussed in the text, in
diminishing the force of the charitable deduction as an incentive to charitable giving.
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The choice between a tax program and a direct spending program will then
involve institutional legislative factors, institutional administrative factors, and
political and psychological factors, among others. As to legislative factors, im-
portant considerations are the congressional committees and the particular
legislators who will have jurisdiction over, and thus control of, the programs if
the tax route is chosen as opposed to a direct program. The expertise, reputa-
tion, and power of the legislative actors, including both the Congressmen and
their staffs, are involved here.' 7 " As to administrative factors, the choice of
administrative agency will depend upon which agency, the Treasury—
Internal Revenue Service unit or another governmental department, is better
equipped to supervise the particular program. These legislative and adminis-
trative factors do not always present clearly defined alternatives and in some
situations overlaps may lessen the importance of the decision. Thus, legislative
jurisdiction may he shared by several committees. Or the Internal Revenue
Service may be mandated to require a certification of qualification for the tax
expenditure from the government department normally responsible for the
activity involved."' But very often, the choice presented by the legislative
and administrative factors will be a clear one along the lines first indicated.
As to political and psychological factors, for many people the use of the
tax expenditure route effectively hides the fact that government funds are
involved and gives the appearance that only private funds are being utilized.
Perhaps those who so view the situation do not understand the tax expendi-
ture concept or, perhaps, do not want to understand the concept given the
results of tax expenditure analysis. The focus on private funds quickly leads
to the belief that private decision making is involved. For some, this private
decision making is a laudable goal. The next step along this line of thought is
17° For an enumeration of the Senate committees that would have jurisdiction
over the types of direct programs that could be substituted for the tax expenditures in
the tax expenditure budget, thereby shifting the present jurisdiction over the pro-
grams and the funds involved from the Senate Finance Committee to those other com-
mittees, see 1978 CBO TAX EXPENDITURE TABULATION, supra note 12, at Tables I and
2. See also 124 CoNG. REC. 55703 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1978) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy). For example, legislative jurisdiction over 33 programs and $48 billion would
shift to the Senate Human Resources Committee; 14 programs and $42 billion would
shift to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee; and 14 pro-
grams and $23 billion would shift to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee.
In his statement Senator Kennedy said: "It is humanly impossible for the 18
members of the Finance Committee arid the 37 members of the Ways and Means
Committee to be Renaissance men and women in employment, commerce, energy,
health, education, housing, banking, state and local finance, transportation, invest-
ment, the cities, shipping, agriculture, foreign trade, life insurance, the environment,
military personnel, veterans, the elderly, the handicapped, and all the other areas in
which tax spending programs are now being used and in which expertise in the areas
is obviously required." Id. at S5704.
17 ' For example, see I.R.C. § 169, five-year amortization for a "certified pollu-
tion control facility" and I.R.C. § 191, five-year amortization for "any certified historic
structure," each requiring certification by the appropriate federal regulatory agency.
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that only through the tax expenditure approach can the goal of private deci-
sion making be achieved.' 72 What is not perceived is that the same private
decision making can accompany a direct government grant.
'" See Hayman n, Tax Expenditures—Spending Money Without Expenditures, 9
NAT'[. J. 1908 (Dec. 10, 1977). The subtitle is "Republicans are latching onto tax ex-
penditures as a way to spend federal money while preserving individual choice and
minimizing bureaucratic red tape." Consider this excerpt from the article:
If Republicans appreciate the way tax expenditures don't show up on the
spending side of the budget, they also have found many other advantages
to the use of the tax code to provide federal benefits. Tax expenditures
have proved consistent with the ideology of free enterprise and individual
initiative.
Take, for example, Domenici's proposal to give a tax credit. of $75 to
elderly and poor heads of households. The Senate voted by a split of 88-2
to attach the proposal to its energy tax hill (HR 5263).
Domenici explained in an interview that his proposal, unlike a federal
grant program, would give the elderly the responsibility to take care of
themselves. "My natural inclination," he said, "is to let people do the
problem-solving rather than the government."
If the money to finance a program does not flow through Washington,
Domenici said, the federal government does not have to spend a lot of
money to administer it. Nor does it have an opportunity to smother the
program in red tape, he added. The absence of red tape is one of the
reasons why Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Ore., is one of the Finance Commit-
tee's leading advocates of tax expenditures.
"With any federal grant program," Packwood said in an interview,
"there's a tendency for us in Washington to be convinced that we know
best what the recipients should do with their money." Packwood said he is
a firm believer in the opposite principle: that individuals know best what
they need.
When the federal government assigns to itself the job of administering
a program or writing the regulations that govern what recipients can do,
Packwood said, almost invariably it makes a mess of things. "We can set
goals pretty well," he said, "but we can't manage very welt,"
Packwood added a related point: that federal management or regula-
tion often forces uniformity on the recipients of federal aid. If the federal
government established a grant program for the families of college stu-
dents, he said, it might. load the program clown with so many regulations
that students attending only certain kinds of colleges would qualify. On the
other hand, he said, a tax expenditure would promote a diverse system of
higher education.
Tax expenditures also permit regional diversity, Packwood added.
"What we need in New York City may not he what we need in Newport.,
Ore."
Rep. Barber B. Conable, Jr. of New York, the ranking Republican
member of the Ways and Means Committee, said it was appropriate for
Congress to tie fewer strings to money that it leaves in private hands
through tax expenditures than to money that it collects in taxes and redis-
tributes in spending programs. "And we Republicans tend to resist the de-
vices for financing social purposes that carry with them tighter controls,"
Conable said in an interview.
Roth sounded a similar theme last May 12 [1977] when he testified to
the House Budget Committee on tuition tax credits. "I believe there is
something fundamentally wrong in the growing concept that working
American taxpayers should come to Washington to apply for government
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The tax expenditure approach involves private decision making by gen-
erally allowing a taxpayer to declare himself eligible for the "tax grant," that
is, to determine, in the first instance, whether he is eligible for the exclusion
or deduction that constitutes the tax expenditure. The Internal Revenue Serv-
ice may later examine that conclusion if it audits the tax return. In contrast,
under most direct spending programs, the person seeking the monetary ben-
efit must first establish eligibility with the agency handling the program be-
fore a grant is received. But, this difference in mechanics is not an inherent
or necessary attribute of either type.of program. A particular tax expenditure
program may require a certification from a government agency to enable the
taxpayer to claim the benefit on the return,' 71 and a direct spending program
could he run on a payment first, audit later basis.' 74
Additional interrelated psychological and political factors are present in
the choice of routes. Thus, under the present budget system, both revenues
and budget outlays are kept lower when tax expenditures are used instead of
direct programs. Hence, legislators or Presidents desirous of not appearing to
be "big spenders" can quite comfortably approve tax expenditures without
hurting their image of fiscal conservatism. 175 Similarly, the focus on tax rules
permits the debating points to shift away from the real issues. Thus, consider
President Carter's 1978 proposals to reduce or eliminate certain "entertain-
ment deductions" and the attacks made on the grounds that the President's
proposals would curtail spending in luxury restaurants, thereby creating un-
employment for the workers in those restaurants, and that the proposals
would seriously affect the theatre, baseball, and other sports activities because
of their dependence on "entertainment" ticket purchases.' 7 " Essentially,
those voicing these attacks were not debating the merits of the proposals as
aid programs financed by their own taxes," Roth said. He urged that Con-
gress enable "our working people to keep more of what they earn to pay
their own bills and not the government's."
Id. at 1909.
The statements obviously exhibit only a surface description, and none of the
Congressmen quoted bother to explain why, if they strongly desire simplicity and ini-
tial private decision, they do not so structure direct programs. To say, as Senator
Packwood does, "that individuals know best what they need," is an absolute non
sequitur as to why a tax program should be chosen. The real question is whether these
Senators and Representatives are acting under an unexplored and honestly mistaken
illusion or whether they are using the illusion to justify the enactment of a tax pro-
grain where they would be politically unwilling affirmatively to vote for a direct spend-
ing program with the same objective, either with a lack of controls and hence similar
to the tax route, or with some controls.
ITS See note 171 supra.
'74 The payment of Medicare and Social Security benefits have some elements
of a payment first—audit later approach.
"5 See Havemann, supra note 172.
"" See The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, Hearings on the
President's 1978 Tax Program Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2ci
Sess. 5377-417 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. S 1 7564-69 (daily ed. Oct, 7, 1978) (Senate floor
debate rejecting a proposal to disallow 50% of "business" meal deductions); 124 CONG.
REC. S17967-69 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (Senate floor debate rejecting a proposal to
reduce deductions for entertainment costs).
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aspects of a proper tax structure, but were instead seeking to maintain exist-
ing tax rules for their claimed incentive effect in enabling luxury restaurants,
the theatre, and sports activities to survive.'" But, it is unlikely that any of
the legislators making these arguments would lend his name to a bill giving a
direct government grant to a "luxury restaurant," with the grant increasing in
proportion to the luxury of the restaurant, or to a bill giving a direct grant to
high level advertising or other executives if they promise to continue to eat in
luxury restaurants. The number of direct programs which a resourceful mind
could produce to protect luxury restaurants is obviously large—and it is just
as obvious that no legislator would choose to defend those programs. The
very use of these arguments to attack a tax proposal illustrates how the politi-
cal rules change when a tax program is the focal point of a debate. We lack a
full analysis of the psychological and political factors that may be involved in
the choice of routes. Presently, the effects of tax versus direct programs rep-
resent an area that the political scientists largely have left untouched.' 78
Both a study of the criteria that should govern the choice between the tax
expenditure route and the direct budgetary route, and an assessment of the
various tax expenditures, existing and proposed, in the light of those criteria,
clearly are necessary. While progress in accomplishing such studies' has been
slow in contrast to the need, the Congressional Budget Office has at least
indicated that it fully understands this need, and has produced several such
studies. One study involves the existing tax expenditures for low income hous-
ing.'" Another concerns the proposed tax credit for higher education.'"
The CBO also has assisted the House Budget Committee Task Force on Tax
Expenditures in holding hearings on certain new tax expenditures.'" The
177
 The present line dividing non-deductible "entertainment" expenses from
deductible business expenses is not considered as a tax expenditure because it is as-
summed Congress has been making an effort properly to locate the line under appro-
priate normative tax structure criteria. But if the line is drawn on the basis of the
subsidy arguments advanced to attack the proposals, then the result should be clas-
sified as a tax expenditure.
'" See Good & Wildaysky, A Tax By Any Other Name: The Donor Directed Automatic
Percentage Contribution Bonus, A Budget Alternative for Financing Government Support of
Charity, 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
AND PUBLIC NEEDs 2389 (U.S. Treas. Dept. 1977), for a discussion of some of the
questions raised in the text in the context of the charitable contributions deduction,
179 CBO HOUSING STUDY, ,supra note 77.
' In CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL AID TO POST-SECONDARY STU-
DENTS: TAX ALLOWANCES AND ALTERNATIVE SUBSIDIES (Jan. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
CBO EDUCATION STUDY]. The Administration recognized that to defeat the congres-
sional impetus for a tax expenditure for college tuition (a tax credit) it was necessary
to counter with a direct program and then explain the difference between the two.
Also, the congressional committees charged with jurisdiction over expenditure programs
for education have realized that one basic issue involved is whether those committees
or the tax committees will control the formulation of federal aid to education. Ulti-
mately, in 1978, Congress passed the Administration's direct program. The tuition tax
credit proposed died in Conference because of the Senate refusal to accept the House
provision extending the tax credit to elementary and secondary school costs, and also
perhaps because of the promised Presidential veto of any tuition tax credit bill.
See, e.g., Hearings on College Tuition Tax Credits Before the Task Force on Tax
Expenditures, Government Organization and Regulation of the House Comm. on the Budget,
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substantive material produced and issues raised in these various activities un-
derscore the need for a coordinated study of tax expenditures that, on the
executive side, involves OMB, the Treasury, and those government agencies
that would have control over a program if structured as a non-tax program.
Unfortunately, the executive branch has been slow to respond to these
needs. In the Republican period, apparently little thought was given to the
entire issue. Thus, a Department of Agriculture letter criticizing, from the
standpoint of agricultural objectives, certain tax relief provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 seems to have been buried in OMB.' 82 Even the present
Democratic Administration sponsored insulation tax credits and other energy
credits in its energy program without any real thought as to why the tax route
should be chosen, how the credits would affect IRS administration, or how
this choice of tax credits would weaken Presidential and Treasury opposition
to the use of tax credits by others for their programs. The Treasury, in its
intense preoccupation in 1977 and 1978 with devising and then defending a
tax reform program, and with defending energy taxes and credits for which it
had no institutional enthusiasm, has yet. to plan an orderly study of tax ex-
penditures.
In its efforts to pursue other budgetary goals, OMB likewise appears to
have failed to plan studies. In addition, political goals pushed the Adminstra-
tion in the direction of tax credits in the 1978 urban program, again under-
cutting the Treasury Department's and the Internal Revenue Service's opposi-
tion to the use of tax credits. Moreover, the proposed urban tax credits were
structured so that the IRS merely would be paying for items certified by other
agencies. Except for the political view that the tax system must "contribute
something" to the urban program, the payments just as readily could have
been made by those other agencies.'"
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Hearings], and the Report
thereon (Comm. Print 1977).
182 See Surrey, supra note 3, at 322 n.34, 6 TAX NOTES No. 12 at 301 n.34.
182 The proposed urban program would provide, on a two-year trial basis, an
additional five points on the investment credit for equipment and industrial buildings
in distressed areas and certified by the Economic Development Administration, up to a
total amount of $200 million each year. Obviously, this is a spending program and
belongs entirely in the Economic Development Administration. The urban program
also called for an employment credit, to replace the existing jobs credit, for employ-
ment of minority persons certified by the local agency administering the CETA pro-
grams. Here also that agency could fully handle the incentive payments.
The added investment credit for distressed areas under the urban program
and the President's recommendation to limit. "small issue" industrial development
bonds to "economically distressed areas" have the clearly unfortunate aspect of intro-
ducing for the first time geographical limitations into the income tax. These limitations
probably could survive attack under the "uniformity" clause of the Constitution, which
has been construed to require only "geographical uniformity," since taxpayers where-
ever situated can obtain the tax benefits. Moreover, since a direct spending program so
structured would be constitutional, why should a tax expenditure program have to he
tested under the constitutional uniformity clause? It would seem difficult for the Su-
preme Court not to consider these urban program tax credits as spending programs
when the executive branch and Congress, by including them as tax expenditures,
thereby state they are spending programs.
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While the executive branch has responded slowly, there are signs that. the
basic need for coordinated study in the tax expenditure field is recognized in
the Treasury and OMB. The 1977 OMB-Treasury testimony on the proposed
Sunset legislation "4 essentially stressed the desirability of coordinated review
of tax expenditure and direct programs by the executive agencies involved. In
particular, Treasury Secretary Blumenthal, in his testimony on the 1978 tax
proposals, stated that.
[t]he Administration intends to analyze tax and non-tax subsidies for
housing. Our objective is to determine the need for subsidizing par-
ticular segments of the housing market and the most efficient means
of providing needed subsidies.'"
Indeed, the HEW reaction to the tax credit for education in presenting an
alternative direct program is an indication that the Administration recognized
there are two levels to a tax expenditure debate: First, does Congress believe a
serious government assistance goal is involved and, second, if so, how should
the assistance be provided. Hence, if the Congress does desire to provide the
assistance, merely deploring the use of the tax expenditure route will not- be
an effective political response. Instead, the response at least must involve an
alternative direct method of providing the assistance. While the alternative
may not win the battle, at least there is a chance that the issue will be fought
out on more rational grounds.'"" As the experience in 1978 illustrates, when
the tuition tax credit and increased direct educational assistance were compet-
ing approaches, the final choice of the direct assistance may he an indication
that if the Department. whose jurisdiction and expertise are involved—here
HEW—strongly supports the direct approach and is backed by the President,
the direct approach will be accepted.
Although these tax expenditures probably are constitutionally valid, the injec-
tion of these geographical limitations is deplorable. It could well set off a lengthening
list of "geographical" lax expenditures. Since the Congress rarely approaches tax ben-
efits with careful analysis, acceptance of geographical variations in these tax expendi-
ture urban programs could lead to acceptance of geographical variations in cases
where the result would be unconstitutional, e.g., personal exemption levels that would
vary geographically.
Indeed, the Revenue Act of 1978 included some elements of the President's
proposed urban program, though with much less emphasis on economically distressed
areas. Thus, I.R.C. 48(a)(1)(E) and 48(g) were added to provide an investment
credit for costs of rehabilitating buildings more than 20 years old that are used in the
taxpayer's trade or business. The targeted jobs tax credit was substituted for the expir-
ing new jobs tax credit, along the lines the President had recommended. The "small
issue" exemption for industrial development bonds was increased generally, with a
specific provision included for facilities constructed under a HUI) urban development
action grant. I.R.C. §§ 103(b)(6)(1)), I03(c)(6)(1).
1 " Sec text at notes 310-28 infra.
"5
 The President's 1978 Tax Program, Prepared Statements of Administration Witnesses
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (statement of
the Honorable W. Michael Blumenthal).
"" The HEW approach in 1978, suggesting an alternative direct assistance
route, contrasts with its approach in 1977 which was limited to attacking the tax ex-
penditure program. Compare 124 Coxe. Rs.c. H2199 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1978) with 123
CONG. REC. 55303 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1977).
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Finally, OMB apparently is beginning to lake a stronger position on the
need to analyze tax expenditures, and the -f reasury is now willing to work
with CBO and OMB on a program of studies. It should be noted, however,
that. in a coordinated study of tax expenditures, it is important that budget
managers recognize that elimination of some tax expenditures may require
direct programs which will necessitate an increase in the direct outlays of a
particular agency. In other words, the revenue gained from closing down a
tax expenditure may have to be added to the direct budget of the agency
taking over the underlying program. If the government budget managers do
not, allow for this flexibility, the agencies involved will simply dig in and de-
fend continuance of the tax expenditure, even where the Lax expenditure
program is inferior to a direct program.
The need for a coordinated approach is particularly evident in the expo-
sure of most tax expenditures to "tax reform" efforts. The essence of tax
expenditures is to provide governmental assistance through the income tax.
This use of the tax system clearly runs counter to the concept of horizontal
equity under that tax. This concept of horizontal equity holds that families
with the same income should pay the same individual income tax, and, simi-
larly, that corporations with the same profits should pay the same corporate
tax. The concept is essentially a description of the "fairness" that the public
perceives is the essence of the income tax, and the .justification for its promi-
nence in the federal fiscal system. Tax expenditures thus are perceived by
many as "tax preferences" or as "tax loopholes." Hence, tax expenditures
naturally become the focus of tax reform attention and attacks. As a result,
tax expenditures will continue to create a tension that renders government
assistance inherently unstable. If that assistance is an important national
priority, it is therefore necessary to consider whether a direct program that
would not involve such tax reform tension is a better way of providing the
assistance. Thus, while in the eyes of some, political and psychological factors
make the tax expenditure approach desirable, other political and psychologi-
cal factors point in precisely the opposite direction. 187
" 7 Chairman Long's testimony in the Sunset Hearings, supra note 13, touched
on an aspect of this tension:
I want to talk about the issue of tax expenditures. Incidentally, this is one
area where 1 think politicians may find it to their temporary advantage to
deceive and mislead the public. They won't find it to their long-range ad-
vantage.
People find you out, gentlemen, for what you are, whether you like it
or not. If you are doing business straightforward and honestly with them
when they find you out, that is to your advantage; if you are doing busi-
ness deceitfully when they find you out, you are going to get the worst of
it.
There are a lot of people who like to use this phrase, "I voted to
reduce tax expenditures" rather than saying, "I voted to raise your taxes."
But let's look at what some of these "tax expenditures" are. They involve
situations in which some persons are not taxed the same as others. For
example, that involves veterans where we give them a tax advantage with
regard to their veterans' benefits. That involves a credit for child care ex-
penses or for the hiring of welfare recipients. "Tax expenditures" involve
incentives for the working poor to take a job rather than remain on wel-
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B. Some Possible Courses of Action
In comparing a direct approach and a tax approach, the essential ques-
tions are whether a particular government assistance program is an important
priority and, if so, is a direct approach available and, if so, how do the two
approaches compare. These questions clearly lend themselves to sensible,
coordinated studies. The studies may be conducted within the executive
branch or the legislative branch, or both. A preliminary step, that would ad-
vance such studies, would be a more detailed explanation, in the Budget, of
the presence and effects of the related tax expenditures.
The Budget Special Analyses now describe in considerable detail the
amounts, goals, and effects of the government's direct spending programs in
the areas selected for the Analyses. While in recent years tax expenditure
programs have begun to be mentioned, as yet there is neither the same de-
tailed descriptive material nor any substantial analysis relating the tax expen-
ditures to the direct programs or to the priorities in particular areas. These
Special Analyses could provide such detail, and presumably would indicate
several appropriate studies. For example, Part 5 of the Budget, "Meeting
Federal Needs: The Federal Program By Function," provides descriptive
material for the outlays under the budget classifications. Tax expenditures are
fare; they involve a credit for the purchase of a new house or the deduc-
tion on a home mortgage. All those matters are regarded as "tax expendi-
tures," and a repeal of those provisions would involve a major tax increase
on poor, disabled, aged. Anyone who wants to go out and tell those old
people he voted for a reduction in "tax expenditures" hoping to lead them
to think he either voted to reduce Government spending or to cut their
taxes is deceiving them.
People Find us out for doing that kind of thing. 1 would urge that we
not try to mislead the people into thinking that, when we put more taxes
on, we have cut their taxes or cut Government spending when we really
did just the opposite.
How many people here want to go out and tell people, "1 support the
sunset bill. Let me tell you what that does to you, Grandma. That guaran-
tees you an automatic tax increase. Let me tell you what it means, Mr.
Homeowner. It guarantees you a tax increase on your home. I support the
sunset bill. Let me tell you what that does to you, little widow woman. It
means you are going to pay taxes on that social security check that you
have been receiving since your husband died. I support the sunset bill. Let
me explain what that means to you, Mr. Veteran. It means hereafter you
will pay a tax on your veteran's disability pension check."
Hearings on the Sunset Act of 1977, supra note 13, at 465-66.
This testimony does underscore the assistance that lies behind tax expendi-
tures and the political force of that assistance. What the testimony leaves out is that the
assistance could he provided through direct programs and presumably should he pro-
vided if the issue cuts as deep as the testimony indicates. The testimony also indicates
the political and informational barriers that can make it difficult to substitute direct
programs for tax expenditure programs.
For comments by some Senators on the effects of using tax expenditures and
the lack of coordination in decisions whether to use tax expenditures or direct pro-
grams, see Can Congress Control the Power of the Purse? Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Budget, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25, 35-36, 44-46, 84-94 (1977). See also S. BUDGET
COMM. COMPENDIUM, supra note 12.
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mentioned in the introductory material, and particular tax expenditures are
described in the material under some of the functional categories, such as
Income Security. But, for most of the budget functional categories, the mate-
rial covers only direct outlays. Even where tax expenditures are referred to,
their amounts are not included in the outlay tables, so that a complete picture
of amounts being spent is not presented. Thus, there remains considerably
more opportunity in the budget documents to integrate the discussion of di-
rect programs and tax expenditure programs.
There are certainly enough subjects for study, and sensible planning
would produce a feasible schedule and allocation of tasks. For example, one
set of studies is suggested by the failure of tax reform in certain areas, such as
the tax expenditures for low income rental housing. Obviously, the continued
exception of such housing from reform provisions restricting the real estate
tax shelter is a clear indication that government. assistance is thought to be
necessary. A new program must be substituted for the tax shelter assistance
before the latter assistance, inefficient and inequitable though it is, is disap-
proved by Congress. The CBO study in this area is a useful starting point for
analysis. 188 Other tax shelters that prove resistant to reform also are candi-
dates for study. Along the same line, the termination dates placed on various
tax expenditure provisions—the five-year amortization provisions, such as for
rehabilitated housing and historic buildings, the legal services provisions, or
provisions such as the targeted jobs credit adopted in 1978 and set to end
after 1981—are an open invitation for study. The need is underscored by the
tendency often to extend the life of these provisions in the absence of
adequate studies. 1 e"
Tax expenditure provisions for which Congress requires a special Trea-
sury report are a high priority for coordinated study. One example of these
provisions is the assistance provided Puerto Rico through the tax expenditure
tax credit—previously an exemption—for United States companies engaged
in activities in Puerto Rico. Preliminary Treasury Department studies have
indicated that in 1976 almost 80 percent of the $533 million revenue cost of
these provisions went not to Puerto Rico, but to large United States corpora-
tions, principally drug and electronic companies. Whether Puerto Rico itself
receives a corresponding benefit is not yet clear, though it would appear that
those companies provide few jobs as compared to the tax benefits they re-
ceive. Further, the 1976 change in the terms of the tax provisions has created
a very serious instability in Puerto Rico's fiscal position, since the change
leaves billions of dollars, presently located in Puerto Rican banks and other
financial institutions, in a highly volatile state.'"
188 CBO HOUSING STUDY, Supra note 77.
1"
 A recognition of the need for the studies is contained in section 554 of the
Revenue Act of 1978, which requires a joint Treasury–Labor Department study on the
targeted jobs tax credit to be submitted to Congress by June 30, 1981.
The congressional decision not to extend the one-year credit for the purchase
of new homes was in large part the result of a HUD study that demonstrated the
uselessness, and consequent wastage involved in the credit. Surrey & McDaniel, supra
note 7, at 721.
180 See U.S. TREAS. DEPT., THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE POSSESSIONS
CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION, FIRST ANNUAL. REPORT Uune 1978).
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Presently, section 555 of the Revenue Act of 1978 requires the Treasury
to submit a study of the 1978 changes in capital gains taxation to Congress by
September 30, 1981. The study is to include an analysis of the
effectiveness—or, we assume, the lack thereof—of the changes in "stimulat-
ing investment and increasing the rate of economic growth." The study also is
to explore the effects of the change in capital gains taxation on employment
growth and the level of tax revenues. This study thus should provide an op-
portunity for the Treasury to examine in detail the merits of the rather ex-
travagant claims made by the proponents of capital gains tax reductions in the
1978 legislative debates.
In addition, follow-up studies on the effectiveness of the energy tax cred-
its produced by the 1978 legislation will be required to see if the credits are as
promising and rational as their proponents ardently proclaim. Similarly, the
pollution control tax expenditures require study to ascertain their effective-
ness and to explain why government assistance for business in meeting pollu-
tion control requirements has taken the tax route and not the direct assistance
route. Such a study also could extend to the use of regulatory taxes rather
than, or along with, direct regulation in the environmental area and the
energy area.
Tax expenditures in several other diverse areas indicate the need for
coordinated study. In the medical-health area, tax expenditures merit study so
as to provide information on their efficiency and equity, and thereby to make
available material helpful in considering a national health program.'" The
tax expenditures made available through the exemption for certain types of
industrial development bonds, notably hospital bonds, residential housing
bonds, pollution control bonds, and bonds issued under the "small issues"
exemption, require study to determine their efficiency and role in meeting
national needs in these areas. Coordinated study is also necessary for those
tax expenditures that exist side-by-side with direct programs in the same field.
The rental housing tax shelter expenditures mentioned above are one exam-
ple. Homeownership tax expenditures and the child care tax expenditure are
additional examples. Likewise, the tax expenditures in the estate and gift tax
area are kept well hidden, and need the study they have never received. This
study should cover the 1976 Act changes and also extend to non-tax expendi-
ture structural defects in those taxes.'"
Finally, the developments in congressional consideration of welfare revi-
sion may provide additional topics for study. This revision raises questions as
to the appropriateness of the present income tax exemptions for many trans-
191 For Some earlier studies, see SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1974
BUDGET 109-29 (Fried et al. eds. 1973); B. MITCHELL & J. VOGEL, HEALTH AND TAXES:
AN ASSESSMENT or THE MEDICAL DEDUCTION (Rand R-1222-0E0, 1973); K. DAVIS,
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 14-17 (1975).
192
 For a list of the tax expenditures, see Appendix C, infra; FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXATION, supra note 67, at 884. For a description and criticism of the 1976
Act changes, see Surrey, supra note 3; McDaniel, Foreward: The Interaction of Tax Plan-
ning and Tax Policy, 19 B.C. L. REV. 387 (1978). For a description of structural defects,
see Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77
Co',um. L. REV. 161 (1977).
300	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 SVol. 20:225
fer payments. If the proposed basic welfare payment is made taxable—an
issue in itself—it is difficult to see why other transfer payments, such as un-
employment insurance, social security, and so on, should remain untaxed.
These suggestions for study could, of course, be amplified. There are
many tax expenditures, and most of them have never been carefully studied,
either as tax items or in the coordinated approach here suggested. What is
needed is not, therefore, a prolonged search for subjects of study or long
debate on priorities and scheduling, but rather, a concerted effort by the
necessary participants to begin the studies. The main responsibility for the
executive branch falls on OMB, strongly backed by the Treasury, and respon-
sibility for the legislative branch falls on CBO, strongly backed by the Budget
Committees. If President Carter is ever to reach his goal of ending the "dis-
grace" he sees in the tax system, these studies are a necessary step in the
process.
V. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ISSUES
The processes by which Congress considers tax and budget policy legisla-
tion are continually evolving and continually subject to stress. Two distinct but
related effects of the tax expenditure concept were brought into sharper
focus by the legislative actions in the period between 1976 and 1978. The first
concerned the impact of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 193
 on the
procedures for dealing with tax legislation. The second concerned the ques-.
don of committee jurisdiction over tax expenditures and procedures for con-
sidering areas where tax and direct measures overlap. This part explores both
of these effects, particularly in light of the congressional budget process, and
the authorization-appropriations process."'
A. Tax Expenditures and the Budget Process
I. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided the occasion for the first major
test of the efficacy of the procedures established by the 1974 Budget Act to
subject tax expenditures to the new congressional budget process. 195
 In the
First Concurrent Budget Resolutions for Fiscal 1976, the House and Senate
Budget Committees had attempted to exert some control over the level of tax
expenditures by providing for a $1 billion increase in revenues through "tax
reform legislation." 1 9 t1 In early 1976, as the Budget Committees began con-
sideration of the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year
1 " Pub. L. No, 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
194
	 our prior discussion of legislative process issues, see Surrey & McDaniel,
SUPTa note 7, at 709-20. For a discussion of recent developments in the tax legislative
process, see Surrey. The Federal Tax Legislative Process, 31 RECORD Assoc. OF BAR OF
Crry OF NEW YORK 515 (1976); McDaniel, supra note 136.
1 '' 5 For an overview of the 1976 Act, see Surrey, supra note 3.
19" See H. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The assumption was de-
leted from the binding Second Concurrent. Resolution for Fiscal 1976 because there
was no tax bill then pending which could have been enacted in time to generate $1
billion in revenues in fiscal 1976.
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1977, attention was shifted from "tax reform" and focused on the more pre-
cise term used in the Budget Act—"tax expenditures." 197 The difficult ques-
tion presented for the Budget Committees at this juncture was how to effect a
positive reduction in the level of tax expenditures.
One possible technique would simply have placed a limit on the total dol-
lar amount of tax expenditures permissible for the following year. For exam-
ple, if the tax expenditure list for fiscal year 1976 totaled $102 billion, the
Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1977 could have provided for a maximum $100
billion in tax expenditures. TheFe are a number of problems with such an
approach, however, not the least of which is that a $2 billion reduction in tax
expenditures could be accomplished with no change in the tax expenditure
provisions. This result could be achieved by a simple rate reduction or an
increase in the standard deduction, which, in turn, would automatically re-
duce the dollar cost of many tax expenditures. Furthermore, it is possible that
a Budget Resolution phrased in terms of a reduction of the aggregate rev-
enues involved in tax expenditures would not achieve the objective sought in
the Budget Resolution—review, evaluation, and, where appropriate, reduc-
tion or elimination of tax expenditures.
An obstacle in achieving the Budget Resolution objectives was the sensitiv-
ity of the Senate Finance Committee, and especially its Chairman Senator
Long, to what they considered a potential intrusion on the Finance Commit-
tee's jurisdiction. Pursuant to section 301(c) of the Budget Act, the Finance
Committee on March 15, 1976 submitted its views on the level of federal
revenues for fiscal 1977 to the Senate Budget Committee. In its submission,
the Finance Committee simply called for a net reduction in revenues for fiscal
1977 totaling $19.6 billion.'" The method of reaching that figure, whether
through extension of the existing temporary tax cuts or by increasing tax ex-
penditures, was not detailed, and the figure itself was to result from the Fi-
nance Committee deliberations on H.R. 10612, the House-passed Tax Reform
Bill of 1975.
The Finance Committee commenced hearings on the Tax Reform Bill on
March 17, 1976. Almost immediately, Senator Long began to state his displea-
sure with the interest in tax expenditures being evidenced by the Senate
Budget Committee and the Congressional Budget Office.'" On April 1,
1976, with the Resolution due to be reported out by the Committee by April
15, 1976, he appeared before the Budget Committee during its markup of
the First Concurrent Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1977. Senator Long argued
that it was unrealistic to anticipate any significant revenue gains from tax re-
" 7 See S. REP. No. 731, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); Surrey & McDaniel, supra
note 7, at 706-07 n.85.
198 See Fiscal Year 1977 Finance Committee Report Under the Congressional Budget
Act, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 4, 1976). For background material, see STAFF OF SEN-
ATE FINANCE Comm., 94th CoNo., 2D SESS., DATA AND MATERIALS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1977, FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT
(Comm. Print 1976).
" 9 SFC 1976 Hearings, supra note 77, at 406.
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form in fiscal 1977. One basis for this conclusion was his assertion that rev-
enue raising measures traditionally were prospective, while revenue losers
were usually retroactive.'"
It was thus obvious that, if the budget process was to exert any control
over spending through the tax system in fiscal 1977, a specific reference to
tax expenditures was required in connection with the First Concurrent Resol-
ution for that year. The Senate Budget Committee Report on the First Con-
current Resolution therefore provided for a $2 billion net revenue increase
resulting from changes in existing tax expeticlitures. 20 ' The Budget Resolu-
tion itself, however, merely set a revenue target of $362.5 billion, to be
achieved by subtracting a total of $15.3 billion in revenue reductions from an
estimated $377.8 billion in revenues, if the 1975 tax cuts were not ex-
tended.'" The Budget Committee Report made clear that the $15.3 billion
figure was to be reached by netting the $17.3 billion revenue loss resulting
from extension of the temporary tax cuts for a full year and the $2 billion
revenue gain to be realized by cutting back on existing tax expenditures. 203
The Senate approved the Budget. Resolution on April 8, 1977. Prior to
this approval, however, members of the Finance Committee exerted consider-
able effort in floor debate to establish the Committee's freedom to reach the
$15.3 billion in the Budget Resolution by any combination of tax cuts, tax
increases, and changes in tax expenditures that the Committee might decide
upon. 204 The Conference Committee then met on the Budget Resolution.
The House Budget Committee, in its Report, had likewise assumed a $2 bil-
lion revenue gain from modification of existing tax expenditures. 25 The
Conference Committee Report stated that the Budget Resolution was based
on an assumed $2 billion revenue gain from "tax reform.,, 206 The First Con-
current Resolution was adopted by the House and the Senate on May 12 and
13, 1976, respectively.
In the meantime, as the Senate Finance Committee concluded its hearings
on the tax reform bill and commenced its markup sessions, the pressure
created by the Budget Resolution became apparent. For example, Senator
Long discouraged some who sought new or expanded tax expenditures on
the ground that the Committee had to raise the revenue to meet the budget
target. In addition, however, his remarks indicated that he recognized the
possibility of satisfying the Budget Resolution by manipulating effective dates
21" 4 TAx NOTES No. 15 at 5-10 (Apr. 12, 1976). Senator Kennedy pointed out
prior legislative examples that conflicted with Senator Long's position. 122 CONG. REC.
S4711 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976). See also SFC 1976 Hearings, supra note 77, at 1699-705.
201 S. REP. No. 731, supra note 197, at 6, 8.
202 S. CON. RES. 109, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The "temporary" tax cuts had
originally been implemented in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
203 S. REP. No. 731, supra note 197, at 6.
204 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S5295, 5326 (daily eds. Apr. 8 and 9, 1976).
215 H. REP. No. 1030, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1976).
206 H. REP. No. 1008, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The use of the term "tax
reform" rather than "tax expenditures" was not intended, and was never treated, as a
change in meaning. The $2 billion figure was selected because it represented approx-
imately a 2% reduction in tax expenditures, which corresponded to the 2% reduction
in direct programs being recommended.
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to shift the revenue effects of the tax expenditures into fiscal years after
1977.207 Thus, H.R. 10612, as reported to the Senate floor in June, 1976,
reflected the influence exerted on the Finance Committee by the overall rev-
enue target set by the Budget. Resolution. Nevertheless, the bill did not com-
ply with the Budget Committee method of reaching the target and, in the
Budget Committee's view, the objective of the budget process was evaded de-
spite the Finance Committee's technical compliance with the Budget Act.
The Finance Committee bill technically came close to the overall target
figures for fiscal 1977 established in the First Concurrent Budget Resolution.
The Finance Committee bill produced "reductions" of nearly $15 billion for
fiscal 1977, as compared to, the $15.3 billion targeted by the Resolution. The
$15 billion figure was reached, however, by obtaining only $980 million in
revenue from "tax reforms" and by then cutting off the tax cut extensions as
of June 30, 1977, rather than extending them throughout fiscal 1977 as con-
te ► plated by the Budget. Resolution. The latter action "saved" $1.8 billion.
Hence, the budget target of $ 1 5.3 billion in net tax reduction was met by a
$15.5 billion tax cut extension and a $980 million increase from tax reforms. 2 u 8
Thus, the Finance Committee bill rejected the premises on which the
Budget Resolution target figures were based. It provided neither a $17.3 bil-
lion tax cut nor a $2 billion reduction in lax expenditures. Indeed, even the
$980 million figure for reductions in tax expenditures in 1977 reached by the
Committee was suspect. This figure was reached only by reversing the process
that. Senator Long previously had described to the Budget Com mitee as
"normal." 20
 Contrary to Senator Long's earlier .assumption, the Finance
Committee made the revenue gainers in the bill retroactive and deferred the
effective dates of the prospective revenue losers, in some instances skipping
fiscal 1977 completely. Asa result, revenue gains were artificially hunched in
fiscal 1977 and net losses in fact resulted from the Finance Committee actions
on tax expenditures for all fiscal years after 1977. 2 "
In its treatment of effective dates, of course, the Finance Committee was
manipulating its bill to effect. technical compliance with the Budget Act. But it.
was also undermining a rational budget process of bringing tax expenditures
under effective control of Congress. There is little point in a budget process
that produces technical compliance in one year but allows the approval of
expenditures which prove uncontrollable in subsequent years. Thus, while on
balance the Finance Committee in 1976 obviously felt pressured to comply
with the Budget Resolution, it demonstrated a remarkable ability to avoid and
actually subvert the goals which the Resolution sought to achieve.
Recognizing these circumstances, the Budget Committee determined at
the outset of the Senate floor consideration of H.R. 10612 to challenge the
2"7 See, e.g., SEC 1976 Hearings, supra note 77, at 2059.
208 122 CONG. REC. 59571 (daily ed. June Ili, 1976) (statement of Sen. Long). It
was widely assumed that the Senate Finance Committee left itself a margin of some
$800 million to "play with" on the Senate floor, i.e., further tax reducing amendments
would be accepted to increase the $14.5 billion net revenue reduction in the bill to the
targeted $15.3 billion.
2 " See text and note at 200 supra.
210 S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 34 (1976).
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Finance Committee bill as violating the First. Concurrent Budget Resolution.
Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Budget Committee, and Senator BeUnion,
the ranking Republican member of the Committee, argued that in adopting
the First Concurrent Resolution, Congress had also adopted the method to be
employed in reaching the target figures. That method, as reflected in the
Budget Committee Report, was designed to produce specified economic
results—a certain form of fiscal stimulus through a full year extension of the
tax cuts and a degree of fiscal restraint from cuts in government direct and
tax expenditures. By changing the mix of tax cuts and tax increases, the Sen-
ate Finance Committee's bill would produce different economic results from
those approved by Congress." In opposition, Senator Long, along with
members of the Finance Committee, argued that passage of the First Concur-
rent Resolution required only that the Budget Resolution figures be met. The
$2 billion figure for tax expenditures appeared only in the Budget Committee
Report, not in the Resolution itself. According to the Finance Committee, the
Report simply expressed the Budget Committee's views of the most desirable
way to achieve the $15.3 billion figure. As such, the Finance Committee was
free to disagree, and the full Senate could then work its will. Under this view,
the Finance Committee bill was not subject to a point of order on the ground
that it was in violation of the Budget Resolution. In the debate, Senator Long
also invoked fears of a Budget Committee invasion of the jurisdiction of other
committee chairmen if the Muskie-Bellmon views were upheld. 2 ' 2
The debate on whether the Finance Committee bill as reported was or
was not in compliance with the Budget Resolution ended inconclusively. To
force the issue, Senator Muskie offered an amendment to extend the tempo-
rary cuts for all of fiscal 1977. This amendrnent would bring the tax reduc-
tion figure up to the $17.3 billion figure posited by the Budget Committee. If
the Muskie amendment passed, then it was hoped that the tax reform
amendments offered by a coalition of fifteen Senators would bring the tax
expenditure reduction figure up to the targeted $2 billion. Since preliminary
votes indicated that the Muskie amendment would be defeated, he withdrew
4. 2 " Predictably, the Senate then proceeded to reject virtually all the tax re-
form amendments to the bill and added a host. of new tax expenditures.
When H.R. 10612 left the Senate floor, instead of a $2 billion reduction in tax
expenditures for fiscal 1977, tax expenditures were increased by $260 million,
a figure that quickly accelerated to almost. $850 million by fiscal 1981. 214
2" 122 CONG. Rec. S9568-84, 9711-26 (daily eds. June 16 and 17, 1976).
212 Id.
2 ' 3 The debate on the Muskie amendment appears at 122 CONG. REC. S9737-46,
9827-55, 9880-84, 9988-10010 (daily eds. June 17, 18 and 21, 1976). The proposals of
the tax reform coalition appear at 122 CONG. REC. 59583-89 (daily ed. June 16, 1976)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). At. the conclusion of Senate floor consideration of H.R.
10612, Senator Muskie moved to recommit the bill to the Finance Committee with
instructions to report out a bill containing only the tax cut extensions. The motion was
tabled. 122 CONG. REC. SI3582-88 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976).
214 See generally 122 CONG. REC. S14383 (daily ed. Aug. 24, ,1976) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
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While no clear cut votes had been taken, it was obvious that the budget
process had failed to constitute a significant force in achieving particular tax
reforms on the Senate floor. A number of factors may have accounted for this
failure. While some Senators opposed the necessary revenue raising reforms
on the merits, others may have feared a "power grab" by the Budget Commit-
tee. Still others, as the defeats for tax reform and the victories for new tax
preferences mounted, simply concluded that the bill would be cleaned up in
Conference. Others still apparently had not grasped that preferential tax pro-
visions constitute federal spending and had difficulty seeing how the policies
of the Budget Act really applied to tax provisions. Whatever the reasons, the
1976 experience demonstrated that the Budget Act had little impact on Sen-
ate floor votes on particular issues. Yet, at the conclusion of the Senate floor
debate, Senator Long himself added an amendment that it was the sense of
the Senate that the Senate Members of the Conference Committee seek to
reduce the net revenue reductions in the bill to the $15.3 billion figure
targeted in the Budget Resolution. 215
Obviously, a formidable task faced the Conference Committee on the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. In contrast to the Senate bill, the House version of H.R.
10612 provided a $1.7 billion revenue gain from cuts in tax expenditures for
fiscal 1977, with revenue gains for each year thereafter up to a projected $2.5
billion in fiscal 1981. 2 ' 6 In the Conference Committee, the discipline sought
to be achieved by the budget process reasserted itself. Although the individual
provisions of the Conference bill in some respects differed sharply from the
House bill, the revenue gain from tax reform was almost $1.6 billion for fiscal
1977, with the revenue gains increased to $2.47 billion by fiscal 1981. 21 A
number of factors combined to produce this result.. Conferees were quite sen-
sitive to revenue and budget considerations, detailed revenue estimates were
made available by the staffs for each issue under consideration, and the Con-
ference Committee sessions for the first time on a major tax bill were open to
the public and the press.
In the meantime, work on the Second Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal 1977 had begun. The Senate version assumed a fiscal 1977
revenue gain of $1.1 billion from tax reform; the House version assumed a
$1.6 billion gain. 2 " The Conference Committee report assumed a $1.6 bil-
lion gain, the same as provided in the Conference Committee version of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. 219 On September 16, 1976, Congress adopted the
Second Concurrent Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1977 as recommended by
"5
 122 CONC.. REC. SI3784 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976) (statement of Sen. Long).
219 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1975, H.R.
REP. No. 658. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975). The figures in the text vary somewhat
from those shown in the Committee Report, reflecting subsequent revisions in the
revenue estimates by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
217 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976, at 108 (Oct. 4, 1976),
219
 S. REP. No. 1204, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); H.R. REP, No. 1457, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
219
 H.R. REP, No. 1502, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
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the Conference Committee. The same day both the House and the Senate
approved the Conference Report on H.R. 10612, the Tax Reform Act of
1976.
Evaluation of the adequacy of the budget process to control tax
expenditures—on the basis of the 1976 experience—must be a mixed one.
On the one hand, the $2 billion target figure appears to have exerted a sig-
nificant influence on the deliberations of the tax writing Committees and on
the Conference Committee."' Even so, the approaches of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, as well as the
experience on the floor of each house, were quite different. In part, this dif-
ference may be accounted for by the fact that Representative Ullman, Chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee, was instrumental in securing
enactment of the 1974 Budget Act and, indeed, served for a time as Chair-
man of the House Budget Committee. Thus, cooperation rather than con-
frontation marked the relationship between the House Budget Committee
and the Ways and Means Committee. The Senate Finance Committee, in con-
trast, adopted quite a different tactic. While it felt constrained by the Budget
Resolution, much of its effort was devoted to circumventing it. This approach
undoubtedly reflected the philosophical and personal differences between
Senator Muskie and Senator Long. In any event, the result in the Senate was
confrontation rather than cooperation between the two committees. In addi-
tion, once the bill reached the Senate floor, the discipline envisioned by the
budget process could not restrain the erratic treatment of the tax system that
traditionally results from the Senate floor open rule.
Recognizing these problems, however, the budget process did produce
two important results on the Senate floor. First, the budget process apparently
motivated the Long amendment, noted above, that committed the Senate con-
fereees to try to report a bill that complied with the Budget Resolution. Sec-
ond, the budget process provided Senator Muskie a vehicle with which to
emphasize, for the Congress and the press, that the absence of significant
reform was directly contrary to assumptions underlying the Budget Resolu-
tion and significantly undercut a rational budget process.
22° Another effect of the budget process was realized subsequently. The Senate
version of H.R. 10612 contained a number of tax expenditures for energy conserva-
tion and production. The Conferees agreed to drop all these provisions from the bill,
with the understanding that the Finance Committee would add them to H.R. 6860,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the Energy Tax Bill enacted by the House in 1975, and
then still pending before the Finance Committee. The Finance Committee took this
action, but added to H.R. 6860 a one-half cent per gallon increase in the federal
gasoline tax. The tax increase was necessary because H.R. 6860 was scheduled for
floor action after passage of the Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget. If only
the tax expenditures had been included in H.R. 6860, the bill would have been subject
to a point of order under section 311 of the Budget Act since it would have reduced
revenue levels below the mandatory figure established by the Budget Resolution. Since
they had to be financed by higher taxes, the Senate then lost its enthusiasm for
energy-related tax expenditures, and H.R. 6860 was allowed to die.
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2. The 1977-1978 Experience
The passage of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, the
Energy Tax Act of 1978, and the Revenue Act of 1978 continued the interac-
tion between the budget process and the tax legislative process that had been
experienced in 1976.
a. Budget Resolutions and the Tax Credit for Higher Education Costs
The revised budgetary and tax proposals, submitted by President Carter
in January of 1977, necessitated a Third Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal 1977. Like the First Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal 1978,
adopted in May, 1977,221 the Third Resolution did not seek to impose any
limitations on tax expenditures."' In the Second Concurrent Resolution for
Fiscal 1978, however, proponents of tax expenditures, drawing on the experi-
ence of earlier efforts of tax reformers to employ the budget process in the
cause of tax reform, succeeded in adding the revenue necessary to fund a
proposed tax credit for the costs of higher education to the Resolution. Dur-
ing the House floor consideration of the Budget Resolution, Congressman
Giaimo, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, opposed the amendment
to the Budget Resolution to decrease federal revenues (and increase the def-
icit) by the estimated $175 million cost of a tax credit for higher education.
Congressman Giaimo's primary objection was procedural. He maintained that
"[the college tuition tax credit] should be taken to the proper legislating
committees of the Congress. If it passed there, then it can be included in the
budget. But we should not start in the reverse manner of getting it passed
through the budget with the hope that putting it in this budget will act as
some sort of priority incentive toward getting those committees to act on it."
Despite this argument, the House adopted the amendment.'"
In the Senate, a similar amendment was offered by Senator Roth, a Re-
publican member of the Senate Finance Committee. It was opposed by the
Budget Committee. In particular, Senator Muskie stated that the Budget Res-
olution procedure was not the appropriate vehicle for approving individual
tax provisions. Senator Long announced that he would vote for the Roth
amendment. A majority of the Finance Committee followed Senator Long's
lead. 224
 By adopting the Roth amendment to the Budget Resolution in Sep-
221 See S. REP. No. 134, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1977).
222 See S. REP. No. 9, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977). The Resolution did pro-
vide for postponement of the effective date for the changes in the sick pay exclusion
made in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. In addition, the proper treatment of the re-
fundable portion of the earned income credit was considered, as discussed in text at
Part V.B.1 infra.
22$ See 123 GONG. REC. H9028-31 (daily ed. Sept, 8, 1977).
224 See 123 CONG. REC. 814515-16 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1977). The position taken
by Senator Long and the Finance Committee on the tuition tax credit may seem incon-
sistent with their prior position opposing the specific tax assumptions built into the
Budget Committee Report. However, the distinction is that a floor vote on a particular
item expresses the will of the Senate; the Senate never votes on a Budget Committee
Report as such.
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tember, 1977, Congress ensured that the college tuition tax credit proposal
could be added to subsequent revenue legislation by creating more "room" in
the budget for revenue reducing measures. Subsequently, Senator Roth suc-
ceeded in having the credit appended to the Social Security bill passed by the
Senate in November. 225 Acceptance by Senator Long and the Finance Com-
mittee of the Roth amendment to the fiscal 1978 Budget Resolution can
hardly be taken as general acquiescence in such a procedure. One could ex-
pect substantial opposition from the Finance Committee to an amendment to
a Budget Resolution that proposed, for example, an increase in revenues to
make room in the budget for an effort to repeal a tax expenditure such as the
deduction for intangible drilling and development costs.
The tuition tax credit proposal represented only half of the 1978 debate
over how to provide assistance for higher education costs. An alternative
proposal was to provide direct financial assistance for higher education costs
incurred by low- and middle-income families. This debate graphically illus-
trated the interchangeability of tax and direct expenditure programs. In an
effort to divert the congressional drive for tuition tax credits that had gained
momentum in 1977, the President, in early 1978, proposed expansion of the
programs that provide direct financial assistance to defray the educational
costs of students from low- and middle-income families. The President's
proposal was approved by the House Committee on Education and Labor in
somewhat modified form in the Middle-Income Tuition Assistance Act. In its
March 15, 1978 letter of recommendation to the House Budget Committee,
the Ways and Means Committee neither recommended enactment of tuition
tax credits nor did the Committee urge provision in the Budget Resolution
for such tax credits. Subsequently, however, the House Ways and Means
Committee reported out H.R. 10250, the Tuition Tax Credit Act of 1978,
providing tuition tax credits not only for the costs of higher education, but
also for the costs of elementary and secondary education.
The House Budget Committee's Report on the First Concurrent Budget
Resolution for Fiscal 1979 provided $1.4 billion to finance the proposed direct
financial assistance program, 226 but specifically recommended against enact-
ment of tuition tax credits. 2 " The Budget Committee preferred the direct
financial assistance approach because, unlike the tax credits, financial assis-
tance was not provided to high income families and the direct program was
less expensive than the tuition tax credit approach in the long run. 228 Rec-
ognizing the political force behind the tax credit approach, however, the
Report stated: "In line with the views expressed by the Appropriations Com-
mittee, the committee recommends that if Congress agrees to a revenue reduc-
225 The debate on the Roth amendment to the Social Security bill can be found
at 123 CONG. REC. S18792-803 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977). The Conference Committee
deleted the Senate-passed college tuition tax credit from the final version of The Social
Security Financing Amendments of 1977, H.R. 9346, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See
H.R. REP. No. 837, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1977).
226 H.R. REP. No. 1055, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
227 Id. at 13.
228 Id. at 18.
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tion to accommodate tuition tax credits, then the additional budget authority
and outlays provided in this function [education] for the proposed Middle-
Income Student Assistance Act should be eliminated.'"
During the House floor consideration of the First Concurrent Budget
Resolution for Fiscal 1979, an amendment. was offered to provide $635 mil-
lion additional revenue reduction to accommodate the tuition tax credits.
House Budget Committee Chairman Giaimo argued unsuccessfully that there
was sufficient room in the revenue reductions provided in the Budget Resolu-
tion to provide for the tuition tax credits if adopted. (Presumably, however,
the requisite "room" could have been provided only by reducing general tax
cuts or by revenues resulting from tax reforms adopted by the Ways and
Means Committee.) Accordingly, in Giaimo's view, it was unnecessary to adopt
the further revenue reduction proposed by the floor amendment. Moreover,
the effect of adopting the floor amendment, which dealt only with revenue
reductions, would leave in the Budget Resolution both the $1.4 billion in di-
rect outlays recommended by the Budget Committee and the $635 million in
revenue reductions for the tax credits proposed by the floor amendment.
Even so, the House adopted the floor amendment.•" In the Senate, the Sen-
ate Budget Committee Report on the First. Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal
1979 neither recommended nor opposed adoption of tuition tax credits. In-
stead, the Senate Report recommended a revenue floor which "would allow
for a number of legislative proposals including a college tuition tax credit.
231
.	 .	 .
The Conference Committee Report on the First Concurrent Budget Res-
olution for Fiscal 1979 adopted a middle ground by providing a revenue floor
that would accommodate a tuition tax credit. In addition, the Resolution also
229 Id. at 73-74. As to other tax expenditure 'natters, the House Budget Com-
mittee Report stated: The Committee strongly supports tax reform to reduce un-
necessary tax expenditures. It assumes that any reduction in individual or corporate
taxes beyond the level recommended by the committee will be offset, dollar for dollar,
by revenue gains achieved through tax reform." Id. at 13. The Report also showed the
aggregate revenues in tax expenditures associated with each budget function. Id. at 5.
.Z3" 124 CONG. REC. H3595-607 (daily ed. May 4, 1978).
231 S . REP. No. 739, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978). The Senate adopted the
First Concurrent Budget Resolution without discussion of the tuition tax credit issue.
124 CONG. REc. 57446-58 (daily ed. May 15, 1978). At the time of the floor considera-
tion of the Budget Resolution, the Senate Finance Committee had approved a tuition ,
tax credit approach and the Senate Education Committee had approved a direct assis-
tance approach.
As to other tax expenditure matters, the Senate Budget Committee Report
made no assumptions with regard to elimination or reduction of existing tax expendi-
tures, reiterating, however, the Committee's view that "it is as important to control the
growth of tax expenditures as it is to control the growth of direct spending programs."
S. REP. No. 739, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1978). In addition, the Senate Budget Com-
mittee for the first time set forth in its Report the tax expenditures related to each
budget function. Indeed, the tax expenditure data provided by the Senate Budget
Committee was more detailed than that in the corresponding House Budget Commit-
tee Report, note 226 supra.
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provided funds for a direct student assistance program, although not in
amounts as great. as originally provided in the House Budget Committee Re-
port.:
The conference substitute includes $0.3 billion in revenue reductions
and $0.-7 billion in budget authority for additional middle income
student tuition assistance. This represents a 50 percent reduction in
total resources included in the House resolution for both the tax
expenditure and grant proposal forms of this assistance, since it is
not expected that both proposals will be implemented as intro-
duced. 2 " 2
Subsequently, the House of Representatives adopted the Tuition Tax Credit
Act of 1978, 2 " The House floor debates revealed that both proponents and
opponents of the tax credits clearly understood that the proposed tax expen-
diture was to he considered and evaluated as au alternative to direct. assistance
under the President's proposal. Direct spending criteria, such as distribution
of benefits by income classes, costs as compared to benefits, constitutionality
(under the House bill tax credits would benefit religious elementary and sec-
ondary schools), ease of administration, and the like, were by anti large
applied to the tax credit pre.)posal. 2"
The Senate likewise passed its version of the tuition tax credit measure.
The major difference from the House bill was that the Senate bill covered
only the costs of higher education, whereas the House-passed measure cov-
erecl elementary and secondary education costs in addition to higher educa-
tion costs.235
 Having acted favorably on the tuition tax credit, the Senate
then proceeded to approve the College Opportunity Act of 1978, providing
direct financial aid for education costs along the lines recommended by the
President. 2"
The inability of the conferees to resolve the differences between the two
tuition tax credit bills, the Senate Conferees' involvement in considering the
Revenue Act of 1978, and the threat of a Presidential veto meant that the
binding Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget had to be adopted be-
fore either the tax or the direct approach to providing financial support for
education costs could be passed. Accordingly, the Conference Report stated:
"The 'conferees believe enactment of both a tuition tax credit and a college
tuition assistance spending program would be inefficient and duplicative. The
Congress should choose between these two proposals." 237
 Ultimately, the tu-
232 124 CONC.:. REC. 1-13943 (daily ed. May 15, 1978).
233 H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
234
 124 CONG. REC. H4727-99 (daily ed. June 1, 1978).
2"5 As in the House floor debate, Senators dikussed the bill in spending terms
although some sought to establish that the tax credits involved only a "tax cut," not a
government spending program. For the Senate floor debate, see 124 Cole. REC.
SI3070-72, 13106-36, 13146-58, 13191-256, 13310-87 (daily eds. Aug. 10, 11, 14 and
15, 1978).
"' 124 Cone. REC. S 1 3464 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1978).
2"7
 H.R. REP. No. 1594, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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ition tax credit bill died in the Ninety-Fifth Congress because of the refusal of
the Senate to accept tuition tax credits for elementary and secondary educa-
tion costs. 2 " The direct spending program was enacted.
The tuition tax credit—direct spending alternative presented Congress,
and especially the Budget Committees, with unique opportunities to formulate
criteria for choosing between tax and direct spending approaches to a given
problem and to coordinate proposed tax expenditures with overall national
policies in a particular area. Both opportunities were missed. Congress, rather
than affirmatively choosing between the two approaches, attempted to ap-
prove both, even though the educational policies, benefits distribution, and
administration of the two programs differed widely and were even contradic-
tory in sonic respects. 2" Nor did the Budget Committees seize their oppor-
tunity to analyze and compare the programs, either with each other or with
existing education policies, and to present the results to their respective
houses with a positive recommendation as to which was preferable. The fail-
ure of the Committees to make an affirmative recommendation may be
explained by the caution with which they have approached taking substantive
positions on particular budget items. Less understandable was the Commit-
tees' failure to conduct the necessary comparative studies to articulate the
criteria for Congress to employ in choosing between the tax and direct spend-
ing approaches, and the failure to exercise responsibility to ensure that a tax
spending program, if adopted, was properly structured and coordinated with
direct spending programs in the area.
b. Budget Resolutions and the Energy Tax Bill
The effect of the budget process on the effective dates of tax expendi-
tures was illustrated during Senate consideration of the Energy Tax Bill in
late 1977.241/ The energy tax legislation was reported to the Senate floor
after adoption of the Second Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal 1978, which
established binding figures for that year. 2 " At the outset of the Senate floor
consideration of the Energy Tax Bill, the Budget Committee asserted that the
Finance Committee bill provided $800 million more in tax reductions, via new
and expanded tax expenditures, than permitted by the Budget Resolution.
Senator Long argued that the bill was not subject to a point of order because
section 1056 of the Finance Committee bill empowered the Secretary of the
Treasury to defer until October 1, 1978 the effective dates of the various tax
expenditure provisions if necessary to ensure compliance with the Resolution.
2 " 124 CoNG. REC. S19141-44 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
239
 The effort to approve both approaches—the tuition credit approach being
sidetracked on the last day—was in part a response to the Presidential threat of a veto
of any tuition credit. The Congress did want to adopt increased educational assistance.
Its clinging to both approaches would assure that end result. Also, the efforts to pass
the tuition credit were in large part a reflection of the desire of many in Congress to
give assistance at the elementary and secondary school level, and the tuition credit was
viewed as the only possible constitutional route to that. end (though others saw that
approach as grasping at constitutional straws that were not realistic).
"" Energy Tax Act, H.R. 5263, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
241 H.R. REP. No. 582, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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Moreover, Senator Long offered his assurances that, whatever the results of
the legislation passed by the Senate, he would not return with a bill from
conference that was in violation of the Budget Resolution. 242
Senator Abourezk raised a point of order contending that the Finance
Committee bill was in violation of section 303 of the Budget Act because it
exceeded the budget authority for fiscal 1978. The Chair ruled that a point of
order did not lie on that ground, presumably because of the authority
granted to the Secretary of the Treasury to defer the revenue losses until
fiscal 1979. 243  Abourezk then refined his point of order, asserting
that the bill was in violation of section 303(a)(2) of the Budget Act, which
provides that it is out of order to consider a measure providing an increase or
decrease in revenues to become effective in a fiscal year until the First Con-
current Resolution for that year has been adopted. Section 1056 of the Fi-
nance Committee bill allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to defer the effec-
tive dates of the tax expenditures to a date not later than October 1, 1978, in
other words, until fiscal 1979. Hence, the Senator maintained that the bill was
in violation of the Budget Act since the First Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal
1979 would not be adopted until about May 15, 1978. Senator Long then
moved to change the date to which the Secretary could defer the tax expendi-
ture effective date to September 30, 1978. As so amended, the bill was not.
subject to the point of order since the provisions would all have to become
effective in fiscal 1978, a year for which the First Concurrent. Resolution had
already been adopted. 244
The Budget Committee did not press its original point concerning the
extent to which the Finance Committee bill exceeded the revenue losses al-
lowed by the binding Second Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1978. Rather, the
Committee stated that it would wait to assess the impact of Senate floor
amendments. As amended by Senator Long, however, the bill seemed suscep-
tible to a point of order under section 311(a) of the Budget Act. Section
311(a) provides that after Congress has completed action on the Second Con-
current Budget Resolution, it is out of order to "consider" any bill reducing
revenues for the fiscal year covered by the Resolution if "enactment of such
bill ... 0,5 reported" 245 would cause revenues to be less than specified in the
Resolution. Yet, section 1057 of the Finance Committee bill did provide that it
was the sense of the Senate that the Senate conferees should bring back a bill
from the Conference Committee within the budget limits. As in 1976, the
Senate Finance Committee was attempting to provide itself with maximum
242 123 CONG. REG. S17681 (daily ed. Oct.. 25, 1977) (statement of Sen. Long).
Section 1057 of H.R. 5263. The Energy Production and Conservation Tax Incentive
Act, as reported by the Finance Committee, provided that it was the sense of the
Senate that the Senate Conferees "to the extent practicable" reduce the revenue loss
from the bill to that provided in the Budget Resolution.
243 123 CONG. REC. S17683 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977). In addition, technically it
would appear that the point of order should have been raised under section 311 of the
• Budget Act.. See text at note 244 infra.
2" 123 CONG. REC. S17683 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977).
24S Budget Act, supra note 10,	 311(a) (emphasis added).
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flexibility by technical compliance with the letter of the Budget Act. The
Budget Committee did not subsequently raise a point of order under section
311(a).
c. Budget Resolutions and the Revenue Act of 1978
The budget process played a major role in the Senate floor debate on the
Revenue Act of 1978, materially influencing both the procedures by which the
bill was considered and the substantive provisions that emerged, or failed to
emerge, in the Senate-passed measure.
(i) The Budget Situation. By the time the Senate Finance Committee re-
ported the 1978 Revenue Act on October 1, 1978, the binding Second Con-
current Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal 1979—October 1, 1978 to Sep-
tember 30, 1979—had been adopted. That Budget Resolution provided for
$21.9 billion in tax reductions for fiscal 1979. 24" The Finance Committee bill
produced net tax reductions of $20.5 billion. 247 Accordingly, the fiscal 1979
Budget had room for additional tax reductions of $1.4 billion in that year.
The tuition tax credit bill and the energy tax legislation were still pending in
conference committee; it was assumed that the tax reductions in those mea-
sures would absorb the remaining $1.4 billion in the Budget. Technically,
however, since neither bill had been reported out of conference and approved
by both Houses at the time the Senate began consideration of the Revenue
Act of 1978, the full $1.4 billion was still available to he absorbed by Senate
floor amendments to the 1978 Revenue Act. Accordingly, no amendment was
subject to a point of order on the ground that it exceeded the Budget Resolu-
tion until amendments providing $1.4 billion in tax reductions for fiscal 1979
had been approved by the Senate.
(ii) The Issue of Out-Year Budget Effects. The first point of interaction be-
tween the budget and tax legislative processes in the Senate debate on the
1978 tax bill arose in connection with the impact of Budget. Act. requirements
on years beyond the fiscal year for which a Budget Resolution has been
adopted. As discussed above, section 303(a) of the Budget Act provides that it
is out of order to consider any measure providing an increase or decrease in
revenues which is to become effective in a fiscal year for which the First. Con-
current Resolution has not yet been adopted. An exception to this rule is
provided in section 303(b), however, permitting such measures to be consid-
ered if they become effective in the second succeeding fiscal year—the so-
called "leapfrog" provision. Thus, a.1 the Senate began consideration of the
1978 Act, amendments providing revenue reductions for fiscal 1979 within .
the $1.4 billion remaining under the budget limit, or for fiscal years 1981 and
thereafter, were not subject to a point of order under section 303(a). In con-
trast, amendments providing for revenue reductions commencing in fiscal
1980 were subject to a point of order.
"" H.R. CON. Res. 683, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. REP. No. 1594, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
247 S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 16 (1978).
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The unsatisfactory situation produced by the section 303 Budget Act
rules was made clear by an amendment offered by Senator Roth to reduce
federal income taxes by one-third over a three-year period. This amendment
represented the highly publicized "Kemp-Roth" Republican tax cut pia,048
To comply with the fiscal 1979 Budget Resolution, only a 7 percent tax cut
was provided for 1979, with larger cuts then scheduled for 1980 and
1981. 24 " Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, raised
a point of order under section 303(a) of the Budget Act on the ground that
the Roth amendment provided a revenue reduction in fiscal 1980. Since the
First Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal 1980 had not been adopted, the "leap-
frog" exception in section 303(b) did not apply to protect the Roth amend-
ment. The Chair sustained the point of order. Senator Long appealed the
ruling of the Chair. 25 "
In terms of the technical interpretive question presented by Senator Mus-
kie's point of order, the Budget Act language is less than completely clear.
Furthermore; the issue in the Senate debate was not decided on a precise
legal interpretation of the statutory language. Senator Muskie's basic argu-
ment was that the budget process would provide no restraint on out-year
spending if section 303(a) were not applied as he asserted it should be. Ac-
cordingly, Congress could avoid the discipline of the budget process by
scheduling tax cuts into future years and thereby make the setting of budget
targets in those years a largely preordained formalism. Moreover, Senator
Muskie pointed out that the Budget Act. does contain a mechanism to accom-
modate particular amendments that reduce revenues in the succeeding fiscal
year, since a Budget Act waiver can be obtained upon a passage of a resolu-
tion approved by the Budget Committee and adopted by the Senate. Senator
Roth had obtained no such waiver. 251 Senators Long and Roth, on the other
hand, argued that Senator Muskie's interpretation of the Budget Act was con-
trary to common sense. The Senators maintained that interpreting the Act to
permit an amendment reducing revenues in fiscal 1979, 1981, and 1982, but
subjecting an amendment that included revenue reductions in fiscal 1980 to a
point of order, was absurd.
By a vote of 48-38, the Senate overruled the decision of the Chair sustain-
ing Senator Muskie's point of order. The Roth amendment was then voted
down on its merits. Whether the budget vote represents a permanent repudia-
tion of Senator Muskie's interpretation of the Budget Act is not yet clear. A
number of Senators appear to have voteil to overrule the ruling of the Chair
because they wanted an opportunity to vote up or down on the highly pub-
•licized Roth amendment itself without being precluded from doing so by a
248 For the floor debates on the Roth amendment, see 124 CONG. REC.
S17200-09, 17216-37, 17245-50, and 17319-25 (daily eds. Oct. 5 and 6, 1978).
' 1 ' Id. at S 17206.
25
 Id. at. S 17238-45.
2" Interestingly, Senator BeIhnon, ranking Republican on the Senate Budget
Committee, had filed a budget waiver resolution for the Roth amendment but the
Budget Committee had not acted on it at the time Senator Roth called up his amend-
ment_ Id. at S17241.
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point of order based on the Budget Act. The episode clearly points up a
weakness in the budget process. From one viewpoint, a budget process does
seem absurd that permits unlimited out-year tax reductions, for example, for
fiscal 1981 and following, but bars reductions for fiscal 1980. More persua-
sively, however, the leapfrog exception itself is the aberration in a rational
budget process. What is wrong in the present Budget Act is not the bar to
revenue reductions in the first succeeding fiscal year, but the failure similarly
to bar tax reductions that go into effect in succeeding fiscal years. Thus, the
response to the "absurdity" argument is that the failure of the Act to control
the Budget in the second fiscal out-year is no reason for failure to control the
Budget in the first out-year.
While the Roth amendment did not itself involve tax expenditures, the
Senate action taken on that amendment applied equally to amendments pro-
viding for tax expenditures beginning in fiscal 1979 but scheduling increases
in revenue reductions in later years. Under the present interpretation of sec-
tion 303(a), the nonrefundable portion of a tax expenditure is treated as a
reduction in revenues. Accordingly, following the Senate vote on the Roth
amendment, Senator Muskie felt he was barred from raising a point of order
as to amendments that scheduled increases in tax expenditures in fiscal
1980." 2
The out-year effect of scheduled tax reductions, or increases in tax ex-
penditures, represents a serious problem for the budget. process. It seems
clear that if the United States is to continue a single year budgeting process,
the exception in section 303(h) should be repealed. Failure to do so, especially
if the precedent set by the vote on the Roth amendment is followed,
forebodes potentially disastrous results for a disciplined congressional budget
procedure. Partly in recognition of this fact, Senator Long himself offered a
sense of the Senate amendment to the 1978 Revenue Act stating that the
Senate Conferees on the bill should limit the revenue loss for fiscal years after
1979 "to an extent that is practicable and feasible."' To a substantial ex-
tent, the Conference agreement achieved this objective. Nonetheless, the
larger problem of the proper functioning of the budget process remains. It is
not satisfactory to continue to resolve that problem on an ad hoc basis in the
context of a particular item of proposed tax legislation. Inevitably, as in the
case of the Roth amendment, other issues and concerns will be involved that
will prevent undivided attention to the budget issue itself.
A step short of outright repeal of section 303(b) of the Budget Act would
treat nonrefundable tax expenditures as "spending authority" for purposes of
section 303. The leapfrog exception in section 303(b) applies only to revenue
reductions. Consequently, a measure that provides new "spending authority"
in a succeeding fiscal year is subject to a point of order under section 303(a)
252 See, e.g., the tuition tax credit amendment offered by Senator Packwood and
adopted by the Senate which scheduled increases in the allowable credit in 1979 and
1980, id. at S17193-200; the special carryback provision for net operating losses at-
tributable to product liability losses that was made effective commencing in fiscal 1980,
id. at S17771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978).
151 Id. at S17766, 18037.
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even if it leapfrogs the immediately succeeding fiscal year, Under the
suggested approach, revenue reductions not involving tax expenditures, such
as rate reductions, changes in brackets, personal exemptions, or zero bracket
'amounts, would be eligible for the leapfrog exception, while scheduled in-
creases in tax expenditures would not. To date, however, the nonrefundable
portion of tax expenditures is treated as a revenue reduction for Budget Act
purposes. Only the refundable portion of tax expenditures is treated as
spending authority. , 254
(iii) The Impact of the 1979 Budget Limits. The limits of the fiscal 1979
Budget had a marked impact on the provisions that were included in the
Senate-passed version of the Revenue Act of 1978. The effects were in part
foreseen and in part accidental. As the Revenue Act came to the Senate floor,
some $1.4 billion in unused revenue reductions were available under the
pending Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1979. The first amendment adopted by
the Senate—Senator Haskell's amendment providing an extension of the gen-
eral jobs tax credit and a deferral of the corporate rate cuts—actually re-
duced the revenue loss in the Finance Committee bill by $203 million, thus
placing amendments in order that produced revenue losses of over $1.5 bil-
lion for fiscal 1979. However, Senator Packwood, fearing a veto of a separate
tuition tax credit. bill, offered the tax credit proposal as an amendment to the
Revenue Act. The Senate passed this amendment, thereby absorbing $334
billion of the remaining budgeted tax reductions. An amendment offered by
Senators Bumpers and Kennedy to provide $537 million in further tax reduc-
tions for middle-income individuals was also adopted. 2 " Senators Packwood
and Kennedy then offered an amendment to repeal DISC and to use the
revenues from that repeal to reduce the top corporate tax rate to 45 percent
as opposed to the 46 percent rate provided in the Finance Committee bill.
The Senate rejected the portion of the amendment repealing DISC, but
adopted the corporate rate reduction. 2 '" This action produced an additional
$563 million revenue reduction in fiscal 1979. Obviously this result was totally
unanticipated by the amendment sponsors.
As a result of the foregoing actions in the Senate, however, only $135
million in fiscal 1979 tax reductions remained available under the Budget
Resolution. A series of amendments, some with effective dates carefully tai-
254 See text at notes 278-79 infra.
2 " 124 CONG. REC. S17209-16 (jobs credit), S17332-34 (tuition tax credit),
SI7325-32 (rate reductions) (daily eds. Oct. 5 and 6, 1978). Procedurally, the
Packwood tuition tax credit was initially offered as an amendment to the House bill
rather than the Senate Finance Committee amendment to the House bill. The
Bumpers-Kennedy proposal was an amendment to the Packwood amendment. The
usual procedure in Senate floor consideration of a tax bill is, at the conclusion of floor
debate, to strike the House bill and substitute the Finance Committee amendment (as
amended on the floor) in lieu thereof. To prevent their measure from being lost in
that process, Senators Packwood and Kennedy subsequently moved to have their
amendments considered as amendments to the Committee bill rather than the House
bill. Once this action was taken, the fiscal 1979 revenue reduction involved absorbed
part of the available $1.4 billion as described in the text. See 124 CONG. REC. S I 7550-
51, 17670-71 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978).
"" 124 CONG. REC. S17374-84 (daily ed. Oct 6, 1978).
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bred to produce a minimal fiscal 1979 effect, soon absorbed this amount:257
Thus, after three days consideration of the bill, and with a large number of
amendments still remaining to be offered, any amendment producing a fiscal
1979 revenue loss was subject to a point. of order and could not be considered
by the Senate. 258 Only by deferring the effective date into out-years could
further revenue reducing measures he considered. Such amendments could
have been in order because of the Senate interpretation of the Budget. Act
discussed above."' At this juncture, however, another procedural bar was
raised.
(iv) The Impact of Cloture. The Revenue Act. of 1978 came to the Senate
floor only two weeks before the scheduled termination date of the Ninety-
Fifth Congress. Accordingly, considerable pressure was exerted for quick ac-
tion on the bill. Nonetheless, a number of Senators were prepared to offer
major non-tax legislation which, for a variety of reasons, had not been previ-
ously scheduled for Senate floor consideration as amendments to the tax bill.
These amendments included, for example, the Humphrey-Hawkins full
"7 On October 9, 1978, Senator Muskie circulated the 1011owing "scorecard" to
demonstrate how the budget resolution figure of $21.9 billion in lax reductions had
been reached:
Budget Effect.
of H.R.	 13511
as amended by
Senate
($ millions)
Remainder
Under Budget.
Ceiling
(S millions)
Finance Committee Report —20,534 1,366
Haskell Jobs Credit and Corporate
Rate Change +203 1,569
Bumpers Individual Rate Reduction —537 1,032
Packwood Tuition Credit. —334 698
Packwood Corporate Rate Change —563 135
Bumpers Charitable Lead Trusts —15 120
Percy Railroad Rolling Stock (Sec. 861) * 120
javits National Research Services Awards —52 68
Danforth Taxable Bond Option * 68
Hathaway Technical Corrections Act
Excluding Carryover Basis —8 60
Metzenbaum Rehabilitation Credit —9 51
Morgan S&L's —5 46
McGovern Trucks —1 9 34
Wallop Capital Gains +2 36
Dole Child Care Credit —5 31
Miscellaneous Bills —31 0
—21,900
*	 Less than $1	 million.
2 " Senator Long stated he would support Senator Muskie if he raised a point
of order regarding the fiscal 1979 limit, 124 Cosic. R•c. S17551-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1978). Later, when a point of order was raised by Senator Muskie, to an amendment
that would not be within the limit, the Senate sustained the point of order, 124 CONG.
REc. SI7813 (daily ed. Oct. 9, I978)..
2" See text. at notes 246-54 supra.
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employment bill, hospital cost containment legislation, and the sunset mea-
sure. Proponents of these bills saw the tax bill as the last opportunity to obtain
a Senate vote on their particular legislation in 1978. Opponents, of course,
wanted to debate each proposal at length in an effort. to defeat it.
The Senate normally imposes no limits on the number of amendments
that may be offered to a tax bill, nor does it impose any significant germane-
ness requirement. Accordingly, facing the prospect that the lax bill might fail
to pass the Senate before the scheduled adjournment date, Majority Leader
Byrd filed a cloture motion with respect to the tax bill. 21" The motion was
passed and cloture was invoked, 2 " with the following impacts on the tax bill
under the rules accompanying cloture.
First, only amendments filed prior to the cloture vote could be considered
after cloture was invoked. Moreover, once cloture was invoked, a filed
amendment could not be revised or amended by its sponsor. As a result, after
the cloture vote, any amendment reducing revenues in fiscal 1979 was subject
to a point of order under the Budget Act, at least in the absence of other
amendments being adopted that increased fiscal 1979 revenues. The sponsor
of the amendment could not avoid the point of order by revising the effective
date since such an action would have constituted a prohibited revision of the
amendment. The combination of cloture and the budget. process therefore
protected the few tax reforms included in the Finance Committee bill and
prevented the addition of the large number of floor-approved tax expendi-
tures that usually accompany a tax bill leaving the Senate floor. A primary
example of the first category was the inability of Senators Helms and Reigel .
to secure a vote on their amendment to delete the Finance Committee provi-
sion repealing the state and local gasoline tax deduction. 2 62 In the second
category, for example, an amendment proposing an energy tax credit for the
elderly was ruled out of order. 21i 3 It seems likely that, absent the combination
of the cloture rules and the budget process, both amendments would have
been adopted by the Senate.
Second, once cloture was invoked, a very strict germaneness rule became
operative. Unless an amendment dealt quite specifically with a subject con-
tained in the Finance Committee bill, the amendment was subject to a point of
order. On this basis, for example, amendments were ruled out of order that
would have prohibited the Internal Revenue Service from issuing fringe
benefit regulations, that would have reversed an IRS ruling on investment
annuities, and that would have sanctioned the award of attorney's fees to tax-
payers in certain types of cases.'"
Third, even if an amendment was submitted prior to cloture, did not
reduce fiscal 1979 revenues, and was germane, it nonetheless was subject to a
point of order if it amended the Finance Committee bill in more than one
place. Again, this cloture rule is applied in the Senate with extreme technical-
211 " 124 CONG. REC. S 1 7357 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
2"1 124 CONG. REC. SI7818 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978).
202 124 CONG. REC. S17826-32, 17989-93 (daily eds. Oct. 9 and 10, 1978).
2"3 124 CONG. REC. S17813 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978).
2 "a
	 at 517822, 17832.
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ity. For example, an amendment by Senator Nelson to modify the Finance
Committee capital gains provision by reducing the exclusion factor from 70
percent to 60 percent was out of order because it changed 70 percent to 60
percent in two different lines of the Committee bill without incorporating the
unchanged intervening language into the amendment so as to satisfy the one
place rule. 2 "5
 In addition, a number of amendments proposing new or ex-
panded tax expenditures were not brought up because they violated this rule.
Finally, once cloture was invoked, each Senator was allowed only one
hour of floor time. Thus, a Senator who used up his or her allotted hour
could no longer offer amendments to the bill.
The interaction of cloture and the budget process produced a tax bill that
left the Senate floor with far fewer "Christmas tree" amendments, usually in
the form of tax expenditures, than any Senate-passed measure in recent
years. The out-year revenue problems were substantially due to the number
of amendments adopted prior to cloture that had small fiscal 1979 impacts,
but were scheduled to lose larger amounts of revenues in subsequent fiscal
years. 26 " The Senate conferees were armed with the sense of the Senate's
resolution, however, and this resolution, coupled with Administration opposi-
tion to out-year revenue losses, helped produce a bill in the Conference
Committee that kept such revenue losses within acceptable limits. 267
Thus, the Senate floor action on the Revenue Act of 1978 again
demonstrated that the budget process, standing alone, is not an adequate in-
strument to prevent the proliferation of floor amendments increasing tax ex-
penditures. On the other hand, it is quite evident that the budget process can
be effective when it is backstopped with strict germaneness and closed rule
principles, as in the House floor action on tax bills. However, the cloture
adopted for the 1978 Senate tax bill was highly unusual and is unlikely to be
repeated, especially since more Senators now realize the effect of cloture on
the amendment process.
3. Other Aspects of the Budget Process
The budget resolution process and floor actions to sustain that process
were the most visible aspects of the interaction of tax expenditure and budget
issues in the 1976-1978 legislative experience. But there are other means by
which the Budget Act provisions are employed to subject tax expenditures to
the scrutiny and control imposed on direct expenditure programs. For exam-
ple, the House Budget Committee's Task Force on Tax Expenditures has held
hearings on such proposed tax expenditures as the college tuition tax
credit, 2 "S although the Senate Budget Committee abandoned use of its tax
2"5 124 CONG. REC. S17966 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978).
266 See, e.g., the amendment by Senator Metzenbauin to provide an investment
credit for rehabilitation of certain buildings used in a trade or business which had an
effective date of September 1, 1979, so that only one month's revenue loss would be
reflected in fiscal 1979. 124 CONG. REC. S17552-58 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978).
267
	 H. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1978).
266
 Task Force Hearings, supra note 181. See also the Tax Force hearings on the
impact on cities of President Carter's proposed change in the investment tax credit
(Feb. 15, 1978).
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expenditure task force during 1976-1978. Additionally, the Congressional
Budget Office has cautiously accelerated its activities with respect to tax ex-
penditures. The Budget Act, sections 202(a) and (c), imposes the duty on
CBO to provide information to the Budget Committees concerning tax ex-
penditures. Such studies also are to be provided to any other committee upon
request and "to the extent practicable."
The first comprehensive study produced by CBO under the foregoing
authority was its background paper, "Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies and
Direct Subsidy Alternatives" (May, 1977). The study was requested jointly by
the Chairmen of the House Budget Committee and of the House and Senate
committees with legislative jurisdiction over direct housing programs. In addi-
tion, CBO released a study in January, 1978, of the proposed college tuition
tax credits analyzing the effects of various tax and non-tax programs to pro-
vide financial assistance to middle-income families incurring costs of higher
education.269
 A more limited report was prepared by CBO on the refund-
able tax credit for intercity bus companies contained in the energy tax bill in
1977 . 270
B. Tax Expenditures and the Authorization-Appropriations . Process
The impact of the tax expenditure concept on issues of committee juris-
diction and the need to coordinate tax and direct programs were brought into
clearer focus during the 1976-1978 legislative period.
I. Treatment of Refundable Tax Credits in the Budget Resolutions
The proper treatment of refundable tax credits must be resolved under
the congressional budget process, just as it. must be resolved under the Budget
submitted by the President. Proper treatment is essential since characterizing
the refundable portion of a tax credit either as an outlay or as a revenue
reduction has a number of practical ramifications for the tax legislative pro-
cess. These ramifications will be explored following a discussion of how the
Budget Resolutions treated the earned income credit.
Prior to the Third Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1977, the House and
Senate Budget Committees reached a series of temporary compromises on the
proper treatment of the refundable portion of the earned income credit in
the Budget Resolutions. The House Budget Committee had taken the position
that the refundable portion of the credit was an outlay, thus corresponding to
the OMB treatment in the President's Budget. The Senate Budget Committee,
largely at the urging of Senator Long and the Finance Committee, had taken
the position that the entire revenue associated with the credit should be
shown as a reduction in revenues.
269 CRO EDUCATION STUDY, supra note 180.
27 ' 123 CONG. REC. 517826 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1977) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY PROPOSALS: A
PERSPECTIVE 81-99, 127-29 (June 1977), for a Staff Working Paper analysis of pro-
posed energy tax credits.
January 1979]	 TAX EXPENDITURE DEVELOPMENTS
No open confrontation on this issue emerged until the House Budget
Committee Report on the Third Concurrent. Budget. Resolution for Fiscal
1977 specifically took the position that the refundable portion of the credit
was an outlay. 2 " In contrast, the Senate Budget Committee Report treated
the entire credit. as a tax reduction, an action strongly supported by Senator
Long.272
 The Conference Report temporarily accepted the Senate position,
stating that "the [Budget] Committees intend to reconsider this question de
novo during consideration of the First Budget. Resolution for FY 1978 with
the intent of developing a common position at that time between the two
Houses and the Administration." 273
 That intention was not realized, how-
ever. The Conference Committee Report on the First Concurrent Resolution
for Fiscal 1978 merely repeated the quoted language, now looking toward a
solution of the issue in the Second Budget Resolution. 274
 But in the Confer-
ence Report on the Second Budget Resolution for Fiscal 1978, the Senate
position was adopted: "The conferees, however, agreed that this decision
should not dictate future decisions on the treatment of payment in excess of
tax liability. This decision by the conferees, therefore, does not create a
precedent." 273
In its Report on the First Concurrent Resolution for the Budget for Fiscal
1979, the Senate Budget Committee reversed its prior position and treated
the refundable portions of the earned income credit and the proposed credit
for education costs as outlays. The House Budget Committee, in line with the
fiscal 1978 agreement, treated the entire earned income credit., including the
refundable portion, as a reduction in revenues. The Conference Committee
then adopted the Senate position, which had been the House position for the
previous two years, and treated the refundable portions of the tax credits as
outlays.""
The treatment of the refundable portion of tax credits under the Budget
Resolution has some practical ramifications. Although the amount of the fed-
eral deficit or surplus remains the same regardless of the treatment, some
differences are produced depending on the approach adopted. First, the
"scorekeeping" function established by the Budget. Act requires the Budget
Committees to report on a recurring basis the effect on revenues and budget.
"outlays" of existing and proposed legislation. 277 Treating the refundable
portion of a tax credit as an "outlay" will make the item more visible in the
27 ' H.R. REP. No. 12, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977).
272
 123 CoNG. REC. S2907-08 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1977).
27" H.R. REP. No. 30, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 5 (1977).
274 See H.R. REP. No. 134, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 5 (1977).
2"
 H.R. REP. No. 601, 95th Cong., lit Sess. 5 (1977). The Administration
apparently supported the Senate position for purposes of the Budget Resolution, al-
though it. had not necessarily changed its views on the merits. The 1979 Special
Aftalysis G. reflected this changed position.
27"
 S. REP. No. 739, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1978); H.R. REP. No, 1055, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 1173, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Presum-
ably future CRO and 0 MB Special Analysis G budgets will follow the congressional
treatment..
277 31 U.S.C.	 1322(d) (1976).
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scorekeeping reports than if it simply is reflected in the overall revenue fig-
ures as a reduction in revenue.
Second, when the refundable portion of a tax credit is classified as an
outlay, the "crosswalk" provisions of section 302 of the Budget Act become
operative. Under section 302, "outlays" and "new budget authority" must be
allocated in the Conference Report on a Concurrent. Budget Resolution
among each committee that "has jurisdiction over bills and resolutions provid-
ing such new budget authority." Accordingly, the Finance Committee, for
example, •
 is limited by the outlays allocated to it. If the Finance Committee
reported out a bill with refundable credits in excess of such outlays, the bill
would have to he referred to the Appropriations Committee under section
401 of the Budget Act.
Third, if a refundable credit is an "outlay," it would seem to follow that it
also represents a "spending authority" under the Act.." 8 This characteriza-
tion is important in part because section 303(a) of the Budget. Act subjects to a
point of order any legislation that provides new "spending authority" for a
fiscal year before the First Concurrent. Resolution on the Budget is adopted
for that fiscal year. An exception to section 303(a) contained in section 303(b),
however, allows prospective revenue reducing legislation to be considered
without being subject to a point of order if it "leapfrogs" into the next fiscal
year.'" This exception does not apply, however, if the proposed legislation
constitutes "spending authority" under section 401. Thus, while a refundable
tax credit, with an effective date in the subsequent, second fiscal year, is not
subject to a point of order under section 303(a) if it constitutes a "reduction in
revenues," such a credit would be subject. to a point of order if the credit
constitutes "spending authority." As we have seen, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee has 'shown considerable adeptness in manipulating effective dates of
tax expenditures to effect technical compliance with the applicable Budget
Resolution. Treatment of the refundable portion of a tax credit as "spending
authority" under section 401 would inhibit such actions. Furthermore, under
section 402(f) of the Budget Act, the Appropriations Committees would ob-
tain jurisdiction to study the refundable tax expenditure "spending authority"
provisions and report from time to time their "recommendations for terminat-
ing or modifying such provisions."
Finally, treating refundable credits as revenue outlays would subject that
portion of the resulting tax expenditure program to the overall spending ceil-
ings established by the Budget Resolution. This in turn means that such tax
expenditures would be required to compete with direct outlay programs for
priority in the annual congressional appropriations process. Tax expenditures
are now exempt from that priority selection process, since they receive an
automatic first priority for federal funds. Asa corollary, the flexibility of the
"" The term "outlays" is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (1976); the teim
"spending authority" in 31 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(2) (1976).
27" For example, revenue legislation proposed in January, 1978 with a January
I, 1979 effective date is subject to a point of order under section 303(a). However,
under the exception in section 303(b), the same legislation could be considered in
January. 1978 if the effective date were changed to October 1, 1979.
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Finance Committee in providing a given tax reduction by a mix of tax cuts
and tax expenditures would be impaired if refundable credits were subjected
to the priority selection process.
2. The 1977 Energy Tax Legislation
In the view of many observers, the Finance Committee's real concern with
the treatment of refundable tax credits is the possibility that the exclusivity of
its jurisdiction over tax expenditure aspects of tax legislation might be abro-
gated. The 1977 energy tax legislation provided a dramatic illustration of this
issue. The stage for the jurisdictional problems in the Senate can be usefully
set by considering the development of the 1977 energy legislation in the
House. The procedure employed in the House for dealing with the energy
legislation represented a significant advance toward implementing rational
procedures for coordinating tax and direct programs in the same substantive
area.
When the President submitted his National Energy Plan to the House, 28 °
Speaker O'Neill established an Ad Hoc Committee on Energy to receive and
to coordinate the reports of five standing committees, including Ways and
Means, on H.R. 8444, The National Energy Act. 281 For the first time, a
non-tax committee was empowered to coordinate tax expenditures and tax
regulatory measures with proposals approved by other House committees.
The Ad Hoc Committee had the power to choose direct instead of tax ap-
proaches to energy problems, even though Ways and Means might have
favorably reported tax measures. In fact, a marked degree of cooperation
existed among the various committee chairmen with responsibility for the
energy legislation. The procedure followed was impressive. Over 113 separate
legislative initiatives were considered by some 200 members of the House sit-
ting in committees before arriving at the bill reported to the floor by the Ad
Hoc Committee. 282
As observed by Ways and Means Chairman Ullman, the procedure fol-
lowed by the House on the energy legislation will have to be employed in the
future as complex national issues are addressed."' Indeed, the House action
on the 1977 energy bill represents the most rational procedure yet adopted to
evaluate and coordinate tax expenditure (or tax regulatory) proposals with
direct spending (or direct regulatory) approaches to a given problem. The
success of the technique, however, appeared to rest on two essential ingre-
dients: strong leadership from the Speaker and a willingness by committee
chairmen to work cooperatively. Neither of these factors was present as the
Senate took up the energy tax legislation.
289
 THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 80.
281 See H.R. Res. 508, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and the House floor consid-
eration thereof at 123 CONG. REC. H3349-55 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1977),
282 See REPORT OF THE HousE AD Hoc Commit-TEE ON ENERGY, H.R. REP. No.
543, 95th Cong„ 1st Sess. (1977), and 123 CONG. REC. H8173 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1977).
"3 123 CONG. REG. H8!83 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1977),
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In the Senate, the unified approach of the House to the energy legisla-
tion was abandoned, with the tax portions of H.R. 8444 being referred to the
Finance Committee and the non-tax portions to the Energy Committee. The
Senate Finance Committee rejected completely the President's proposed re-
liance on excise taxes as regulatory measures to increase oil and gas conserva-
tion efforts. 2 A 4 Instead, the Finance Committee recommended a set of new
tax expenditures, totaling some $40 billion by fiscal 1985, to encourage con-
servation. Included in the list were five refundable tax credits. 285
When the energy tax bill reached the Senate floor, Senator Hollings, a
member of the Appropriations Committee, moved to refer the bill to that.
Committee with instructions to report the bill back to the Senate with an
amendment deleting the refundable portions of those tax credits not previ-
ously approved by a full Senate vote. The motion was based on section
401(b)(2) of the Budget Act, which provides that in certain circumstances a
bill reported by a committee and containing new "spending authority" must
be referred to the Appropriations Committee for up to fifteen days. The Ap-
propriations Committee position was that the refundable portion of each of
the credits constituted "spending authority" as defined in section 401(c)(2) of
the Budget Act. 288
Somewhat surprisingly, Senator Long was agreeable to the referral to the
Appropriations Committee. He rejected, however, the view that such a refer-
ral was required by the Budget Act. He argued that "spending authority" as
defined in section 401(c)(2) includes only payments "the budget authority for
which is not provided for in advance by appropriations Acts." L 87 Refundabil-
ity of the tax credit was achieved in the bill by treating creditable amounts in
excess of tax liability as overpayments of tax, thus triggering a refund. Re-
funds of taxes are made pursuant to a permanent appropriation measure.288
Under the Long view, budget authority for refundable credits had been pro-
vided "in advance" and, accordingly, the refundable portions of the tax cred-
its did not fall within the purview of section 401(c)(2) of the Budget Act. 28"
Upon Senator Hollings' agreement to delete the reference to section 401
from his motion to refer the energy bill to the Appropriations Committee,
284 The House bill did contain some new tax expenditures. For a critical
analysis of those provisions, see 123 CONG. REC . S14272 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1977)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
285 See S. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 120-22 (1977). The refundable
credits were those for (1) residential insulation costs, (2) residential solar, wind, and
geothermal costs, (3) business investment in "alternative energy property," (9) business
investment. in "specially defined energy property," and (5) intercity bus transportation.
286 Section 401(b)(2) of the Budget. Act., note 10 supra, additionally requires that
the legislation, if enacted, not exceed the budget authority allocated to the Finance
Committee under the crosswalk provisions of section 302(h) of the Budget. Act, dis-
cussed in text at notes 277-78 supra. This provision was not violated by the Finance Com-
mittee bill if the refundable portions of the credits listed in note 57 ,supra constituted
"spending authority." The floor debate on the Appropriations Committee motion ap-
pears at 123 CONG. REC. S 18037-52 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
287 Budget Act, supra note 10, § 401(c)(2) (emphasis added).
288 31 U.S.C. § 711(3) (1976).
289 Id. at S18039-40 (statement. of Sen. Long).
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Senator Long agreed to the motion 	 The bill was referred to the Commit-
tee, which immediately reported it back to the floor with an amendment. delet-
ing the refundable portions of the specified credits. On the merits, the Ap-
propriations Committee amendment was defeated and the refundable credits
remained in the hill.'-'"t Technically, of course, Senator Long can argue that
the referral of the bill to the Appropriations Committee did not constitute a
determination that the refundable portion of a tax credit constitutes "spend-
ing authority" under the Budget Act. Nevertheless, implicit acceptance of the
principle that spending authority was involved is present, since otherwise
there was no reason to refer the energy bill to the Appropriations Committee.
Even accepting this view, however, a number of technical issues are yet to be
resolved concerning the treatment of refundable credits.
In the first place, Senator Long's reliance on the legislation making per-
manent appropriations for tax refunds seems misplaced. That legislation
applies only to refunds of "moneys erroneously received." 3 "= Refundable
credits do not readily fit. within this phrasing. Thus, the language in section
401(c)(2) of the Budget Act, requiring bills containing new spending authority
to be referred to the Appropriations Committee, should not be read to
exclude refundable credits from the definition of "spending authority." It
should be noted, however, that section 401(c)(2) is of limited scope. The sec-
tion applies only to bills reported out by a committee. Thus, if the Senate
Finance Committee reported a nonrefundable credit, a floor amendment to
make the credit refundable, even if offered by the Finance Committee, would
not be referrable to the Appropriations Committee under the Budget Act. 2 " 3
Moreover, a refundable credit reported by the Finance Committee would not
be subject to referral to the Appropriations Committee if the refundable
amount did not exceed the Finance Committee's "crosswalk" outlay allocation
under section 302 of the Budget Act.. Thus, if the refundable portion is
treated as "spending authority," the separate referral can be avoided if the
Budget Resolution has provided for outlays sufficient to fund the refundable
portions of the credits and if such outlays have been allocated to the Finance
Committee under the crosswalk procedure.
The 1977 Senate floor experience on the refundable energy tax credits
revealed the need for more carefully delineated procedures if the appropria-
tions process is to be protected front circumvention by refundable tax expen-
ditures. More broadly, of course, while the refundahility feature of a tax
credit makes the avoidance of the appropriations process more obvious, 2 " the
same avoidance is presented by the nonrefundable portion of tax expendi-
tures.
299 Id. at S18043.
2 " Id. at S18044 - 52.
292
 31 U.S.C. § 711 (3) (1976).
393 For example, in the Senate consideration of the Social Security Financing
Amendments of 1977, a floor amendment. to make the college tuition tax credit re-
fundable was therefore not subject to a point of order. 123 CoNG. REC. S18802-03
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977).
394 Senator Chiles apparently realized for the first time that the Finance Com-
mittee could assume jurisdiction over the entire Federal Budget by means of tax ex-
penditures during the debate over the Energy Tax Act of 1977:
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Recognition of this fact led Senator Kennedy to introduce Senate Resolu-
tion 326 requiring that whenever the Finance Committee reports a bill con-
taining or extending a tax expenditure, or whenever a tax expenditure floor
amendment is offered by, on behalf of, or with the approval of the Finance
... I think you could kind of use the device in a lot. of ways.
I just started looking at a few appropriations bills. I find school assis-
tance in the federally impacted areas, and it would seem to me if you
wanted to you could say that we are going to give a refundable tax credit
to those areas that have an Army base there.
After all, that is something that is important in the fact that. they do
not pay any taxes, so we will give them a refundable tax credit. Therefore,
regardless of whether the Appropriations Committee decided to cut the
impacted funds, if we decided to just give them a refundable tax credit we
could do so.
I look at another appropriation bill, and I see security supporting as-
sistance. Under that. appropriation act Israel is down from $750 million,
Egypt for $93 million, Jordan for $9 million. Let us give Israel a refund-
able tax credit. They do not pay any taxes to the Federal Government now,
but we can give them a refundable tax credit. If we can do it for the bus
companies, why can we not do it for Israel. So we give them a refundable
tax credit, and we do it that way.
I look at another one, and I see the Panama Canal Zone, which is a
subject of great interest now. For the Panama Canal Commission we are
putting up some funds. Well,. they do not pay any taxes now, but there is
no reason why you cannot give them a refundable tax credit. It is said the
Nation needs this device. It is something we need, so if we decide to, or the
Committee on Finance decides to, we just make a refundable tax credit.
You would take every hem, I think, that. is in any of the appropria-
tions bills or any other item we want to think about and call it a refundable
tax credit, and I think that is the concern that the Appropriations Coin
 has after that collies out and after that is in that bill.
The whole reason for the Budget Act. was because we felt we had to
have some control over spending. We were having all kinds of' good items
coming out, and I have never voted for a bad appropriation since I have
been in government. They are all good, and they all benefit someone. But
no one was tending the store and saying we have only got so many dollars
to spend, and so we have got to set priorities.
So we said in the Budget Act we are going to try to set some priorities,
and we are going to say that is the Budget Committee's prerogative to try
to set those. But that conies up for debate, and everybody on this floor has
an opportunity to put his 2 cents worth in to determine what those
priorities should be. But within those broad priority numbers we allow the
au g committee and the appropriating committee to say where the
money should be spent, for what kind of items it should be spent and. at
the same time, in that act we try to cut out the backdoor spending. the
trust fund device that had been used, and all of the other kinds of
backdoor devices.
Now, I can tell you if we can have this kind of device as a refundable
tax credit it would be the biggest backdoor spending of' any that Oleic is.
There would just be no way of controlling that because nothing would go
through. It would not go through the Budget Coninnuee, it would not go
through the Appropriations Committee, and it would not go through the
authorizing committees.
123 Cone. REC. S 1 8042 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
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Committee,'" the measure must be referred both to the Appropriations
Committee and to each other committee having legislative jurisdiction over
the subject matter encompassed by the tax expenditure provision. Each com-
mittee to which a referral is made would have 14 clays in which to consider
the tax expenditure and to report. its recommendations to the Senate. The
Kennedy resolution would apply whether the tax expenditure provision were
refundable or not.
3. The Tuition Tax Credit Legislation
The House-passed version of the 1978 tuition tax credit bill provided a
nonrefundable tax credit for tuition costs. In the Senate Finance Committee,
however, the tuition tax credit was made refundable.'" This action brought
into play two provisions of the Budget Act. First, the refundable feature was
scheduled to become effective for a fiscal year (1980) for which the First Con-
current Budget Resolution had not been adopted. This action violated section
303(a) of the Budget Act. Accordingly, the Finance Committee also reported
out a resolution to waive section 303(a). This resolution was referred to the
Budget Committee for action. Second, the jurisdiction of the Appropriations
Committee was invoked under section 401 of the Budget Act, since new
spending authority had been approved by the Finance Committee in excess of
the outlay authority allocated to the Committee under the First Concurrent
Resolution. 207
Both the Budget Committee 2"" and the Appropriations Committee 299 is-
sued reports adverse to the Finance Committee Bill. Rather than face a direct
vote on the committees' actions, the Finance Committee reported out its tu-
ition tax credit, bill without the refundable feature. 3 " On the Senate floor,
however, Senator Long offered an amendment to make the credit refundable.
To test the Budget Act application, he raised a point of order against his own
amendment under sections 303 and 401 of the Budget. Act. The point of
order was sustained by the Chair and appealed by Senator Long. The full
Senate, however, sustained the Chair's ruling. Senator Long then submitted a
revised refundahility amendment, and moved formally to waive section 303(a)
21 ' It is unclear why S. Res. 326 would not apply to tax expenditure amend-
ments offered on the Senate floor by Senators "independent" of the Finance Commit-
tee. if floor amendments are to he covered, it would seem that all must be governed if
the procedure is to be workable. Indeed, the broader rule might have the salutory
effect of limiting such floor amendments.
For a description of the extent of the overlap of Senate Finance Committee
jurisdiction (as a result of tax expenditures) with the jurisdictions of committees with
legislative and appropriations responsibilities for direct programs in the areas covered
by the tax expenditures, see 124 CoNc. REC. S5703 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1978) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy).
29" S. REP. No. 1066, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. (1978).
277
 See the discussion of Budget Act sections 303(a) and 401 in text at notes
278-79 supra.
2"8 S. REP. No. 1067, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
"" S. REP. No. 1065, 95th CAmg., 2d Sess. (1978).
3"" See 124 CONG. REC. S13070-71 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1978).
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of the Budget Act. This motion also was defeated by the full Senate and the
revised amendment was likewise ruled out of order."'
The impact of the budget process on the tuition lax credit bill made sev-
eral important points clear. From a budgetary standpoint, the budget process
itself was applied in analyzing the provision. That is, the refundable portion
of the credit was treated as a "spending authority" and the budget process
then operated just as it would have in the case of a direct spending program.
From a program standpoint, a tuition tax credit excluding taxpayers with no tax
liability is impossible to defend on equity grounds. Thus, the budget process
operated well as a process, but the result of that operation, viewed from a
spending perspective, was an inequitable program. Obviously, much closer
coordination of tax and direct spending programs is required to ensure that,
if the tax spending route is followed, both proper program design and com-
pliance with the budget process can be achieved. 302
In addition, the tuition tax credit bill experience pointed up two aspects
of the increasing Senate sensitivity to the impact of tax expenditures. First,
the Appropriations Committee is obviously inhospitable to refundable tax
credits, viewing such devices as infringements on its jurisdiction. This attitude
must be tempered since absolute rejection of refundability means that the
neediest members of society cannot benefit from those tax expenditures that.
are adopted. Second, the Budget Committee was keenly sensitive to the "out-
year" budget effects produced by pre-scheduled increases in the amount of
the allowable tax credit.
• C. Non-Tax Committees and Tax Expenditures
The growing understanding and acceptance of tax expenditure analysis
inevitably impels non-tax committees and their staffs into the tax legislative
process. Increasingly these committees have come to realize that tax expendi-
tures have a significant impact on policies they arc pursuing through direct
programs. The preceding discussion has highlighted some examples of this
phenomenon where the Budget and Appropriations Committees have become
involved in the tax legislative process because of their recognition of the real
nature of tax expenditure provisions. The following discussion indicates
briefly the actual and potential involvement of other non-tax committees in
the consideration of tax legislation.
3 " 124 CONG. REC. 813370-76 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978).
3"2 It should be noted that the budget process as such did not technically pre-
clude the Finance Committee from reporting out a refundable tuition tax credit. Upon
failure to secure a waiver of section 303(a) from the Budget Committee, the Finance
Committee could have provided for a smaller refundable tuition tax credit which
stayed within the budget spending limits for fiscal 1979 and did not increase in the
following years. This action would have eliminated any objection from the Budget
Committee. However the measure still would have been subject to the Appropriations
Committee jurisdiction because room for the refundable portion of the credit had not
been provided in the outlay allocation to the Finance Committee. Apparently, the Fi-
nance Committee felt it was more important to have a larger nonrefundable credit
than a smaller refundable one.
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Paragraph 3(b) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate pro-
vides for joint referral of a bill to two or more committees upon motion of the
Majority and Minority Leaders. This joint referral procedure technically af-
fords the opportunity to refer bills that include tax expenditures both to the
Finance Committee and to the legislative committee with jurisdiction over the
subject matter covered by the tax expenditure. Senator Long, however, has
demonstrated that he is alert to the dangers posed by this procedure to the
exclusive Finance Committee jurisdiction over tax expenditures by objecting,
in at least one instance, to a proposed joint referral of a tax expenditure
bil1, 3 "3
A second potential for the involvement. of non-tax committees in the re-
view of tax legislation was Senate Resolution 4, "The Committee System
Reorganization Amendment of 1977,""" which reflected a major effort by
the Senate to reorganize the structure and jurisdiction of its committees. The
question of jurisdiction over tax expenditures was considered in the develop-
ment of Senate Resolution 4 by the Temporary Select Committee to Study the
Senate Committee System. In the original version of the resolution, each
standing committee of the Senate would have been empowered to "study and
review tax expenditures related to subject matters within its jurisdiction, and
submit reports and its recommendations with respect thereto." 30 `' Senator
Long appeared before the Select Committee to object to the provision. He
argued that the non-tax committees already had the power to conduct such
studies. Formalization in the Senate Rules, he contended, would lead to un-
necessary duplication of committee work and staff personnel."' As a result,
Senate Resolution 4, as reported by the Select Committee and adopted by the
Senate, did not. contain the language quoted above."'
In addition to the tax expenditure activities by the Budget Committees
and CBO, other non-tax committees have involved themselves in tax legisla-
tion by holding hearings and issuing reports on tax expenditures that cover
subjects within their legislative jurisdiction."' As a result, the staffs of these
committees have become more aggressive participants in the tax legislative
3 " 123 Cone. REC. S2373-79 (daily ed. Fcb. 7, 1977).
3" S. Res. 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 51827 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1977).
3 " S. Res. 4, * 101(a)(2). 95th Cong.. 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REG. Slit (daily ed.
Jan. 4, 1977).
3 S 6 See 123 CONG. RF:C. S1641) (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1977).
3"7 See S. Res. 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REC. S1827 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1977). The vote adopting the resolution as amended is at 123 CONG. REC. 52307 (daily
ed. Feb. 4, 1977).
'1 " See, e.g., Federal Tax Policy and Urban Development.' Hearings Before the Sub-
cumin, on the City of the House Cumin. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977), and the Report thereon (Comm. Print 1977); SENATE COMM. ON THE
INTERIOR, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF OIL AND GAS AND SOME
POLICY ALTERNATIVES, 934 Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Some committees have involved
themselves in lax provisions that arc not non-tax expenditures. See, e.g., SURCOMM, ox
COMMERCE, CONSUMER AND MONETARY AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, FOREIGN TAX CREDITS CLAIMED BY UNITED STATES PETROLEUM COM-
PANIES, H.R. REP. No. 1290, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. (1978).
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process. In addition, the Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress has developed the staff capacity to deal with tax expenditure issues
and has prepared reports on various provisions that have proved influential
in congressional deliberations. 309
Increasing involvement by non-tax committees and staffs appears inevita-
ble as the tax expenditure concept becomes integrated into congressional
thinking and procedures. While this involvement complicates the tax legisla-
tive process, in the long run it is probably a development to be welcomed. At
a minimum, the substantive expertise of these committees and staffs should
improve the equity and efficiency of those tax expenditure programs that are
employed. More broadly, better coordination of tax and direct spending
programs could result, with questions being raised more frequently as to the
wisdom and propriety of using the tax route.
D. The Sunset Legislation
In 1976, momentum gathered in the United States Senate to enact "sun-
set" legislation. The basic purpose of the legislation was to ensure regular,
periodic review of the need, effectiveness, and efficiency of each authoriza-
tion; termination of the program was the sanction if the requisite review was
not undertaken."'" Linder the 1976 proposal, authorization of federal pro-
grams would terminate every five years on a staggered basis unless reenacted.
Moreover, all programs would be required to undergo a zero base review by
the executive branch and by the appropriate congressional committees, if
necessary, before reenactment.
The 1976 legislative proposal was reintroduced as S. 2 in January, 1977.
As did the 1976 bill, S. 2 included tax expenditures in the sunset process.
Title IV of the 1977 bill established a procedure whereby five-year termina-
tion dates would be set for each tax expenditure with the definition of tax
expenditures encompassing not only the income tax but "any tax." 3" Prior
to the termination date, the tax writing committees would be required to con-
duct. a "sunset" review of the tax expenditure scheduled to terminate that
year 2
3 "9 See, e.g., Gravelle, Hughes & Farb, The Domestic international Sales Corpo-
ration (DISC) Provision and its Effect on Exports and Unemployment: A Background
Report (Apr. 30, 1976), reprinted in 122 CONC. REC. S6324-27 (daily ed. May 3, 1976);
Tannenwald and Farb, Comparative Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Investment Tax
Incentives (June 7, 1976), reprinted in 122 CoNo. REC. S8684-89 (daily ed. June 8,
1976); Gravelle, Provisions Reducing the Effective Tax Rate of Commercial Banking
Organizations (Jan. 19, 1977); Gravelle and Kiefer, Deferral and DISC: Two Targets
of Tax Reform (Feb. 3, 1978), reprinted in 124 CONC. REC. S1286-91, S1409-13 (daily
eds. Feb. 6 and 7, 1978); Gravelle and Kiefer, U.S. Taxation of Citizens Working in
Other Countries: An Economic Analysis (Apr. 20, 1978), reprinted in 124 CONG. REC.
S6193-202 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1978).
' 1 " S. 2925, 94th Cong., 2c1 Sess. (1976). See McIntyre, The Sunset Bilk A Periodic
Review for Tax Expenditures, 4 TAx NoTEs No. 32 at 3 (Aug. 9, 1976).
"" S. 2, § 401(b), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cost. REC. 5148 (daily ed. Jan. 10,
1977).
" 12 Id, § 411.
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Predictably, the inclusion of tax expenditures in the sunset process
aroused controversy. The Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of
the Senate Committee on Government Operations held hearings on S. 2 in
March, 1977. 1 " OMB supported Title IV of the bill. Budget Director Lance
specifically noted that a review of outlay programs in a given area "without
also reviewing [tax expenditures in the same area] would surely be inappro-
priate." 314
The Treasury stated that it was "not opposing " the use of termination
dates for tax expenditures. Secretary Blumenthal proceeded, however, to
dwell at some length on technical problems the Treasury saw in implementing
such a procedure. Terminating a tax expenditure, in the Treasury view, was
more complicated than terminating a direct program. Because of the technical
interrelationships between Code provisions, the Treasury pointed out that
termination of one Code provision frequently requires changes in others, and
therefore that extensive study would be required to determine the full
economic effects of a given change. Furthermore, as to tax expenditures
created by regulations and rulings—such as the exclusion for Social Security
benefits and tax deferral for income earned by foreign subsidiaries of United
States corporations—the Treasury contended that substantive legislation to
terminate, not mere termination dates, would be required. Finally, the Trea-
sury noted that because business and economic decisions are based on tax
considerations, total termination without transition rules might prove un-
fair."'
While the Treasury statement devoted itself to identification of the prob-
lems, it did not address itself to how the problems could be solved. Actually,
however, none of the problems raised by the Treasury was incapable of reso-
lution. Senator Kennedy, in a statement before the Intergovernmental Rela-
tions Subcommittee, pointed out that the "problems" identified by the Trea-
sury were also "problems" in terminating direct programs. Senator Kennedy
also suggested that. the requisite budgetary and legislative expertise existed to
solve the problems in each case. 316
The "problems" raised by the Treasury, not surprisingly, provided part
of the ground for Senator Long to recommend that Title IV in its entirety be
deleted from S. 2. 3 ' 7 When the full Government Operations Committee con-
sidered the bill in June, 1977, Title IV was modified on the motion of Senate
Finance Committee members Roth and Danforth. Under their motion, tax
expenditures would be "reviewed" periodically, but no automatic termination
date would be established. Feeling that "review" was no improvement on exist-
ing procedures, Senator Glenn, the sponsor of Title IV, moved to drop Title
IV from the bill entirely in order to seek its passage in its original form on
313 Hearing on the Sunset Act of 1977, supra note 13.
314
	 at 93.
315
 Id. at 109-11.
316 Id. at 329.
317 Id. at 484.
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the Senate floor. 3 " Accordingly, as reported by the Committee"" and as
subsequently approved by the Senate Rules Committee,' S. 2 contained no
provisions governing tax expenditures.
Frustrated by his inability to get the sunset bill scheduled for floor debate
during 1978, Senator Muskie offered the bill as a floor amendment to the
Revenue Act of 1978. Senator Glenn then offered his proposal to apply the
sunset process to tax expenditures as an amendment to the Muskie amend-
ment. Opponents of the Glenn amendment were prepared to follow the
strategy of debating the amendment until cloture was invoked, after which
both the Glenn and Muskie amendments would fall because they were non-
germane to the Revenue Act. To force a vote prior to cloture, Senator Glenn
moved to table his own amendment. That motion was defeated with a curious
mixture of proponents and opponents of the Glenn amendment combining to
defeat the tabling motion. Perhaps the opponents so voting did not want to
see a showdown vote occur on the motion, and hence clouded the vote by
joining the proponents of the amendment. Once cloture was invoked, both of
the sunset amendments were out of order. 32 '
Several arguments were advanced by opponents of the Glenn amend-
ment. First, Senator Long argued that termination of a tax expenditure, if it
was not reauthorized under the sunset process, constituted a "backdoor" tax
increase for taxpayers. This result, he asserted, was different from that which
obtained by application of the sunset procedure to direct spending pro-
grams. 322 Senator Long's argument. is disingenuous at best. Termination of a
tax expenditure may result in a tax increase in the end if Congress so decides.
But, Congress also might decide to use the increased tax revenues made avail-
able by the termination to provide a general tax reduction, or to fund new or
increased tax expenditures. Consistent. with Senator Long's argument., one
could equally assert that the termination of a direct spending program will
produce a tax reduction since revenue targets can be lowered. But, of course,
the termination may or may not produce that result depending on the use
Congress decides to make of the newly available funds. Thus, though the
mechanics are somewhat different, the results of terminating both tax and
direct expenditures basically are the same. In either case, there is an increase
3'B
	
Common Cause, Sunset Process for Tax Loopholes, 8 IN COMMON No. 3 at
14 (Summer 1977); Tax Expenditures Dropped from Sunset Bill, 5 TAx NOTES No. 27 at 7
(July 4, 1977). Compare Senator Hart's bill, S. 921, to provide periodic review but not
termination of tax expenditures. 123 Com:. REC. 53490 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1977).
3 " S. Rip. No. 326, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
32" S. REP, No. 981, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
321 See 124 CONG. REC. S17357-73, 17475-500, 17536-43, 17729-36, 17819 (daily
eds. Oct. 6, 7 and 9, 1978): Senator Glenn subsequently offered an amendment that it
was germane to subject to the sunset process the tax expenditures adopted in the
Revenue Act of 1978. That amendment was tabled. Id. at S17969-72.
Following a change in the basic Muskie sunset bill, the Glenn amendment
provided for a 10-year cycle in which all tax expenditures would he reviewed.
322 124 CONG. REC. 817475 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978). See also 124 CONG. REC.
S16776 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1978). Senator Long's phrase probably was an intentionally
ironic reference to the "backdoor spending" phrase that was used to characterize tax
expenditures in the early years of the discussion of the concept.
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in the amount of revenue available to the government, and Congress must.
make a decision as to the uses to which those amounts will be put."'"
Members of the Finance Committee also argued that sunset for tax ex-
penditures was unnecessary because the Committee already periodically re-
viewed the provisions." 24
 This argument, of course, is really an objection to
the whole sunset process. Direct spending programs, after all, are likewise
periodically reviewed, typically annually, by the appropriate authorizing and
appropriations committees or subcommittees. If it is desirable to establish a
regular schedule to review direct programs, it is equally desirable to apply the
same procedure to tax expenditures. Moreover, nothing in the sunset process
would prevent the Finance Committee from reviewing particular tax expendi-
tures before the scheduled time.
The most fundamental objection advanced by Senator Long and other
members of the Finance Committee against the sunset process, however, was
that they did not want to have to assume the burden of proof to reauthorize a
tax expenditure. Under present procedures, the burden of challenging tax
expenditures is on opponents of a tax expenditure seeking the expenditure's
repeal. Under sunset, the burden would shift to proponents of a tax expendi-
ture to persuade Congress and the President that a tax expenditure should be
reenacted. Procedurally, this process would mean that a particular tax expen-
diture would ter-minate, for example, if thirty -four Senators filibustered the
proposed reauthorization and prevented cloture. Similarly, a tax expenditure
would lapse if the President. vetoed a congressionally approved re-
authorization and there were not enough votes to override the veto. 32" Again,
the answer to this objection is that precisely the same procedure applies to
direct spending programs. The Finance Committee members put forward no
reasons to justify a different procedure for tax expenditures.
In sum, the arguments advanced against the Glenn amendment " 2" do not
justify exempting tax expenditures from any sunset process that ultimately is
323 A number of tax expenditures are now enacted with automatic termination
dates. Senator Long did not explain why the "automatic tax increase" argument was
not equally applicable to such provisions.
324 124 CONG. Rec. SI7494 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978). For a study, by an organiza-
tion supporting the Glenn amendment, of the "review" given in the past by the tax
committees 10 tax expenditures, see Commos: CAUSE, GINIME SHELTERS (May 1978).
325 124 CONG. Rce. 517492, 17496, 17735 (daily eds. Oct. 7 and 9, 1978).
325 Some particular aspects of the Glenn amendment. should be noted. First, the
refundable portion of the earned income credit (and any future refundable credit) is
treated as an "outlay." Accordingly, that element of the earned income credit would he
subject to sunset procedures for direct spending programs even in the absence of a tax
expenditure component of sunset legislation. See 124 CONG. REC. S 17485 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1978).
Second, the Glenn amendment itself proposed to give the tax-writing commit-
tees considerably more discretion over the extent to which tax expenditures are sub-
jected to sunset. review than would he given to the authorizing and appropriations
committees with respect to direct expenditures. The amendment. provided a two-step
procedure: (1) The Congressional Budget Office, working with the tax-writing com-
mittees, would prepare an "inventory" of lax expenditure items: (2) the tax-writing
committees would then submit for congressional approval a resolution establishing a
review timetable for those items in the inventory that the tax-writing committees de-
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adopted by Congress. These arguments were simply debating points designed
to allow the Finance Committee to continue its jurisdiction over tax expendi-
tures unimpeded by procedures presently applicable to direct_ spending pro-
grams. 327 We need not concern ourselves here with the merits of the sunset.
technique. Many observers doubt. its efficacy in dealing with direct spending
terinined should be subjected to the sunset process. See 124 Cone. REC. SI7363-64
(daily ed. Oct.. 6, 1978). Step (2) is an undesirable provision when compared to the
sunset process applicable to direct spending programs. It. would enable the tax-writing
committees to exempt any tax expenditure item from the sunset process. Of course,
Congress could override the committees' recommendations. But it seems undesirable
' 1.4.) place the initial decision for exemption within the lax-writing committees. It is true
that some direct spending programs would he exempt from sunset, e.g., social security,
but this was a decision of the Government Operations Committee, not the
authorization–appropriations committees, Those committees would not be given the
"exemption privilege" for the direct spending programs that would be granted to the
tax-writing committees under the Glenn amendment.,
327 This debating point approach to the Glenn amendment. typifies arguments
made elsewhere. Thus, those who support the sunset principle when applied to direct
spending programs but who attack the Glenn amendment always overlook the point.
that their arguments addressed to the tax side of "sunset" equally apply to the spend-
ing side, which they do not attack. See, for example, the statement of Reginald Jones,
Co-Chairman of the Business Roundtable, made at a Tax Foundation lunch, Oct. 25,
1978:
Let's begin with some legislative history on "sunset" legislation. This is
a concept. that enjoys wide, bipartisan support as a way of bringing federal
spending programs under control. It is a direct response to the dramatic
increase in the percentage of federal spending for so-called uncontrollable
programs, which comprise more than three-quarters of all federal spend-
ing.
These are programs where spending mandated by earlier congres-
sional action could not be appreciably altered. Under sunset. legislation, al-
most all federal spending programs would be systematically reviewed by
the Congress and would automatically be terminated—brought to
sunset—unless they were specifically reauthorized by the Congress. ...
Sunset legislation is sure to be revived in the next Congress, and the question
is going to he: Should sunset legislation include or exempt review of the
so-called tax expenditures? ...
Both business and individuals would be thrown into a constant state of
uncertainty with respect to major investment and consumption decisions, if
the application of important tax provisions were subject to possible cancel-
lation. And since some tax expenditures would be up for review every year
(to spread the Congressional workload), the state of uncertainty would be
permanent.
That's all we need in these times of' uncertainty over so many other
aspects of government—regulations, monetary and fiscal policy, energy
policy, antitrust policy, foreign trade policy—every one of them already a
strong inhibitor of business investment. Uncertainty as to the continued
application of major tax provisions would damage business, investor, and
consumer confidence. Instead of contributing to economic stability, the
sunset concept applied to tax expenditures would cause even worse fluctua-
tions in investment and consumption decisions—fluctuations that would
aggravate existing economic problems.
Apart from their exaggerated tone, such statements, which obviously apply as well to
direct spending programs, must really characterize the speakers as believers in tax
sunrises but no tax sunsets.
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programs. What is clear, however, is that. if sunset legislation ultimately is
enacted, it must apply to tax and direct expenditure programs alike. The
technical problems envisioned by the Treasury seem capable of satisfactory
resolution. A sunset. process that excludes programs expending almost 25 per-
cent of total federal funds would undoubtedly prove as unsatisfactory and
ineffectual as a budget control process that fails to cover tax expenditures. 328
E. Development of Mechanisms to Coordinate Tax
and Direct Expenditures
We have previously outlined the procedure by which more rational and
effective congressional consideration and coordination of tax and direct
expenditures could be effected within the framework of the present budget
process."'" Obviously, at the end of 1977, implementation of that ideal pro-
cedure remained far from realization in actual practice. Nonetheless, in par-
ticular instances, effective coordination has taken place. In addition, there
were signs of movement toward a better system, although as we earlier pre-
dicted, the path to reform has not proved an easy one.
The 1976 - 1978 legislative experience did suggest some lessons to be
learned and some possibilities for additional gradual steps that can be taken to
move the legislative process toward more complete integration of tax expendi-
tures with direct spending programs. First, it is clear that the goal of integra-
tion probably cannot be realized without a combination of forceful exercise of
authority by the leadership in each House and of cooperation between the tax
and non-tax committees. That combination existed in the House of Represen-
tatives in its consideration of the 1977 energy legislation. It does not yet exist
in the Senate. Nevertheless, the Budget Committees can move to bring tax
expenditures under control by utilizing their Task Forces on tax expenditures
to develop and carry out hearings and to issue reports on an agreed upon set
of tax expenditures, and by requesting comprehensive reports to be prepared
by CBO on the tax expenditures selected for Task Force hearings. In addi-
tion, the Budget Committees, under section 801 of the Budget Act, may re-
quest that any program evaluations of tax expenditures conducted by OMB,
the Treasury or the "various executive agencies" be made available to the
Committees. The Committees themselves should encourage the development
of such evaluations. 33*
' 28 Subsequent to passing the Revenue Act of 1978, the Senate passed the basic
sunset bill, S. 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The bill as approved by the Senate did
not, however, include the Glenn tax expenditure title and Senator Glenn did not offer
his amendment. See 124 CONG. REC. S18145-97, 18211-21 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978).
With the conclusion of the Ninety-Fifth Congress, S. 2 died, which was the result ex-
pected when it was passed by the Senate. Thus the sunset measure must be considered
anew by the Ninety-Sixth Congress. The House has not to date acted on sunset legisla-
tion.
'" Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 717-20.
33" Attention has been given by the Senate Budget Committee to such matters.
See Can Congress Control the Power of the Purse?, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Budget, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1977).
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Furthermore, the legislative experience demonstrated that the Budget
Committees should include, in the body of the Budget Resolution, and not
just in the accompanying Committee Report, directions to reduce existing tax
expenditures by a specified amount. The requisite authority for such an ac-
tion would appear to be granted by section 301(a)(6) of the Budget Act. This
section directs that the First Concurrent Resolution shall include not only the
recommended levels of revenues and the aggregate level of revenue increases
or decreases, but also "such other matters relating to the Budget as may be
appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the 'Budget] Act."
Several amendments to the Budget Act are suggested by the 1976-1978
legislative experience. The Budget Act should be amended to require closer
coordination of tax and direct spending programs between the tax committees
and the authorizing and appropriations committees, perhaps along the lines
of the resolution introduced by Senator Kennedy. 3 " The support of the
chairmen of the non-tax committees is, of course, an essential prerequisite to
the success of such an effort. The Budget Act also should be amended to
prevent out-year increases in tax expenditures that "leapfrog" the succeeding
fiscal year. It may be desirable as a budgetary matter to move to multi-year
budgeting for all programs. But until that step is taken—both for tax and
direct spending programs—the present procedure whereby it is possible to
schedule increases in tax expenditures for the current fiscal year and the sec-
ond, third, and succeeding fiscal years, but not for the first succeeding fiscal
year, 332 is irrational and harmful to the existing single-year budget. process.
Finally, even in the absence of formal coordination, each House and Sen-
ate authorizing committee is empowered to hold hearings and obtain CBO
reports on particular tax expenditures. To date, neither tax writing committee
has evidenced any great interest in obtaining the objective studies that are
required if tax expenditures are to be intelligently evaluated. This informa-
tion vacuum could be filled by non-tax committees to ensure that their exper-
tise is brought to bear on the necessity and proper structure of a proposed tax
expenditure.
VI. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES
A. Consideration by International Organizations
The concept of tax expenditures as developed in the United States is
rapidly becoming a subject of interest in the rest of the world. In considerable
part, this interest results from the discussion of tax expenditures as a princi-
331 See text. at notes 294-95 supra.
332 The text assumes the Muskie interpretation of section 303 of the Budget.
Act, and not the result produced by the Senate vote overruling the Chair's acceptance
of that interpretation as applied to the Revenue Act of 1978, which overruling permit-
ted scheduled increases for the first succeeding fiscal year as well. See text at notes
246-54 supra. Note that even under the overruling vote, while "leapfrogging" is not
involved, the problem of increasing tax expenditures for all succeeding fiscal years
remains.
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pal topic at recent annual meetings of the two major international fiscal or-
ganizations. 333
At its Jerusalem 1976 Congress, the International Fiscal Association (IFA)
selected "Tax Incentives as an Instrument for Achievement of Governmental
Goals—Their Role in Income Taxation and a Comparison with Alternative
Instruments Regarding Both Economic and Social Goals" as one of its
topics. 334 The IFA Directive guiding the preparation of National Reports for
about twenty countries described the tax expenditure concept, asked whether
thinking about the tax system in the various countries had encompassed that
concept, and requested the preparation of a tax expenditure budget for each
country. The IFA General Report described the response:
On the basis of the National Reports, only the United States and
Germany have a systematic treatment of tax expenditures in their
legislation, and of the two countries the treatment in the United
States is more detailed. Consequently, in the National Reports only
those for the United States and Germany could present a formally
recognized list of tax expenditures and accompanying estimates.
Japanese legislation has a listing of special provisions under the
heading "Special Taxation Measures," and the Japan Report uses
this legislation as the basis for its statement of tax expenditures.
However, it would seem the legislative classification does not cover
all items here considered as tax expenditures, so that the enumera-
tion in the Japan Report is not as inclusive as in the United States or
Germany.
Viewed as a whole, therefore, only the Reports from the United
States, Germany, and Japan include what may be regarded as
reasonably comprehensive tax expenditure budgets with reliable es-
timates. In several other countries, while the legislation does not em-
body the concept, there appears to be considerable thinking about
tax expenditures—though not in such terminology—as represented
by discussions regarding special tax provisions usually of the tax in-
centive type. This has enabled the National Reports from these
countries to present what the Reporters regard as a reasonably com-
333 In addition. PATHWAYS. supra note 34, the first U.S. full-length exposition of
the subject, was reviewed in periodicals in several other countries including France,
Germany, japan, and the United Kingdom. Discussions of the lax expenditure concept.
by U.S. writers that have appeared in European journals include Ault, Steuerver-
giinstigungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland and den USA, 4 STF.UR UND W1RTSCHAFT
335 (1974), and McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Theory and Practical Operation,
45e MAANDBLAD BELASTINGBESCHOUWINGEN 245 (1976).
334
 The International Fiscal Association has a large international membership
composed of practicing tax specialists (tax executives, lawyers, accountants), govern-
ment officials, and academics. On each of the two subjects chosen for an annual Con-
gress it publishes a Cahier containing Reports prepared by National Reporters selected
for the various countries having local branches (there are usually around twenty or so
Reports) and a General Report summarizing and analyzing the contents of the Na-
tional Reports. The National Reports follow the guidelines set forth in a Directive
prepared by the General Reporter, so that the Reports provide organized comparative
material. The particular subject is then discussed at the Annual Congress and the con-
clusion of the Congress is summarized in a Resolution.
:138
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prehensive list., though it required considerable research and judg-
ment on their part and the estimates often are incomplete or more
in the nature of guesses. Countries in this group include Australia,
Israel, and Finland. In other countries, though not much previous
thinking on the subject existed, the research by the National Report-
ers did enable them also to accomplish this result.. See, for example,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Austria.
As to the remainder of the countries, for the most part the sys-
tematic study of tax incentives seems largely unexplored ground and
the National Reporters valiantly worked to present whatever material
they could gather on their own. In many cases they appear to have
achieved useful and reasonably comprehensive lists. But necessarily
the extent of the enumeration of tax expenditures for most of the
countries varies considerably in the detail presented. 335
Against this background, the General Report reached the following con-
clusions:
The great difficulty which the National Reporters experienced
in drawing up tax expenditure budgets and the absence of studies of
the equity and efficiency aspects of tax incentives are strong indica-
tions that tax incentives are little understood or studied.
The great majority of the National Reports indicated that there
is almost no recognition in the fiscal process that tax incentives and
direct expenditures are alternative courses to accomplish government
goals. Consequently, there is almost no consideration of the criteria
that should govern the choice between these courses once it is de-
cided to provide government financial assistance to achieve a particu-
lar goal. The result is a significant and unfortunate gap in knowl-
edge regarding important aspects of tax and expenditure policy.
There is obviously much work to be done by governments and pri-
vate research in these fields.
The material in the National Reports clearly demonstrates that
the preparation of a tax expenditure table for a country is a feasible
goal. The United Stales and Germany are ready illustrations. If this
subject had been studied by IFA, say around ten years ago, those
countries could not have responded any differently from other coun-
tries. Yet because of work done within government, their National
Reporters are now in a position to provide extensive official data,
both qualitative and quantitative.
The matter can he approached from the opposite side. It would
seem that knowledge of the tax expenditure aspects of a tax system
is essential to the orderly management of that system and fiscal pol-
icy in general. A government that is not in a position to identify and
quantify the tax expenditures imbedded in its tax system has really
lost control over an important aspect of fiscal policy. Hence, it is
essential that governments make an effort to prepare tax expendi-
ture tables. Academic research can be helpful here as the National
1FA 1976 Congress, supra note 6, at 19.
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Reports show, most likely as to classification questions. But the prep-
aration of estimates would seem primarily a government task unless
existing data and academic research are such that the task can be
performed outside government. The point is, however, that this
should not be required, and governments themselves should be in a
position to possess and make available the necessary data.
An overall view of the National Reports indicates that while clas-
sification questions will arise at the borderline, and a few may re-
quire further analysis, by far the major part of the task does not
involve seriously debatable points. Nor are there theoretical issues
that stand in the way of obtaining estimates, given the decision to use
"first order" estimates. The problem as to quantification is present
absence of the desired data, not confusion as to what is needed."°
Undoubtedly, the 1FA consideration . of tax expenditures will stimulate
work in this area in other countries. 337 Indeed, the Netherlands National
Reporter, Professor Victor Halberstadt of the Economic InstitUte of Leyden
University, is now working on a study by a Commission organized by the
Netherlands Finance Ministry to consider tax expenditures in the Netherlands
tax system. This study has the potential to develop the tax expenditure con-
cept against the background of European fiscal systems and thus should con-
tribute importantly both to further understanding of the concept and to com-
parative approaches under the concept. Similarly, Canada has instituted a
study to identify tax expenditures in its tax system.
° Id. at 38-39.
337 On lax expenditures, the 1FA Summary, supra note 29, at 46, concluded:
The Congress also considered the factors involved in the choice be-
tween tax incentives and direct expenditures. The need was felt for further
research to explore the factors and ascertain the criteria governing deci-
sions in this respect.
On two points the Congress was in general agreement, one that tax
incentive programs should be scrutinized as carefully as other matters of
budgetary and economic policy, the other, that further research into the
effect of tax incentive measures would be useful, in particular, in order to
measure their cost/benefit ratio.
'['he Summary also said:
There was general agreement as to the usefulness of defining and
evaluating tax incentives. Such evaluation should include the effects
achieved, the revenue losses involved, and any equity consequences. Sonie
difficulty was seen, however, in formulating unambiguously and uncontro-
versially a revenue concept against which all incentives could be identified
and the connected revenue costs measured.
The third sentence obviously asks too much—"unambiguously and uncon-
troversially" identify "all incentives"—and is really a backhanded way of indicating that
borderlines may remain indefinite. See Shoup, supra note 27.
For discussion of the tax expenditure concept in the Dutch system, see Hal-
berstadt and de Kam, About the Choice Between Direct Versus Tax Expenditures,
paper presented before the IIPF 1977 Congress, supra note 6; Christiaanse, Tax Expen-
ditures, 106e WEEKBLAD VooR FISCAL. RECHT 69 (1977). For a listing and analysis of tax
expenditures in the United Kingdom, see WILLIS & HARDWICK, TAX EXPENDITURES IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM (1978) (reviewed in Bird, Current Reading, 26 CANADIAN TAX J.
621 (1978), in reference to the Canadian material).
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In its Varna 1977 Congress, the International Institute of Public Finance
(IIPF)" 8 also considered the subject of tax expenditures. The theme of that
Congress was "Subsidies, Tax Reliefs and Prices." The term "tax reliefs" was
used to cover the "tax expenditure" concept. From the discussion, it appeared
that most of the members attending the Varna Congress felt comfortable with
the technical aspects of the concept and saw no essential difficulties with the
definitional or estimation aspects. In addition, the majority of members clearly
recognized both the absence in official thinking and academic research of this
technique for examining a tax system and the essential need for developing a
tax expenditure approach to a tax system.339 As perhaps might be expected,
these public finance economists readily saw the utility of the concept in ad-
vancing understanding of the various tax systems and the need for careful
analysis of the use of tax expenditures. By contrast, and as expected, some of
the IFA members at the Jerusalem Congress, being practicing tax experts and
recognizing the warning signals posed under tax expenditure analysis for an
uncritical use of tax expenditures, were often prone to be protective of the
present use of tax incentives.
Like the IFA and the IIPF, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has found
itself almost inevitably drawn into an exploration of the tax expenditure con-
cept. Its Working Party No. 2 for a number of years has been developing and
publishing comparative statistical aild descriptive material on the fiscal systems
of member countries. The material covers such broad subjects as, on the one
hand, tax revenue statistics and, on the other hand, the social aspects of taxa-
tion. Under the social aspects of taxation are studies on homeownership, the
average production worker, and the. family unit. It is increasingly becoming
evident to those working on these matters that comparative data on overall
budgets and on government assistance to particular groups or activities must
take account of the assistance being provided through the tax structure as well
as the customary direct budgetary assistance. As a consequence, this Working
Party is gradually, though slowly, widening its exploration of the tax expendi-
ture concept and studying how it may be applied usefully in the context of
338 This organization, considerably smaller than IFA, is composed almost entirely
of public finance specialists, usually academics or government officials. Its member-
ship extends to East European countries. A program committee organizes the prep-
aration of individual papers in accordance with the program agenda and these pa-
pers are discussed at the annual Congress. The papers are published in a single volume,
generally about one year after the Congress at which they were presented. No resolu-
tions are adopted. The 1977 proceedings will be published in SUBSIDIES, TAX RELIEFS
AND PRICES (Hauser ed., forthcoming).
339 The opening address on this phase of the Congress, Surrey, supra note 9,
obviously had no problems in accepting the concept! But even the discussion of that
paper essentially posed no issues that had not been explored in writings in the United
States. The various papers presented contributed useful observations on the criteria
for choosing between tax assistance and direct assistance, on the political and
psychological factors that underlay the use of tax assistance, on the almost universal
tendency of legislatures to approve tax expenditures more readily than direct assis-
tance, and on the adverse effect on the basic tax structure of injecting tax expendi-
tures into an income tax system.
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the varying tax systems of the member countries. It would seem impossible to
develop comprehensive comparative material on the subjects being studied in
the OECD without applying tax expenditure analysis. 34° It is possible there-
fore that the OECD studies may be important in advancing the use of the tax
expenditure concept, both within its member countries in their own budgetary
and tax policies and in the presentation of comparative tax and other fiscal
statistical and descriptive material. •
The OECD work would be substantially advanced if it, or some European
government or research organization, would commence the initial preparation
"° See, e.g., 1FA 1976 Congress, supra note 6, at 40-41, which contains these
observations:
The OECD has published comprehensive material on Revenue Statis-
tics of OECD Member Countries; the latest published in 1975 covers
1965-1972. These statistics, following a standard classification established
by OECD, indicate tax revenues as a ratio of GNP. The study, however,
excludes tax expenditures. Yet tax expenditures can affect such ratios,
since one country may finance certain activities through the tax system
while'another country finances the same activities through the direct
budget. The two countries looked at in terms of collected revenues alone
may show the same ratio whereas in fact the first country could actually
have more relative participation of the public sector in the economy once
tax expenditures are included. While the OECD is aware of this, it pre-
sumably feels at this time that the available national data do not permit tax
expenditures to be included in these comparisons. As indicated above, it
would appear that further activity by the OECD in developing a coordi-
nated approach to the identification and quantification of tax expenditures
by the various governments would be useful in prompting those govern-
ments to obtain the needed data. Certainly it would seem to be within the
reach of the OECD, given sustained cooperation by the fiscal authorities of
the countries, to develop the necessary framework for the data and to sup-
ply reasonable guidelines on any borderline questions that arise.
Other comparative studies under consideration by the OECD also re-
quire tax expenditure data to make the international comparisons mean-
ingful, and would thus complement a basic tax expenditure study. For
example, one set of studies relates to government financing in selected
functional areas, such as health, housing, etc. Certainly the extent of
financing through tax expenditures is a necessary ingredient. Thus in
housing one should look at tax expenditures to individuals for home own-
ership, to business to construct homes, and to financial institutions to lend
funds for the construction or purchase of homes. These tax expenditures
would be joined with other government budget aids such as grants, loans,
guarantees and the like to form the complete picture. Another OECD
comparative study relates to the distribution of income among households
by percentile classes. Such a study, however, requires a definition of "in-
come" and in turn that definition will involve tax expenditure concepts.
Thus "income" could be defined as taxable income plus income excluded
from the tax base because of tax expenditures plus personal exemptions (to
extent not included in tax expenditures). Presumably, most governments
would, however, proceed the other way and have data on money incomes.
But once those data are obtained and taxable income is known, the differ-
ence defines the magnitude of tax expenditures (plus personal exemp-
dons). Hence such a distribution of income study would necessarily com-
plement a basic tax expenditure study. (Transfers in kind may also have to
be considered.)
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of tax expenditure budgets for the member countries. This work could pro-
ceed first through a listing of the tax expenditure items and then progress to
obtaining the data necessary for the revenue estimates. In this regard, one
gets the impression that in some European countries it is believed that work
on the preparation of a tax expenditure budget cannot proceed without an
ironclad agreement on the concept of a normative income tax. Instead, how-
ever, if countries actually proceeded to develop such a budget against the
background of the generally accepted views regarding the structure of an in-
come tax, the classification issues requiring discussion and analysis would
quickly emerge and quickly yield to rational resolution. The consideration of
the tax expenditure concept by the International Fiscal Association and the
International Institute of Public Finance would support this view. The ap-
proach here suggested could initially apply to the income tax but should later
be extended to other global-type taxes, such as the value added tax, the
wealth tax, and the estate or inheritance tax."'
If the OECD, or a European government or research organization, would
thus develop an organized comparative approach to the use of tax expendi-
ture data and analysis, it is to be hoped that other regional organizations such
as The Organization of American States, ASEAN, and OAO, would in turn
apply that approach to their studies. The United Nations and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund in their analyses of fiscal systems similarly could assist
countries in the use of the tax expetkliture concept and also advance its appli-
cation to comparative fiscal studies.
B. Impact of Tax Expenditure Concept in
Particular International Tax Mailers
The tax expenditure concept lies underneath the surface of a number of
important international tax matters. The development of these particular mat-
ters has not expressly utilized that concept and its application as such has not
been explored. Yet the problems involved and the range of solutions so far
adopted or available nevertheless are susceptible to consideration in terms of
tax expenditure analysis. The application of tax expenditure analysis to these
international matters is, however, still in a tentative stage and much more
exploration is in order.
1. GATT: DISC and the Exemption Approach to International Double
Taxation
The European Communities and Canada have challenged the United
States income tax provisions for exports, called DISC, as being contrary to the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibition on export
341 See also McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept in the international Context, 47e
MAANDBLAD BELASTINGBESCHOUW1NGEN 115 (1978). The Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal
Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, which Institute is composed of lawyers and
economists conducting research on tax policy issues of international concern, has an-
nounced that. as a part of its research program for 1978-1979 it will undertake a project,
"International Aspects of Tax Expenditures, - scheduled for implementation in 1979.
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subsidies. The DISC provisions technically provide a deferral of United States
income tax on a portion of the profits earned by taxpayers exporting United
States products."' A DISC is a separate domestic corporation, usually a
paper company, to which a portion of the export profits may he allocated
under a favorable artificial statutory formula that departs from section 482
arm's length pricing. Under the original DISC provisions, the corporate in-
come tax was not applied to one-half of the export profits as long as that
one-half was invested in export related assets. The amount of profit on which
tax may be deferred, under 1976 legislation, is now governed by an incremen-
tal requirement which somewhat reduces that amount below one-half. The
typical use of a DISC, under the statutory formula, is to allocate an artificial
commission to the "paper" corporation on goods exported by the parent.
Since the DISC has no employees, it obviously does nothing to earn the com-
mission. Upon receiving the artificial commission, the DISC in turn invests its
funds in the export accounts receivable of the parent exporter. In actual op-
eration, the "deferral" of tax can become the practical equivalent of ex-
emption.
The GATT asked a Panel of Experts to consider the European challenge
to DISC. This Panel found DISC to be a proscribed export subsidy within the
GATT rules. The Panel first examined the economic effect of the DISC legis-
lation, and concluded that it "conferred a tax benefit ... essentially related to
exports." 343
 It then stated that "if the corporation income tax was reduced
with respect to export related activities and was unchanged with respect to
domestic activities for the internal market. this would tend to lead to an ex-
pansion of export activity." 344 Noting that, according to the United States
Treasury, exports had increased as a result of the DISC legislation, and con-
sidering the fact that so many DISCs had been created was evidence that
DISC status conferred a substantial benefit," 349
 the Panel concluded that the
legislation should he regarded as an export subsidy. In determining whether
the.
 deferral of tax under the DISC provisions constituted a remission of tax
or an exemption from tax, the Panel "was not convinced that a deferral, simply
because it is given for an indeterminate period, was equal to a remission or an
exemption." 34!' the Panel noted that no provision was made for
the interest component_ normally associated with a later or deferred payment
of tax. As a result, the Panel ruled that the DISC legislation constituted a
partial exemption from tax and hence a subsidy, leading presumptively to any
or a combination of the following consequences in the export sector:
(a) lowering of prices, (b) increase of sales effort and (c) increase of
profits per unit. Because the subsidy was both significant and
broadly based it was to be expected that all of these effects would
"42 I.R.C. §§ 991-997.
343 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLA-
TioN (DISC), REPORT or rnE PANEL L14422, at 15-16, para. 67 (November 2, 1976).
344 Id .
345 Id. at para. 68.
34 " Id. at para. 71 (emphasis in original).
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occur and that, if one occurred, the other two would not necessarily
be excluded. A concentration of' the subsidy benefits on prices could
lead to substantial reduction in prices. The Panel did not accept that
a reduction in prices in export markets need automatically to be ac-
companied by similar reduction in domestic markets. These conclu-
sions were supported by statements by American individuals and
companies and the Panel felt that it should pay some regard to this
evidence. 347
The Panel therefore concluded that the DISC legislation in some cases had
effects which were not in accordance with the United States' obligations under
Article XVI:4 [of the GATT]," 348 and that "the various options under the
DISC legislation for the allocation of profits from export sales, ... could in-
fluence the size of the exemption." 349
It is difficult to see how the Panel could reach any other conclusion.
DISC is included in the United States tax expenditure budget and is thus
recognized as the functional equivalent of an interest free government loan,
potentially unlimited in duration, to United States exporters. It is defended by
its supporters as an incentive to exports. Those supporters described in glow-
ing terms its effect in increasing exports, which description, of course, turned
into arguments utilized by the Europeans. Present Treasury thinking consid-
ers DISC as a waste of money in that, at a revenue cost of over $1 billion, it
produced at best only a $2.9 billion increase in exports for the year 1976, less
than 3 percent of total exports. Considering the interaction with flexible ex-
change rates and the possible displacement of non-DISC exports, the increase
in exports engendered by DISC was probably even smaller. 3 " The Treasury
approach thus regards DISC as a cost ineffective subsidy. The United States
defense of DISC before the Panel was necessarily a weak one, given the cir-
cumstances surrounding DISC, and essentially rested on the assertion that a
deferral of tax under DISC was not a subsidy. This was clearly an unacceptable
argument to the economists on the Panel. The Panel decision on DISC thus
broke no new ground but instead represented a rational acceptance of the
strong arguments provided to the Europeans by the origins of DISC and the
contentions of its supporters.
At the same time, however, the United States had, in effect, counter-
claimed against the Europeans by claiming that their tax treatment of exports
was also contrary to GATT. Thus, the United States pointed out that France
under the "territoriality principle" in its income tax does not tax the income
of foreign branches owned by French companies."' Consequently, where a
French-owned foreign branch sold goods manufactured by a French coin-
347 Id. at para. 73.
348 Id. at para. 74.
349 Id. at para. 75. See Rodriquez, III, Note on Recent Development Under General
Agreement on Tanff.s. and Trade (GATT}, 18 HARV. INT1 L.J. 706 (1977).
3" See U.S. 1'REAS, DEPT., THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DomEs-ric IN-
TERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION LEGISLATION, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT (April 1978).
351 The foreign branch must qualify, under French law, as a "permanent estab-
lishment" in the other country. This would make its profits taxable by that country if
the country imposed an income tax.
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pany, the profits on the sale by the branch were not taxed by France. In
contrast, the United States would tax the company in this situation absent any
use of DISC. France, under the "territoriality principle," also exempts from
the French income tax 95 percent of the dividends received from a French-
owned foreign subsidiary, the remaining 5 percent being considered as in-
cludable in income to offset the deductions by the parent of expenses at-
tributable to the dividends. France does tax a French company on its profits
on goods transferred to its foreign subsidiary, and thus taxes profits which
DISC in effect partially exempts in the United States. In addition, France
taxes exports to third parties, which are not fully taxed in the United States as
a result of the DISC provision. But France does not, under its income tax, tax
the foreign source income of its business taxpayers where that income is de-
rived from a foreign branch or subsidiary.
In effect France, in tax terminology, uses the "territoriality , principle" of
only source taxation rather than worldwide taxation of income. This principle,
in effect, results in the "exemption of foreign income" method of avoiding
double taxation of international income by allowing exclusive tax jurisdiction
to the country in which the income arises. With some variations, the Dutch
and Belgian tax systems similarly use the territoriality principle, and hence the
exemption approach.
The United States, in contrast, uses the "foreign tax credit" method. The
United States imposes its tax on foreign branch profits of a United States
company as the profits are earned, and on dividends from a subsidiary of a
United States parent company when distributed to the parent, or construc-
tively distributed under the "Subpart F" tax haven rules. The United States
then grants a credit against its tax for the tax of the foreign country up to a
limit which approximates the United States tax on the foreign source income.
The tax jurisdiction of the foreign country—the country of income source—
is thus a primary jurisdiction but not an exclusive jurisdiction.
The tax expenditure budget in the United States does not consider the
foreign tax credit to be a tax expenditure, but instead regards that credit as
an appropriate accommodation of the United States tax system to the tax sys-
tems of other countries. Nevertheless, since the basic premise of the United
States income tax is that it is a worldwide tax, any treatment of foreign in-
come or income related to foreign activities that reduces the initial United
States tax on such income before application of the credit is a tax expendi-
ture. Hence, the DISC deferral of export profits and "deferral" of tax on the
income of United States controlled subsidiaries (apart from Subpart F), post-
poning imposition of United States tax until repatriation of the profits
through distribution as a dividend, are regarded as tax expenditures, since
these preferences undercut the worldwide jurisdictional basis of our norma-
tive income tax. The foreign tax credit does not undercut that jurisdictional
basis, but instead accommodates the jurisdictional basis to the tax systems of
source countries, thereby preventing "international double taxation."
One would suppose that if the French were to establish a tax expenditure
budget they would not treat their exemption of foreign source income as a
tax expenditure. Instead, presumably, they would regard their territoriality
principle as a counterpart to our foreign tax credit approach, that is, as the
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accommodation under the French normative concept of an income tax to
other tax systems to avoid double taxation. While it may be argued that a
foreign tax credit approach all in all is a better approach in today's tax world,
the exemption system has it supporters. It is, for example, an alternative
along with the foreign tax credit approach presented in the "Methods for
Elimination of Double Taxation" of Article 23A of the OECD Model for bilat-
eral tax conventions.'S 2
Despite this analysis, in considering the United States claim that Euro-
pean tax treatment of exports violated GATT, the GATT Panel, consisting of
the same individuals who made the DISC decision, ruled that the French
treatment of foreign income from export sales abroad was a subsidy under
GATT. The Panel again
started by examining the effects of the income tax practices before it
in economic terms ... [noting that] the particular application of the
territoriality principle by France allowed some part of export ac-
tivities, belonging to an economic process originating in the country,
to be outside the scope of French taxes. In this way, France has
foregone revenue from this source and created a possibility of a
pecuniary benefit to exports in those cases where income and cor-
poration tax provisions were significantly more liberal in foreign
countries." 5 "
The Panel further found that while these "practices may have been an inci-
dental consequence of French taxation principles rather than a specific policy
intention, they nonetheless constituted a subsidy on exports because the ...
benefits to exports did not apply to domestic activities for the internal mar-
ket."''' The Panel also noted that the French tax treatment of dividends
from abroad ensured that the benefits were fully preservecl. 3 "• The Panel
concluded that "[flu circumstances where different tax treatment in different
countries resulted in a smaller total tax bill in aggregate being paid on exports
than on sales in the home market, ... there was a partial exemption From
direct taxes."'" The same decision was reached by the GATT Panel for the
Netherlands "57 and for Belgium."'"
The decision is certainly an interesting one. In tax expenditure terms, it
appears to conclude that the territoriality principle and the "exemption"
"52 The "exemption - system is also presented as an aliernanve in the Draft Treaty
being prepared by the U.N. Group or Experts on Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries. See Surrey, United Nations Croup of Experts and the Gilidelines for
Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARV, L.J. 1, 43 (1978).
35" GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, INCOME -FAX PRAcTicEs
MAINTAINED BY FRANCE, REPORT OF' TILE PANEL 1,14423, at 11, para. 47 (November 2,
1976).
5 " 4 M. at para. 48.
3" Id. at para. 49.
" 5" Id. at para. 50.
357 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, INCOME TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS, REPORT OF 'VHF: PANEL. L14425 (November 2. 1976).
35  GENERAL. AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, INCOME TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, REPORT OF THE PANEL. L/4424 (,November 2, 1976).
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method of relief against double taxation as to exports are not an acceptable
part of a normative tax system. This would leave the "foreign tax credit"
method as the only acceptable approach. If this is so, it would equally appear
that, the "exemption" method is also a tax subsidy—though not a GATT ex-
port subsidy (unless goods exported from the residence country are in-
volved in the foreign activities)—when applied to exempt from residence
country tax the income of a foreign branch engaged in activities other than
export sales, or the dividends of a foreign subsidiary earning profits from
such activities. The GATT Panel decision would also support the United
States classification of the deferral of tax on such foreign subsidiary profits as
a tax expenditure, since it really implies that anything short of current taxa-
tion of those profits is a tax subsidy—though, again, not necessarily a GATT
export subsidy since exports are not directly involved.
It is thus understandable that France and other countries using the ter-
ritoriality principle and the "exemption" method cannot accept the decision of
the GATT Panel. Their principal contention is that, whatever other countries
may see as defects of that principle and the exemption method, they have a
long historical base in European tax systems. Their defense of the method in
the modern world is rested on this history and on tax jurisdiction concepts,
rather than on the importance of continuing the "exemption" method to pro-
vide, in effect, a subsidy for exports and other foreign activities. If, of course,
the defense were placed only on any subsidy effect of the "exemption"
method, with a recognition that current realities made the history irrelevant
and the jurisdictional basis outmoded, then the "exemption" method would
not be acceptable as part of a normative income tax and would pass into the
tax expenditure category.'" The GATT Panel decision may at least stimu-
late further reflection on the appropriate international accommodation of a
country's income tax to the income taxes of the other countries of the
world. 3 "°
35 u In a world in which tax havens abound, the exemption method is a greater
encouragement to their use than the foreign tax credit method. Hence, if exemption
countries are willing to tolerate the unrestricted use by their business enterprises of tax
havens, the suspicion would arise that there is more of subsidy present and less of
historical or jurisdictional principle involved in the justification of the continued use of
the exemption method. Of course, use of the foreign tax credit method is not per se a
defense against tax havens if a deferral approach is allowed, but the foreign tax credit
method may involve a day of some reckoning whereas the exemption method does
not. French .tax officials have said that France "watches out" for tax haven problems
and hence its exemption approach in practice does not promote tax haven activities.
The use by developed countries of the exemption approach appeals to de-
veloping countries, for that approach meshes well, in the eyes of the developing coun-
tries and the enterprises affected, with the prevalent tendency of those countries to
utilize tax incentive devices, e.g., tax holidays, accelerated depreciation, etc., to attract
foreign investment. However, this inevitable effect of the exemption approach gives an
aura of subsidy rather than of tax jurisprudence. This is not to say that the foreign tax
credit approach represents a problem-free solution. The credit approach requires a
consideration of the "tax sparing" issue, discussed in the text at note 362 infra.
3" The exemption system is justified by some on the ground that it pushes in
the direction of source tax neutrality for foreign investment through its focus on the
tax system of the source country. it thereby places all enterprises with activities in that
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2. The Treaty of Rome
It appears that other international organizations may need to utilize tax
expenditure analysis to decide substantive issues of interpretation in the in-
ternational agreements they enforce. Thus, Articles 92-94 of the Treaty of
Rome impose limits on "aid" (Beihilfen) granted by a Member State "in any
form whatsoever" that distorts competition. The Commission of the European
Communities has taken the position that State "aid" includes financial benefits
provided through preferential tax provisions. This view appears to have been
upheld, at least implicitly, by the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities."' Under this view, the application of the Treaty provision would
be facilitated by development of internationally accepted criteria for differen-
tiating provisions that constitute part of the normative structure of the various
tax systems employed by Common Market Countries, which should not consti-
tute "aids" under Article 92-94, and deviations from the normative structure,
which should constitute "aids" or tax expenditures within the Treaty terms.
Of course, denominating a particular provision as a tax "aid" does not imply
that it constitutes per se a violation of the Treaty. It simply means that the
same standard Treaty test of distortion of competition should be applied
equally to tax aids as to direct aids.
3. Double Taxation Treaty Principles and Negotiations
Tax expenditure analysis may be helpful in approaching some present
issues in formulating and negotiating bilateral tax treaties regarding double
taxation. Two illustrations are tentatively presented here, since the application
of the tax expenditure analysis to this area is still in a formative stage.
a. Tax Sparing. While some developed countries are willing, in a limited
way, to extend by treaty "tax sparing" foreign tax credits to taxes foregone by
developing countries under the tatters' tax incentive provisions, the United
States has thus far resolutely refused to allow these tax sparing credits." 2
Suppose, however, a developing country makes the following argument to the
United States: "We are both countries that use tax expenditure analysis. If we
country, whether domestic or foreign owned, on the same income tax footing as to
those activities. But such neutrality can only be achieved if all residence countries
utilize the exemption approach. The foreign tax credit approach focuses on residence
country neutrality—and thus appeals to many economists—in that enterprises resident
therein, whether investing at home or abroad, are subject to the same income tax (as
long as the source country tax does not exceed the residence country tax). This latter
neutrality, can be achieved by a particular country using the tax credit method regard-
less of the method used by other countries. Thus, given the desire of many countries
to use the foreign tax credit method, the exemption method is inherently incapable of
achieving the objective posited by those using the source tax neutrality justification.
3" See Ault, supra note 333.
3 ' 2 For a historical reference on this official United States position, see S. SUR-
REY, The United States Tax System and International Tax Relationships, in TAX POLICY AND
TAX REFORM: 1961-1969, SELECTED SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY OF STANELY S. SURREY
317 (W. Hellmuth & O. Oldman eds. 1973). See also Liebman, A Formula For Tax-
Sparing Credits in U.S. Tax Treaties With Developing Countries, 72 AMER. J. OF INT't. L. 296
(1978).
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utilized a system with no tax expenditures and, say, a 40 percent corporate
rate, and then used a direct spending program to increase investment, such as
having our Commerce Ministry issue checks for 10 percent of the costs of
investment in equipment, the United States would credit the regular tax paid
by a branch or subsidiary of a United States enterprise. The direct subsidy
would, of course, be includable in income or treated as a contribution to capi-
tal and subtracted from cost in determining the depreciation basis for United
States tax purposes. Suppose, instead, we utilize a 10 percent investment
credit. Under present United States policy, only our tax as reduced by the
investment credit would be allowed as a foreign tax credit. Yet, since we clas-
sify the investment credit as a tax expenditure, and thus the equivalent to a
direct program—and so does the United States—you should view the result
as if our full regular tax were paid and therefore grant a tax sparing credit by
treaty. The United States, of course, may require the amount of the credit to
be included in income or may reduce basis for purposes of computing the
recipients' United States tax liability. The investment credit would thereby be
regarded as the equivalent of a direct spending program." 3s3 If we assume
that United States tax technicians are wary of tax sparing, and keep in mind
the historical United States position and the conventional arguments, do tax
technicians have rational answers to offer the developing country?
The answer to this question lies in an examination of the techniques used
by developing countries to attract investment. There would seem to be at least
five categories of these techniques:
(1) a lower overall regular tax rate—here the United States would
only credit the reduced tax;
(2) a tax expenditure incentive, such as the investment credit, accel-
erated depreciation, or the special tax holiday—here the United
States under present practice would only credit the reduced tax;
(3) collection of the regular tax, but a direct grant program directly
or closely linked to the tax paid, such as a percentage of that tax, so
as to rebate in effect part of that tax—here the United States under
present practice would only credit the net amount, regular tax less
rebate, even where there was proper United States income tax
treatment of the grant; 3"
3"3
 The consequence of proper income tax treatment by the United States of
the investment credit and of the recognition of a tax sparing credit would be to split
the benefit of the investment credit between the taxpayer and the United States
Treasury, assuming a United States tax rate of 50%.
3"4 See Rev. Rul. 69-433, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 153, ruling that a Virgin Islands
subsidy of 75% of the Virgin Islands income tax, which subsidy was paid under the
Virgin Islands Industrial Incentive Program, reduces the amount of creditable tax.
This view was followed in HMW Industries, Inc. v. Wheatley, 504 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1974), in holding the subsidy to be a tax reduction and not a non-shareholder con-
tribution to capital, so that a reduction in the basis of the recipient corporation's assets
was not required. Note also the IRS position that a Brazilian Central Bank subsidy of
85% of the withholding tax of 25% on interest levied by Brazil on interest paid by
Brazilian borrowers to foreign lenders, which lenders usually require the Brazilian
borrower to absorb the 25% withholding tax, reduces the amount of the withholding
tax that can be credited by the lender. Rev. Rul. 78 -258, 1978-26 I.R.B. 17. This
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(4) collection of the regular tax and a direct grant program not.
linked to the tax paid but instead paralleling in content the tax ex-
penditure, such as direct cash assistance for investment—here the
United States would under the present practice credit the full tax
paid, but would properly treat the cash assistance as a contribution
to the capital of the recipient and reduce the tax basis of its invest-
ment assets;
(5) collection of the regular tax and a direct program not paralleling
the tax expenditure, such as a highway program or a port facility for
a number of enterprises—here the United States would credit the
full tax paid.
Case (I) clearly seems to present a proper result. Case (5) also seems clear
at the opposite pole front case (I). Cases (2), (3), and (4), however, raise the
issue posed earlier. If it is said that a credit should not be allowed for the tax
paid in case (3)—the direct program linked to the tax, but an initial "pay-
ment" of the full tax—then a fortiori no credit should be allowed for the tax
reduction in case (2), where there is in fact only a lower tax payment since the
tax expenditure is an item that directly determines the final tax. Conversely, if
a credit is allowed in case (2) for the full tax, including the reduction effected
by the tax expenditure, it would seem that a credit for the full tax should be
allowed in case (3), in view of the "payment" of the full amount of the tax.
While under present practice it would seem strange to allow a credit in case
(3), since the direct subsidy linked to the tax would seem to make it indistin-
guishable from the overall rate reduction in case (1), still the argument for the
"tax sparing" credit earlier presented does, as indicated above, extend to both
cases (2) and (3). That argument, of course, rests on the allowance, under
present practice, of a credit for the full tax in case (4), assuming that the
appropriate United States income tax treatment is applied to the direct assis-
tance.
The answer that the United States Treasury tax treaty policy officials
might make to the argument earlier advanced supporting recognition of a tax
credit in cases (2) and (3) would be the following: "The present foreign tax
credit is aimed at preventing duplicative income tax payments. That is the
fundamental policy underlying the tax credit mechanism. Hence, the result in
case (1). Case (3) follows then a fortiori since the tax payment is by hypothesis
always linked with an offsetting 'grant' and no tax sparing credit should be
allowed as a matter of foreign tax credit policy. In other words, if there is in
fact no double tax payment either because of an . overall rate reduction (as in
case (1)) or because the 'payment' is simultaneously offset by a related direct
position reversed letter rulings previously granted to U.S. banks stating that the full
25% tax was creditable. For discussions of this Brazilian situation, see McIntyre, The
Foreign Tax Credit and the Brazilian Rebate, 6 TAx NOTES No. 4 at 67 (Jan. 23, 1978);
Guttentag and Nauheim, The Foreign Tax Credit and the Brazilian Rebate: A Reply, 6 TAX
NoTEs No. 14 at 351 (April 3, 1978); Response of Michael J. McIntyre, 6 TAx NOTES No.
14 at 354 (April 3, 1978); Surrey, Foreign Tax Credit Issues in Relation to Developing
Countries: Withholding Taxes on Interest Payments and Discriminatory Taxes (in forthcoming
publication by Columbia University Center for Law and Economics of its Conference
on "United States Taxation and Developing Countries," at 27-28 (1978)).
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payment (as in case (3)), then no credit should be allowed. As to case (2) and
the argument based on tax expenditure analysis, case (2) involves a 'duplica-
tion' of income tax payment if a tax expenditure is regarded as a constructive
payment of tax and then a constructive direct expenditure. But it must be
recognized that granting a tax sparing credit in case (2), in the real world, is
an invitation to the widespread use of tax incentives since, like the exemption
method, it focuses the attention of multinational enterprises on securing tax
incentives from developing countries. In the real world, tax incentives are far
easier to push past policy officials and legislatures than are direct expendi-
tures. Hence, it is not enough for a developing country to say 'We use tax
expenditure analysis.' Rather, the questions are, 'Do you really mean that? Do
you test your tax expenditures rigorously and use them only when you really
would vote funds for a direct program and hence are way using the tax
spending route for really valid reasons?' Since presumably no country, includ-
ing the United States, can answer those questions 'yes' under oath, the argu-
ment of the developing country presented earlier would seem to be lacking
reality. Given the essential inability of adequately testing the rigidity of the
adherence to the full implications of tax expenditure analysis, the wisest ap-
proach for the United States is to remain with its refusal to allow tax sparing
credits. Under this view, with a tax sparing credit thus denied in case (2), a
full credit, as stated earlier, must be denied in case (3), since otherwise case
(2) is easily sidestepped. A full foreign tax credit would continue to be allowed
in case (4) since such direct monetary grants, not linked to the tax payment as
in case (3), are accepted fiscal techniques."
The advocates of the tax sparing credit might reply as follows: "We were
earlier urging a proper conceptual approach under tax expenditure analysis
to support the allowance of the 'tax sparing' credit. It is not proper under the
conceptual approach for the United States to look behind our tax provisions
or direct grants and consider what factors led to the choice. After all, the
United States has many tax expenditures involving large amounts, so that it is
inappropriate for the United States to question why our country has tax ex-
penditures in its system. Further, if our argument is valid as to case (2), then
there should also be a credit in case (3) since there would be no point in
differentiating these situations."
Here the matter rests. One suspects that pragmatists would stand by the
present United States approach and not accept the conceptual analysis offered
to support the tax sparing credit in case (2) or the credit in case (3). Also, one
senses in the real world that such a course of action is the wiser one, for both
the United States and especially the developing countries. While those coun-
tries may perhaps resent the United States' effort to "protect them" from the
use of tax incentives and tax expenditures, still the United States' experience
with these devices, objectively utilized, certainly provides the United States
with full credentials to offer advice. Finally, the argument based on duplicative
tax payments to deny a credit in case (3)—tax payment and grant linked to
tax—is a strong one and if accepted it would also deny a credit in case (2)—
tax expenditure built into the tax system.
b. Treaty Negotiations. The use of tax expenditure analysis may help in
assessing the appropriateness of proposals, other than tax sparing, advanced
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by countries in negotiations over a particular double taxation income treaty.
As general propositions, the following can presumably be stated: First, assum-
ing that withholding taxes on gross amounts are part of a normative tax struc-
ture, Country A is entitled to obtain application of the normative income tax
structure of Country B for the residents of Country A receiving income from
passive investment or activities in Country B which do not involve a trade or
business there. The denial of the benefit of a normative lax provision would
he a tax penalty imposed on Country A residents but not on Country B resi-
dents. Second, Country A is not entitled to insist on obtaining for its residents
receiving income from Country B a tax expenditure not granted by Country
B to its own residents. These results would seem to be aspects of the proper
application of the non-discrimination clause contained in the usual tax treaty.
Third, Country A is not entitled to obtain for its residents the application of
the tax expenditure provisions of the income tax of Country B just because
they are receiving such income from Country B. Since Country B presumably
could limit its direct spending provisions to residents of Country B, it can, if it
so wishes, likewise limit its tax expenditures. Fourth, if, however, a resident of
Country A is waged in trade or business through a permanent establish-
ment in Country B or is the sole shareholder of a Country B corporation,
with such permanent establishment or corporation subject to the Country B
basic income tax, then Country A is entitled to obtain both the normative tax
provisions and the tax expenditure provisions of the Country B income tax
for the permanent establishment or corporation. This result also would seem
to be involved in the proper application of the non-discrimination clause. This
last statement assumes that Country B could not deny to the permanent estab-
lishment or corporation the assistance available under a direct spending pro-
gram of Country B. Finally, Country A is not entitled to obtain for the per-
manent establishment or corporation a tax expenditure not otherwise granted
by Country B (similar to the second proposition above). Thus, tax expendi-
ture analysis becomes a helpful device to shape the contours of the non-
discrimination clause and otherwise guide tax treaty negotiations.
The foregoing line of reasoning can be applied to the troublesome issues
arising in negotiations over the international application of a particular coun-
try's corporation income tax when that tax involves a form of "integration"
with the individual income tax. This problem is especially difficult in negotia-
tions between a country with a "classical" corporation tax and a country with
an "imputation" system or other form of integration."" 5 If Country A has a
classical corporate tax and Country B an imputation system, such as a
shareholder credit, then for Country B to insist on obtaining a shareholder
credit, from Country A for shareholder-residents of Country B receiving div-
idends from Country A corporations would be equivalent to asking Country A
to provide a tax expenditure for Country B shareholders. The same would be
true if Country B asked for a "split rate" or dividend deduction as to div-
idends paid by Country A corporations to such shareholder-residents in
Country B.
3"5 For a discussion of this subject, see Ault, International issues in Corporate Tax
Integration, 10 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 461 (1978).
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On the other hand, if Country B has an imputation system under which
it grants a shareholder credit to Country B residents who are shareholders in
Country B corporations, and f that imputation system is regarded as a nor-
mative part of the Country B domestic income tax structure, the problem is
more difficult. Essentially the question then becomes one of how Country B
regards the international application of its domestic imputation system in the
absence of treaty, that is, would its normative system differentiate or not dif-
ferentiate between resident and foreign shareholders. If it is the latter—no
differentiation—then Country A in asking for application of the imputation
credit to Country A residents who are shareholders in Country B corporations
is simply asking for non-discriminatory application of the Country B norma-
tive structure. Presumably, Country A would not even have to ask for such
application since, by hypothesis, that application should be in existence under
the assumption as to the Country B normative structure. If it is the
former—differentiation—then Country A is asking Country B to create a
new tax expenditure. The treaty non-discrimination clause would not seem to
require that the shareholder credit be extended to foreign shareholders.
However, if Country B has a split-rate system or a dividend deduction system,
then while a country could unilaterally not extend that treatment. to dividends
paid to foreigners if the country so regarded its normative tax structure,
under the treaty non-discrimination clause the split-rate or deduction might
have to be applied to those dividends.
The difficulty with the above discussion is the lack of a clear answer to
the question of what is the normative income tax structure of domestic "inte-
gration" systems as applied unilaterally in an international context. If a split-
rate or deduction method of integration is used, the present general tendency
is unilaterally to apply the consequences to all dividends, even those going to
foreign shareholders, presumably because of the influence of the non-
discrimination clause as applied at the corporate level. If, however, a
shareholder credit approach is used, the general tendency is unilaterally to
deny the credit to foreign shareholders. 3 "
Somewhat the same analytical issues arise with the question whether a
country with an imputation system, including deduction at the corporate level,
must apply that system to the foreign source income of its domestic corpora-
tions. Behind all these questions is also the question whether the answer turns
" Some countries by treaty, e.g., France and the United Kingdom, extend the
imputation credit to foreign individual shareholders. The United Kingdom in the
U.K.—U.S. pending treaty and in'the U.K.—Netherlands treaty also extends the credit
to foreign parent corporations, but it is uncertain whether other imputation countries
will take that course.
Some countries may argue that an imputation system applied to domestic
shareholders but denied to foreign shareholders constitutes, in effect, an increase in
the dividend withholding tax applied to foreign shareholders. A country under inter-
national rules is free to set that tax at the rate level it chooses. A treaty negotiation,
however, involves a consideration of the rate level of withholding taxes. In this view,
the treaty country not having an imputation system would contend it is entitled to a
lower treaty withholding rate on dividends than the treaty withholding rate specified
for the imputation country.
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on the unilateral approach to prevention of double taxation utilized by a
country, such as the exemption method or the foreign tax credit method. 3 " 7
The lack, as yet, of clear answers to these questions involving the determina-
tion of a normative tax structure in this context indicates the need for more
study. In the meantime, however, treaty negotiations must proceed. Even
though definitive guidelines are lacking, the negotiations should attempt to
distinguish between the issues involving a normative application of a tax pro-
vision and the issues involving a request for the creation of a new tax expen-
diture.
The corporate integration area would seem to be only one example of
how tax expenditure analysis may help to sharpen the thinking on trouble-
some issues in treaty negotiations. The appropriate resolution of the treat-
ment of "non-permanent residents" may be another example—what should
their tax treatment be in comparison, on the one hand, with transients in a
country and, on the other hand, with the indigenous permanent residents or-
citizens of the country. This discussion obviously does not attempt to
catalogue all such possible applications of tax expenditure analysis nor to de-
termine the answers produced by that analysis."" The intent instead is to
indicate the apparent relevance of tax expenditure analysis as a guide to the
solution of troublesome international issues of the character here described.
VII. STATE AND LOCAL
TAX EXPENDITURES
Those concerned with state and local taxes are gradually coming to apply
tax expenditure analysis to such taxes. For example, the budget submitted
annually by the Governor of the State of California has, since the 1975-1976
Budget, contained a list of major tax expenditures effected through the prin-
cipal taxes employed by the State. For 1977-1978, the total of such tax expen-
ditures was over $3.5 billion. The discussion in the Governor's Budget Sum-
mary also reveals a clear perception of the relationship between traditional tax
reform efforts and the tax expenditure analysis. 389
Apart from special tax provisions written in by the states themselves,
many states automatically adopt all or parts of federal tax expenditures. This
result occurs whenever a state bases its income tax on the federal income tax.
Automatic adoption of federal tax expenditures by a state may, of course,
have marked effects on its own fiscal policy and may result in expenditures of
state funds for purposes or in amounts that would never be approved for
direct support by its legislature. A list of these "passive" tax expenditures has
" 7 Ault, supra note 333.
369 See note 44 supra, indicating how tax expenditure analysis is useful in shap-
ing guidelines to determine the qualification of a tax as an "income tax" under the
foreign tax credit provisions.
369 See 1 977-1978 GOVERNOR'S BUDGET SUMMARY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA A-51 to
A-57 (1977). The need for a similar tax expenditure list for Massachusetts has been
recognized and called for by a non-governmental group. See MASS. COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES & MASS. FOUNDATION FOR HUMANITIES AND PUB. POL'IL, TAXES: FAIR OR
FOUL? AN ETHICAL OVERVIEW OF TAXATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 33 (1977).
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been prepared for the State of Colorado."' Other states that have based
their tax system in whole or in part on the federal income tax would be as-
sisted by similar lists in the implementation of their tax and spending policies.
CONCLUSION
During the period from 1976 to 1978, the practical application of the tax
expenditure concept and the theoretical analysis of its implications continued
to expand, both nationally and internationally. Yet, progressive implementa-
tion of the concept requires increased study by tax and budget experts in and
out of government. The task of educating the taxpaying public, and their
elected representatives, to understand both the concept and the effects of tax
expenditures on tax equity and budget efficiency is also an ongoing one.
37° Hildred, Passive Tax Expenditures in State Income Taxes, reprinted in 123
CoNG. REC. S12905 (daily ed. July 27, 1977).
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APPENDIX A*
TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES BY FUNCTION'
(In millions of dollars)
Description
Corporations Individuals
1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979
National defense:
Exclusion of benefits and allowances to Armed
Forces personnel        1,095 1,26(1 1,370
Exclusion of military disability pensions       105 115 120
International affairs:
Exclusion of income earned abroad by U.S.
citizens 	 545 360 385
Deferral of income of domestic international
sales corporations (DISC) 	 945 1,135 1,335 .
Deferral of income of controlled foreign cor-
porations 	 570 615 665
Special rate for Western Hemisphere trade
corporations 	 35 25 15 	
General science, space, and technology:
Expensing of research and development ex-
penditures 	 1,395 1,450 1,520 30 30 30
Energy:
Expensing of exploration and development
costs 	 820 885 965 210 300 300
Excess of percentage over cost depletion 	 1,090 1,120 1,210 305 340 370
Capital gains treatment of royalties on coal 10 15 15 45 50 60
Natural resources and environment:
Exclusion of interest on State and local gov-
ernment pollution control bonds 	 170 220 265 85 110 130
Exclusion of payments in aid of construction
of water and sewage utilities 	 15 10 10
5-yr.	 amortization	 on	 pollution	 control
facilities 	
—80 —130 —45 	
Tax incentives for preservation of historic
structures      5 	 5
Capital gains treatment of certain timber in-
come 	 185 205 230 55 60 65
Capital gains treatment of iron ore
	 5 5 10 5 5 10
Agriculture:
Expensing of certain capital outlays 
	 80 70 75 375 445 460
Capital gains treatment of certain ordinary in-
come 	 10 10 10 330 350 365
Deductibility of noncash patronage dividends
and certain other items of cooperatives 	 455 490 525 —165 —175 —185
Commerce and housing credit:
Dividend exclusion 	 450 475 505
Exclusion of interest on State and local indus-
trial development bonds 
	 195 235 270 95 115 135
Exemption of credit union income 	 70 80 90 	
Excess bad debt reserves of financial institu-
dons 	 535 705 790 	
Deductibility	 of	 mortgage	 interest	 on
owner-occupied homes 	  	 4,490 4,985 5,530
Deductibility of property tax on owner-
occupied homes 	  	 4,205 4,665 5,180
Deductibility of interest on consumer credit 	 1,785 2,120 2,350
Expensing of construction period interest and
taxes 	 475 500 525 150 140 90
Excess first-year depreciation 	 45 45 50 140 145 155
Depreciation on rental housing in excess of
straightline 	 80 70 70 320 300 290
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TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES BY FUNCTION '-Continued
(In millions of dollars)
Description
Corporations Individuals
1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979
Commerce and	 housing credit-Continued
Depreciation on buildings (other than rental hous-
ing) in excess of straight line 	 160 140 130 140 125 115
Asset depreciation range 	 1,955 2,245 2,640 100 115 135
Capital gains (other than farming, timber, iron •
ore, and coal) 	 520 540 575 6,910 7,430 7,990
Deferral of capital gains on home sales 	 890 935 980
Capital gains at death 	  	 7,280 8,120 8,975
Corporate surtax exemption 	 3 875 3,885 3,540
Investment credit 	 8,880 10,735 12,320 2,075 2,390 2,725
Credit for purchase of new homes 	 100 	
Transportation:
Deductibility of nonbusiness State gasoline
taxes    685 760 840
5-yr. amortization on railroad rolling stock	 .. -35 -40 -40 	
Deferral of tax on shipping companies 	 130 105 85 	
Community and regional development: 5-yr.
amortization for housing rehabilitation ... 10 5 5 i 5 10 5
Education, training, employment, and social ser-
vices:
Exclusion of scholarship and fellowship in-
come 	 245 295 330
Parental personal exemption for students age
19 or over        750 770 790
Exclusion of employee meals and lodging
(other than military) 	 280 300, 325
Exclusion of contributions to prepaid legal
services plans        5 10 15
Investment credit for employee stock owner-
ship plans (ESOPs) 	 245 255 305
Deductibility of charitable contributions (edu-
cation) 	 235 255 285 525 585 645
Deductibility of charitable contributions to
other than education and health 	 290 315 350 3,935 4,370 4,855
Maximum tax on personal service income 555 665 800
Credit for child and dependent care expenses 	 475 525 575
Credit for employment of AFDC recipients
and public assistance recipients under
work-incentive programs  15 15 20 	
Jobs credit 	 565 1,475 1,035 125 985 86(}
Health:
Exclusion of employer contributions for medi-
cal insurance premiums and medical care 5,560 6,340 7,225
Deductibility of medical expenses        2,230 2,435 2,655
Expensing of removal of architectural and
transportation barriers to the handicapped 5 10 10 	
Deductibility	 of	 charitable	 contributions
(health) 	 145 160 175 790 875 970
Income security:
Exclusion of social security benefits: Disability
insurance benefits 	 470 550 605
OASI benefits for retired workers        3,790 4,21{) 4,700
Benefits for dependents and survivors        860 950 1,040
Exclusion of railroad retirement system ben-
efits 	 250 265 280
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TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES BY FUNCTION'-Continued
(In millions of dollars)
Description Corporations Individuals
1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979
Income security-Continued
Exclusion of workmen's compensation benefits 	 720 835 970
Exclusion of special benefits for disabled coal
miners        50 50 50
Exclusion of unemployment insurance benefits 
	
1,500 1,200 1,135
Exclusion of public assistance benefits        330 345 360
Exclusion of sick pay        110 75 60
Net exclusion of pension contributions and
earnings:
Employer plans    8,715 9,940 11,335
Plans for self-employed and others 
	
1,390 1,650 1,920
Exclusion of other employee benefits:
Premiums on group term life insurance 860 905 955
Premiums on accident and disability insur-
ance        70 75 80
Income of trusts to finance supplementary
unemployment benefits        10 10 10
Exclusion of interest on life insurance savings 	 1,850 2,025 2,225
Exclusion of capital gains on home sales for
persons age 65 and over        40 70 70
Additional exemption for elderly 
	 1,140 1,155 1,215
Additional exemption for the blind 	 20 20 20
Excess of percentage standard deduction over
minimum standard deduction 	 530 	
Deductibility of casualty losses      320 360 395
Tax credit for the elderly 
	 230 250 255
Earned income credit:
Nonrefundable portion 	 365 285 265
Refundable portion 	 900 945 900
Veterans benefits and services:
Exclusion of veterans disability compensation 	 745 840 830
Exclusion of veterans pensions        35 40 40
Exclusion of GI bill benefits      260 200 170
General government:
Credits and deductions for political contribu-
tions        85 60 75
General purpose fiscal assistance:
Exclusion of interest on general purpose State
and local debt 	 3,105 3,470 3,865 1,725 1,925 2,150
Deductibility of nonbusiness State and local
taxes (other than on owneroccupied homes
and gasoline)  7,660 8,505 9,440
Tax credit for corporations doing business in
U.S. possessions 	 450 485 520
Interest:
Deferral of interest on savings bonds       585 625 670
MEMORANDUM
Combined effect of provisions disaggregated
above:
Capital gains 	 730 775 840 15,555 17,020 18,515
Exclusion of interest on State and local debt. 3,470 3,925 4,400 1,905 2,150 2,415
Deductibility of State and local nonbusiness
taxes 	  	 11,105 12,325 13,680
Deductibility of charitable contributions 
	
670 730 810 5,250 5,830 6,470
All estimates are based on the tax code as of Dec, 31, 1977.
*The Table is from Office of Management and Budget of The United States Government, Fiscal
Year 1979, Special Analyses 158-160 (1078) (Special Analyses G, Table G-1).
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APPENDIX C
LIST AND ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES
TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET ESTIMATES BY FUNCTION
TRANSFER TAXES,'
(Millions of dollars, fiscal years)
FUNCTION 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Agriculture:
Deferral of estate tax payments (farms) $	 2 $	 8 $	 10 $	 12 $	 15
Preferential valuation for real property (farms) 8 9 9 10
Commerce and transportation:
Deferral of estate-tax payments
(closely held business) 2 12 14 1G I S
Preferential valuation for real property
(closely held business) fi 6 7 8
Education, training, employment, and social
services:
Deductibility of charitable
contributions (education) 350 375 400 430 465
Deductibility of charitable
contributions (social services) 260 280 300 320 345
Ileaith:
Deductibility I if charitable
contributions (health) 275 295 315 340 365
Income security:
Exclusion for annuities from qualified
retirement plans 75 80 85 90 95
Failure to tax all generation-skipping
transfers 580 625 670 705 740
Exclusion for life insurance proceeds on
which decedent paid premiums 10 11 12 12 13
Preferential treatment for lifetime gills
(failure to gross-up gills made more
than 3 years before death) 225 240 260 280 300
Orphan's deduction 5
General government;
Exclusion for gills to political
organizations 2 2 2 3 3
Revenue sharing and general purpose fiscal
assistance:
Credit for state death taxes 600 635 670 710 745
Interest:
Bonds redeemable at face value
("flower bonds- ) 125 135 145 155 165
*Estimate.s prepared by Gerald R. Jantscher, The Brookings Institution, Washington. D.C. This
table is fnim Surrey, Warren, McDaniel and Gutman, Federal Wealth Transfer Taxation 884
(1977).
